

ONE YEAR ON

The Foreign Policy of the Enlarged EU An Overview of the New Member States' Contribution to European Foreign Policy

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This paper is the synthesis of a project on the impact of enlargement on European Union foreign policy carried out by CeSPI in 2004 and funded by CeMiSS, Centro Militare di Studi Strategici. The project consisted of ten papers, one for each new member state, addressing a common set of questions. The following is a synthesis of results, largely based on the papers, due to be published in book form in Rosa Balfour (ed.), *L'Europa allargata: come cambia la politica estera europea?*, Soveria Mannelli Rubbettino, 2005 forthcoming. For the purposes of this paper, we have kept footnotes to a minimum: unless otherwise indicated most of the information derives from the country case studies.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The core questions addressed in this paper regard the extent to which the member states are adapting their foreign policies to the EU priorities developed in Brussels, the ways in which they are contributing to the development of the EU as an international player, and the identification of the areas that are most problematised through enlargement.

During the accession process, negotiations on the chapters 26 and 27 of the *acquis communautaire* of the EU's external relations and on the CFSP were amongst the smoothest. More so, the then candidate countries progressively aligned their foreign policy positions to those of the EU. A similar process of alignment with the EU has occurred in the United Nations.¹ They also increasingly 'socialised' to European priorities through NATO, first with the *Partnerships for Peace* and then as members, and by participating in a number of *peacekeeping* missions under the umbrella of NATO, the UN and more recently of the EU. This has led to the expectation that enlargement would not challenge the development of the EU's international commitments and policies, despite the increasing complications of the decision-making mechanisms.

A number of events in 2003-4, however, started to erode this conviction. As is well known, one major intra-European fracture emerged over the US-led military intervention in Iraq in the spring of 2003, with the alignment of Central and Eastern Europe with the US position.² Secondly, the behaviour of some countries during the negotiations on the new Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe proved that the new members were unlikely to become passive recipients of deals struck amongst a few great EU powers. Finally, the new European citizens showed their disaffection towards the EU in the elections to the European Parliament in June 2004.³ The results of the French and Dutch referenda on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe marked another deep crisis over the political project guiding the EU's future development and signalled, according to most interpretations, an 'enlargement fatigue' in the old member states and a disillusionment over the general project of expanding EU membership, though this factor should be considered one of the many European and domestic reasons determining the 'no' vote.

The question raised by these events was the extent to which they were glitches of the enlargement process or whether they represented deeper structural problems of the kind suggested since the early 1990s by the many analysts who feared that enlargement would lead to a weakening of the integration process and a paralysis of decision-making with twenty five members.

At a general level, the challenges of managing enlargement have historically triggered and pushed European integration forward. In 1973 the entry of Great Britain, Ireland and Denmark had led to the creation of the European Regional Development Fund; the accession of Greece and then of Spain and Portugal in the 1980s occurred with the negotiations for the Single European Act; enlargement to Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1995 occurred only after the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union and once the criteria and timetable for the European Monetary Union had been agreed. These four rounds of enlargement neither stalled the process of integration nor did they hamper the development of European Political Cooperation in the 1970s and 1980s and of CFSP in the 1990s. Similarly, the 'big bang' enlargement to ten countries forced European leaders to re-think the EU's institutional arrangements, its *finalités* and *raison d'être*

¹ For an analysis of the pattern of alignment of the candidate countries to EU Statements and Common Positions, see Elfried Regelsberger (2003), 'The Impact of EU Enlargement on the CFSP: Growing Homogeneity of the Views among the Twenty-Five', in *CFSP Forum*, Vol. 1, Issue 3, November.

² In February 2003, the new members of NATO (Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary) signed a declaration supporting military intervention in Iraq alongside some old members of the EU. This position was later followed by a similar statement of the group of candidate countries to NATO – the so-called Vilnius Group that included Slovakia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Croatia and Macedonia.

³ Slovakia experienced a record abstention, with only 16,7% of the electorate bothering to turn up to vote.

through the Convention on the Future of Europe, the 2003-2004 inter-governmental conference and the agreement on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe.

This paper is concerned with the impact of enlargement on the external relations and CFSP of the Union. Overall, this paper argues that contrary to some expectations of a larger and weaker EU, the new member states are contributing to strengthening the EU as an international player, in general as well as through CFSP and ESDP. Enlargement also serves as a motor to strengthen the EU's external policies, as it brings greater awareness of its global responsibilities, expands the areas of direct interest, and adds new expertise on and political ties with a broader range of regions. Indeed, the impact of enlargement has already become visible in a number of important dossiers, especially the Eastern and Southeastern neighbourhoods.

The risks of the enlarged EU are not to be found so much in a hypothetical paralysis due to the increased number of member states but in managing the increased plurality of interests in a harmonious fashion. The negotiations for the budget for 2007-2013 will represent one major hurdle in managing diversity. What shape the EU assume to manage such diversity, especially after the crisis of the Constitution, remains uncertain. However, fragmentation of the EU, or a two-tier EU are less likely scenarios, given the importance that all the new member states attach to the idea of participation, but one can envisage an EU in which groups of member states pursue more vigorously certain policies than others, within or without the enhanced cooperation framework.

2. BRUSSELS'S ROLE IN SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY

To what extent are the new member states changing their foreign policies to harmonise with the priorities and styles developed by the fifteen old members through years of cooperation in Brussels? Of all the new member states, Malta is the only one to have an uninterrupted foreign policy tradition. So long as Cyprus remains divided, the foreign policy priorities of the two entities remain managing relations between the two sides and efforts to strengthen each side's position at the international and multilateral levels. The attempts by the Republic of Cyprus, now represented in the Council, to block direct trade arrangements between the EU and the northern part of the island is a case in point. On the other hand, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are all experiencing a period of foreign policy transition. Throughout the 1990s their efforts were focused almost entirely on integration into the EU and NATO, and the web of relations developed within Central Europe were conducted under pressure from the EU and the OSCE through the 1994 Stability Pact for Europe (discussed below). Only very recently have they started to draft their own specific priorities and to interpret their interests within the European framework.

All the new member states have chosen to attribute considerable importance to Brussels, despite the 2003 divisions over Iraq. This path is seen as the best means to pursue their regional and international interests. The dynamics of "socialisation" initiated through the accession process seem to bear their fruits. Alongside their experience gained through negotiating the *acquis communautaire* with the Commission from 1998 and 2000 onwards, the new EU member states underwent an intense process of transition in particular through a year-long participation as observers within the EU working bodies, upon signing the Accession Treaties in April 2003. Despite the recently regained sovereignty, all the new countries are aware of their limits as an international player, and view their weight as strengthened if they go through Brussels.

In some fields, the new member states were able to persuade their European partners of the importance of a particular dossier: the case of the Ukrainian crisis in November-December 2004 illustrates how Poland and Lithuania in particular managed to ensure that what is their national foreign policy priority (to deepen relations with Ukraine) was transformed into a European priority. As the new Polish Foreign Minister Adam Daniel Rotfeld put it when outlining the country's priorities for 2005, 'the most important objective is to promote our interests and win the support of EU partners for our goals. We have demonstrated that we can be tough campaigners in pursuit of

our goals, without losing sight of the interests of the entire EU. We have not let any one put us in the corner, nor have we sunk into self-isolation. We neither want to – nor should we – move on the margins, or only use the brake, or focus on damage control[...]. We want to be, and are, an active subject of EU policy, with growing influence of the shape of Union decisions’.⁴

Also, the new member states see participation as an added value. If in the Convention on the Future of Europe and in the IGC some countries had surprised partners with firm positions, in the first months of membership they have proven to appreciate the process of negotiation and reaching common ground. More importantly, as we shall see in the following sections, most new member states see participation in EU project *per se* as a goal and fear being left out or becoming ‘second class’ members.

Brussels, however, also means negotiation. It is hard to envisage future patterns of intra-EU bargaining with twenty-five members. Enlargement has certainly altered the balance. In the EU-15 the Franco-German axis still played a crucial role as the engine to integration, despite its decline since the end of the Mitterand-Kohl era. Over the past few years this pattern was modified in certain policy areas, such as defence, thanks to the acceleration promoted by the UK and France with the 1999 St. Malo agreement. This way, Britain was trying to promote its leadership in Europe without participating in all of the EU’s projects. Enlargement puts a rather big question mark on stable patterns of intra-EU cooperation.

In the early 1990s Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, and later the two Republics born from the velvet divorce of 1993, met in Visegrad - for the very first time since the 14th century – and formed an informal consultation group. Even if during the accession process these states privileged overall bilateral negotiations with Brussels, the importance attributed to Visegrad appears to be growing. The four renewed their commitment to the cooperation format shortly after entering the EU,⁵ and have recently agreed to use the group to strengthen their position on issues such as CFSP and the current budget negotiations for the EU’s financial framework for 2007-2013.⁶ Similarly, the Northern member states of the EU - the Scandinavian and Baltic countries – have developed a tradition of cooperation in areas of mutual interest.

Coordinating their positions on select policy issues, however, does not mean that other more *ad hoc* forms of alliances will not take place, given that the overall balance within the EU is shifting, without finding a new configuration. Given the Atlanticism of the new member states (and their views on fiscal policy, to use an example from internal policies) one can imagine a shift in the balance of power towards Britain. But in other fields this new axis is far less visible. The new member states are all due to join the euro, for instance, and have acquired the Schengen *acquis* (even if they are still to become full members).⁷ Indeed, their importance in controlling the external border has been recognised by the rest of the EU by making Poland the host of the EU border agency, and by leaving open the possibility of opening an additional office in Malta.

The most likely scenario is that the new as well as the old member states will prefer opportunist and changing alliances according to the policy area in discussion rather than pursue the consolidation of interest groups. The unexpected alliance between Poland and Spain on the question of voting weight in the Intergovernmental Conference is likely to become more than an isolated event.

⁴ Government information on the Polish foreign policy presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, at the session of the Sejm on 21st January 2005. <http://www.msz.gov.pl>.

⁵ See Visegrad Declaration, Kromeriz, 12 May 2004, available at www.visegradgroup.org/declaration/Visegraddeclaration2004.pdf.

⁶ Andrew Rettman, ‘Visegrad four mull over EU budget strategy’, *EUObserver*, 10 May 2005.

⁷ Though it should be pointed out that the ‘opt-out’ option was not offered to them.

This means that managing diversity will represent the key challenge, especially if the Constitution does not make ratification in all countries. However, the traditionally debated patterns of cooperation, from hard cores to federalism, are ill-suited to the enlarged EU. Opinion polls in the new member states are showing that their citizens, after some disillusionment with the EU in 2003, are becoming increasingly pro-European; overall their governments value participation and integration, also seen as a means to promote their interests; they are important contributors to integration in certain fields; they would all oppose the disintegration of the EU along the fault lines of a hard core and a periphery. Furthermore, the geography of a hard core is hard to find.

The process of europeanisation that is taking place in the new member states does not imply that they will not pursue their own priorities at different levels. The pursuit of specific interests within and without the EU's umbrella occurred with fifteen member and is continuing with enlargement. The Baltic states are joining the Nordic states in promoting in Brussels the Northern Dimension, a cooperation programme that includes all the countries around the Baltic Sea up to Russia in a variety of fields, from the environment and transport to health, welfare and cultural issues. At the same time, the new members will continue pursuing their neighbourhood concerns through other fora available, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea States. This double track is a likely scenario. Budapest, whose long-term concern is the protection of the Magyar communities outside its territory, brought the issue of alleged Serb discrimination and mistreatment of Hungarians in Vojvodina to the European Parliament, and supports enlargement for the same reason. But it will continue to

Cyprus will use its acquired veto rights to condition (although not halt) Turkey's accession process. President Papadopolous has already declared that he has no fewer than 64 opportunities to block Turkey's accession negotiations (i.e., for the opening and closing of each negotiating chapter). The Greek Cypriot government has already used the opportunity of the December 2004 European Council determining the date for the opening of negotiations with Turkey to insist that its consent was conditional upon Ankara's signature of the Customs Union Protocol providing for its extension to the ten new member states including the Republic of Cyprus.

3. THE ENLARGED EU AS A REGIONAL POWER

Enlargement

It is beyond doubt that the enlargement brings with it a strengthening of the EU's policies towards the countries surrounding it. First of all, future enlargements towards Romania and Bulgaria, probably due to accede in 2007-8, and then towards Southeastern Europe, are receiving strong support from the Central European new members, even if Poland and the Baltic states are less keen. Even Slovenia is a strong supporter of Croatia's accession despite some contentious issues with Zagreb; in fact it considers Croatia's entry as the best means to solve them demonstrating how the logic of integration as a form of conflict prevention has reached the new members too. Slovakia, and personally Slovak Prime Minister Mikulas Dzurinda, was one of the most vocal supporters of opening accession talks with Croatia in March. Indeed, the decision to delay the start of Croatia's negotiations in March 2005 due to the country's insufficient cooperation with The Hague in handing in suspects for crimes against humanity was not supported by many of the new members.⁸ Hungary too sees the accession of Serbia-Montenegro, a more distant prospect as things stand now, as the best way to protect its Magyar minority in Vojvodina.

The new members have been involved in EU policies in the Balkans since they were candidate countries, actively participating in all the military and police missions there. The duration of the

⁸ Of the new member states, Slovenia, Hungary, Malta, Cyprus, Lithuania and the Slovak Republic voted in favour of starting negotiations, together with Austria and Ireland.

peace support operations, the number of personnel involved, and the impact of these activities all indicate that the Balkans are a key priority for many of the new member states.⁹ Some countries, such as the Czech and Slovak Republics have invested funds and know-how in the transition towards democracy in the Balkans, also through support of the opposition to Slobodan Milosevic after the NATO intervention for Kosovo. The Bratislava process, for example, was started in 1999 precisely to provide support to the Serbian opposition, and was followed up through the creation of the Bratislava-Belgrade fund for democracy that supports institution-building projects. For the Czech Republic, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and Montenegro are among the top priorities of its diplomacy and for CFSP.

Turkey, however, is a different story. All the new member states are ambiguous towards its accession, even if none of them voiced any strong opposition during the European Council of December 2004 which declared that negotiations with Ankara could start in October 2005. This ambiguity is effectively illustrated by the resolution of the Slovak parliament: 113 out of 150 members of parliament voted in favour of opening negotiation providing that it 'did not entail an obligation for the EU to accept Turkey as a member'.¹⁰ Cyprus could still pose obstacles to Turkey's accession. Even if in December it did not veto opening negotiations, it tied them to the recognition on part of Ankara of the (Greek) Republic of Cyprus, potentially disrupting the reform path undertaken by Turkey.

This reflects a lack of support towards Ankara's advancement towards the EU among the citizens of the new EU member states. Czech NGOs, for instance, have recently started a campaign against Turkish membership, combining arguments on the country's poor human rights record and the treatment of women as well as cultural and religious ones. The Polish President Alexander Kwasniewski has suggested tying Turkey's membership to the offering of accession prospects to Ukraine.¹¹ This position, however, seems to have been recently moderated: at the third summit of the Council of Europe held last spring, Polish Prime Minister Marek Belka stated that: 'Poland and Turkey have similar experiences and a common vision of the European home. Poland wishes to strengthen and develop Europe's integration process and build the security and stability of our continent both in the Euro-Atlantic area as well as throughout all of Eurasia. Turkey's pro-European and pro-Union choice to us is a confirmation of Ankara's strategic and long-term foreign policy. Poland remains Turkey's unfailing ally in its bid for European Union accession'.¹²

The EU Neighbourhood

The European Neighbourhood Policy is the other area that is already being strengthened by enlargement, especially towards the East. The Neighbourhood Policy, initially outlined in 2003 with the Commission's Communication *Wider Europe*,¹³ represents a stabilisation strategy that is intended as an alternative to further enlargements as well as an important innovation in European foreign policy. The heterogeneous countries that surround the enlarged EU includes to the East, Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, and in the Mediterranean all the non-EU involved in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. All these countries share the lack of an accession prospect, at least in the medium-term. The aim of the Neighbourhood Policy is to avoid that the new borders become

⁹ See Annex 7 on the participation of the new member states in EU, NATO, UN and US-led military and policy missions abroad.

¹⁰ Resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, 30 November 2004, www.nrsr.sk.

¹¹ Marcin Zaborowski (2004). 'From America's protégé to constructive European. Polish security policy in the twenty-first century', *Occasional Papers* no. 56, Paris: European Union Institute for Security Studies, Winter.

¹² "Turkey – A Country near to Poland" <http://www.kprm.gov.pl> . On 16-17 May 2005, Prime Minister Marek Belka met in Warsaw the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

¹³ European Commission, *Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM(2003) 104 final, Brussels: 11 March 2003.

a dividing line between ‘ins’ and ‘outs’ and to build with the neighbours an areas of political stability, economic development and security. The ultimate objective is to surround the Union with a ‘ring of friends’, as former Commission President Romano Prodi put it, with whom share ‘everything but the institutions’.

The new member states, while still candidates, had highlighted the importance of developing new strategies especially towards Eastern Europe. In 1998 Poland had proposed the creation of the Eastern Dimension, not dissimilar to the Northern Dimension, and at the end of 2002 had circulated a *non paper*, prepared with the Czech Republic and Lithuania, in the Council of the European Union and in the Commission on these issues.¹⁴ Shortly after the entry of the new member states, the Commission further clarified the main features of the new policy proposals.¹⁵ First of all, the geographical dimension of the Neighbourhood policy was clarified. In contrast with the first Wider Europe Communication, the Western Balkans are not even mentioned – a substantial confirmation that their prospect of EU accession is indeed credible. Russia is included with regard to the possibility of accessing the programmes funded by the EU, especially in the field of cross-border cooperation, but Moscow prefers developing its political relations at the bilateral level. The 2004 Communication also includes the countries of the Southern Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – an important innovation and seems to reveal its long-term thinking, as these countries will border the EU only once Turkey accedes.

The added value of the ENP compared to the previous policy frameworks that governed relations with these countries consists of the introduction of policy documents (Action Plans) that are jointly negotiated with partners, of the use of ‘differentiation’, ie country-by-country discretion allowing those that are more willing to cooperate to receive a better share of the incentives on offer, and the possibility of gradual and increasing sectoral integration into the European market. The Commission is also envisaging a substantial increase in funds to be used to support the ENP, though these still have to be negotiated.¹⁶

The ENP is already receiving support from the new member states, including the Czech Republic – the only one not to have an external border. This is due to a long list of interests and relations of ethnic, cultural, economic, political nature that the new member states have with their neighbours. For the countries of Central Europe, the EU and the OSCE supported during the 1990s the peaceful resolution of disputes through the signature of numerous bilateral and regional treaties and agreements under the aegis of the 1993-94 Stability Pact for Europe, which gave an important contribution to stabilising the whole of Central Europe, setting aside the historical legacy of changing boundaries and empires that characterised the area for centuries.

Some new member states consider, unofficially, the ENP insufficiently ambitious, and its provisions to exercise conditionality too weak. The ENP is indeed an incentives-based policy. If the Action Plans negotiated with the governments of the partner countries state the objectives of political reform to be achieved, more or less based on the Copenhagen criteria that marked the conditions to start accession negotiations, the conditionality regime is by no means clarified and the costs of non compliance are not contemplated.¹⁷ Precisely because the Central European EU member states are examples of the virtuous circle of domestic reform externally supported through

¹⁴ See Dov Lynch (2003), ‘The New Eastern Dimension of the enlarged EU’, in Judy Batt, Dov Lynch, Antonio Missiroli, Martin Ortega and Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, *Partners and Neighbours: a CFSP for a wider Europe*, Chaillot Papers n. 64, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, pp. 34-59.

¹⁵ European Commission, *European Neighbourhood Policy. Strategy Paper*, COM(2004) 373 final, Brussels: 12 May 2004.

¹⁶ For an analysis of the ENP, see Rosa Balfour and Alessandro Rotta (2005), ‘Beyond Enlargement. The European Neighbourhood Policy and its Instruments’, pp. 7-20; Nathalie Tocci (2005), ‘Does the ENP Respond to the EU’s Post-Enlargement Challenges?’, pp. 21-32; and Dov Lynch (2005), ‘The Security Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy’, pp. 33-43, all in *The International Spectator*, Vol. XL, n. 1, January-March.

¹⁷ See Balfour and Rotta (2005) and Tocci (2005).

Brussels's application of political conditionality during the accession process, they would like to see this principle applied in relations with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, alongside a more active engagement in supporting transformation in these countries.

Secondly, some new member states are pushing for a greater EU commitment towards certain countries, notably to the East. The case of the Ukrainian crisis of November-December 2004 illustrates an example of how enlargement has forced certain issues up the EU's foreign policy agenda. The crisis occurred as a consequence of vote rigging and an unfair electoral campaign for the presidential elections that marked the end of the increasingly authoritarian and pro-Russia era of Leonid Kuchma, in power since 1994. The elections were widely, if simplistically, seen as a choice between the West, represented by opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko, and the Russian-supported candidate Viktor Yanukovich. Following the second round of rigged voting, the opposition took to the streets in Kiev, Lviv and other cities, creating what has been called the 'Orange Revolution', the colours of the opposition coalition. The Polish and Lithuanian Presidents Alexander Kwasniewski and Valdas Adamkus were among the first to intervene as mediators between the government and opposition, also pulling the EU's High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana to Kiev. The solution of the crisis and new elections that brought Yushchenko's coalition to power, are also to be attributed to a strengthened role of the new members in defining the EU's external priorities. As Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz put it, it was 'undoubtedly the enlarged Union's success'.¹⁸ Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia immediately started assistance programmes to support the officials working for the new government. Many of new member states, alongside the European Parliament, are likely to support the prospect of integrating Ukraine into the EU,¹⁹ and Yushchenko, in one of his first visits abroad (though his first trip to Russia) to the European Parliament declared that after 2007, when the Action Plan approved as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy will expire, the country will be applying for membership. The possibility of Ukraine's accession to the EU, even if EU leaders for now are maintaining great reserve over this option, will open up an entire new scenario for the Union.

Other countries contemplated in the ENP are also pretty high on the agenda of the new member states. With regard to Belarus, the transborder cooperation programmes envisaged by the ENP will allow countries like Poland and the Baltic states to start building relations with their direct neighbour. The Czech diplomacy also attaches great importance to Belarus and argues that the promotion of human rights there should be a CFSP priority, while at the same time can resort to good links with the country's enfeebled democratic opposition to President Alexander Lukashenka.

The Baltic states have also been active in the Southern Caucasus, also through the OSCE mission that ended in December 2004. Prague too feels strongly about the need for the EU to be active in the Southern Caucasus and to contribute to the resolution of frozen conflicts there. On this basis, the Czech Republic has pressed for the establishment and strengthening of an EU Mission.

If the new member states are keen to deepen and strengthen relations with their Eastern neighbours, the future of relations with Russia is more uncertain. It is somewhat paradoxical that amongst all the new member states, Greek Cyprus is the only one to have a recent uninterrupted history of relations with Moscow, conditioned by the Republic of Cyprus under Archbishop Makarios to use its ties to Moscow (and membership in the non-aligned movement) against NATO member Turkey. During the 1990s all the Central European countries radically shifted their economic and trade interests from East to West and cut down relations with Moscow. Relations between the Baltic states and Russia were dominated by Russian concerns of its minorities there (around one third of the

¹⁸ Breffni O'Rourke, 'EU: Poland Says Ukraine Crisis Proves Merit of EU's New Eastern Members', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 10 December 2004.

¹⁹ Breffni O'Rourke, 'EU: Poland Says Ukraine Crisis Proves Merit of EU's New Eastern Members', *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty*, 10 December 2004.

populations of Estonia and Latvia are Russian) and the ways in which their citizenship rights were protected, the definition of the new states' boundaries, and the retreat of Russia troops from their territory. At best, relations between the new member states and Russia are cold and dominated by a suspicion of Moscow's intentions, also determining the Atlanticism of Poland and the Baltic states.²⁰ The fact that some of the new member states did not participate in celebrations for the end of the Second World War illustrates the extent to which current relations are conditioned by history. Nonetheless, there are some signs that through membership the new EU countries will contribute to strengthening EU policies towards Russia. Lithuania is the only country of the Central European states that has managed to overcome the historical legacy of Russian and then Soviet domination and has negotiated, together with the EU, with Russia a solution to the transfer rights and arrangement for Russian citizens living in Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave now surrounded by the EU. For Poland, membership in the European Union also offers an opportunity to build a new platform of bilateral relations with Russia. As Foreign Minister Adam Rotfeld stated 'We shall spare no effort to make progress in resolving many outstanding problems. A certain experienced Finnish politician advised that one should seek enemies who are far away, and friends who are near. It would be desirable if our two countries were guided by that in their mutual relations'.²¹ No doubt, Poland would like Russia to have the stronger ties with Europe, NATO and the European Union, especially, though not exclusively because of networks of oil and gas pipelines,

This said, there are significant differences of approach between most new member states and some of the old. The new member states have manifested a strong preference for the EU to maintain and develop a focus on the state of democracy and human rights in Russia, of its market economy. They will push for the enforcement of similar standards to those promoted by the EU in the enlargement process and are likely to stand against special deals and the discretion on conditions that the EU has exercised towards its large neighbour. For these reasons, the new member states view with suspicion the bilateral initiatives of Germany, France and Italy towards Russia.

The Mediterranean dimension of enlargement is much weaker than the Eastern one. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) was conceived in the first half of the 1990s to rebalance the EU's expansion towards the North with the 1995 enlargement and to the East. Of the new member states, Malta is the only one to have a tradition of engagement with the Mediterranean and with the Barcelona Process in particular, for example by hosting the diplomatic seminars, a successful partnership building initiative of the political and security 'basket' of the Barcelona Process. Malta will work towards strengthening the EMP, the coherence and the added value of the Mediterranean dimension of the Neighbourhood Policy with the EMP, is supports a number of specific initiatives, such as the integration of Libya in the Partnership (observer since 2000).

Of course, the other countries support the EU's commitments in the region and are beginning to tackle extra-European issues as part of the foreign policy transition that they are undergoing through membership. Hungary, for example, has recently opened diplomatic missions in the Palestinian Territories and in Jordan; now Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland have diplomatic missions in all the Southern Mediterranean countries. Slovenia is set to focus on the parliamentary dimension of the EMP and to the inter-cultural dialogue fund. The Middle East is one area of growing concern among the new member states, and the ties between some of these countries and Israel should not be forgotten. The Czech Republic, for instance, has been developing good relations with both Israel and the Palestinian Authority, has promoted a security agenda through the running of the NATO Contact Embassy in Israel, and sees the CFSP as the best means to coordinate EU support of the peace in the region.

²⁰ Antonio Missiroli (2004), 'The Central Europeans Between the EU and NATO', *Survival*, vol. 46, no. 4, Winter, pp. 121-136.

²¹ Government information on the Polish foreign policy presented by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, Prof. Adam Daniel Rotfeld, at the session of the Sejm on 21st January 2005. <http://www.msz.gov.pl>

Nonetheless, their contribution to strengthening the EU's Mediterranean policies is likely to be modest. Furthermore, as negotiations for the EU budget for 2007-2013 start, the distribution of the funds for the Neighbourhood Policy might well become a testing match to assess the priorities of the member states. The Commission has proposed doubling funds for the European Neighbourhood Programme Instrument with € 14.929m for the 2007-2013²² period - a substantial increase compared to the resources available for the main programmes currently covering the ENP countries for 2000-2006, TACIS (€ 3.138m) and MEDA (€ 5.350m). Should the Commission succeed in security such an increase, it is unclear how these funds will be distributed between East and South.

The enlarged EU therefore strengthens its regional power, even if the Mediterranean is likely to suffer from the shift towards the East. What is to be seen is the balance between the Southern and Eastern dimension. The challenge will be in managing a diversity of increased interests and priorities. Given the option of resorting to enhanced cooperation within the CFSP domain, it is also possible that groups of countries will pursue specific interests within the EU institutional framework but without involving all the member states.

4. THE ENLARGED EU AS A GLOBAL PLAYER

What is more uncertain and complex is the development of the EU as an international actor. Apart from Poland, all the new member states are medium or small sized countries; aware of their limitations, they are all strong supporters of multilateralism as a crucial tool of international politics and have progressively aligned their positions to those of the EU at the United Nations. Poland, however, is 'ambivalent' towards multilateral security institutions, with the exception of NATO.²³ Some countries are seeking international recognition by promoting specific programmes. Slovenia for instance is sponsoring the creation of an international fund for de-mining. This type of activity confirms and strengthens the EU's multilateral vocation.

Development cooperation and relations with the developing world will probably not be significantly enhanced. Most of the new member states are also in transition from being a receiving country to a donor. Budgetary limitations mean that the resources that the new EU member states have so far earmarked for development cooperation are modest, and in some cases disappointing. Their priorities, in the absence of a colonial past, reflect sectoral rather than geographical interests: many countries will focus their assistance on themes such as good governance, the development of local institutions, the promotion of security. Progress on this front, however, is becoming increasingly visible. Under pressure from the EU and from the United Nations Development Programme, the Czech Republic has created the necessary institutional frameworks to manage development aid, has agreed a development aid policy and set specific country priorities.

International relations in general and global security are interconnected themes that require an examination of different issues: the role of NATO in Europe, relations with the United States on the background of the 2003 crisis, the development of CFSP, ESDP and the gradual development of a strategic concept of the European Union in the European Security Strategy.

The 2003 crisis and the alignment of NATO members (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic) and the then NATO candidates to the US position on Iraq opened many question marks on the future of the EU. Enlargement has certainly contributed to the weakening of the Franco-German axis as the traditional motor of integration towards a more Atlanticist position.²⁴ But more structural

²² European Commission (2004), 'Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council laying down general provisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument', COM(2004) 628 final 2004/0219 (COD Brussels, 29 September 2004).

²³ Marcin Zaborowski (2004), p. 9.

²⁴ The accession of Romania seems to strengthen the Atlanticist position within the EU. Its President, Traian Basescu has recently stated that it wants to develop a 'special relationship' with Washington and London, and that, despite France's

issues and other interests also need to be examined. ‘Hungary is our country, Europe our home and the United States our ally’.²⁵ Budapest’s Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány’s sentence illustrates in a nut shell the position of the countries from Central Europe, where NATO represents the link between Europe and the US. With the exception of Cyprus and Malta (which are non-aligned), all the new member states have become members of NATO, with the accession of Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic in 1999 and of the three Baltic states, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania in March 2004.

ESDP

Participation in NATO, first through the Partnerships for Peace and then as members has helped the socialisation of the new EU member states to the Western methods of tackling security affairs, and have contributed with their armed forces to UN, NATO and more recently EU peacekeeping missions.²⁶ NATO continues to be perceived as the key guarantor to security in Europe. This does not hamper ESDP development, supported by most of the new member states. Their commitment to ESDP is, however, moderated by the need to avoid duplication and maintain their transatlantic loyalty and by their limitations in terms of military and budgetary resources, especially as they are undergoing a phase of reform and professionalisation of their armies.²⁷ Generally speaking, some of the new member states support the development of the non-military dimension of ESDP, implicitly preferring a division of labour between NATO (military) and the EU (civilian), between conflict resolution and post conflict reconstruction. Budapest, for example, supports the development of CFSP-ESDP specialised in crisis management and in further defined Petersberg tasks.

Most of the new member states show stable preferences for close cooperation and consultation between the EU and NATO, a position that was reinforced by their experience as a Non-EU European Ally (NEEA) during 1999-2004. There is a strong desire to keep the relationship between the two organisations as transparent as possible, building on the complementarity between them. Their policy supports a pragmatic approach, focused on capabilities rather than institutions. This is also mirrored in the preference for as little duplication as possible and translates into the desire to intertwine defence planning processes in NATO and in the EU as much as possible. The new member states welcomed the Berlin Plus arrangements (to be used for most EU operations), signing a declaration on the strategic partnership between the two organisations in the hope that these can broaden their security dialogue to issues that go beyond crisis management.

At the same time, there is some scepticism on the EU as global security actor. The clear preference that emerges is that the EU becomes an effective actor in and around Europe. The EU is seen as a multilateral actor that develops a special emphasis on crisis management and post conflict stabilisation, fields in which it can bring a vast array of resources and policy tools. The EU should not, however, be built as one of the poles of a multipolar world driven by a desire to counter-balance the US.

A certain degree of attention was paid to the draft of the EU Constitutional Treaty, and the CFSP and ESDP sections were treated very carefully. In particular, the mutual defence clause in the original proposal made by the Convention had, according to the Czech Republic for example, worrying implications for NATO and was strongly contested by the opposition as a concrete example of further integration in the security and defence dimensions of the EU. A clear demand to

traditional support of the country, Bucharest does not appreciate the language expressed by Jacques Chirac in 2003. See George Parker, ‘Romania hits back at French “lecturing”’, *Financial Times*, 18 April 2004.

²⁵ Programme of the Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány,

http://www.mszo.hu/download/dokumentumok/kormanyprogram_2004_2006_magyar.pdf, p. 38.

²⁶ See Annex 7 illustrating the participation of the new member states in military missions abroad.

²⁷ See Annex 6 on defence expenditure in the new member states.

maintain the national veto on these matters was spelt out. The final watered down version of the Constitutional Treaty that dropped entirely the separate clause and the protocol on mutual defence was deemed acceptable. Enhanced cooperation was another thorny issue, where the Central European candidates emphasised the need for the mechanism to be inclusive in character. In the end Poland proved to be more willing to accept the notion of the mutual defence (solidarity) clause than other Central and East European candidates.

The issue of permanent 'structured cooperation' in the defence area was even more complex. Prague was concerned especially with the unclear definition of the entry criteria and the possibility that these criteria became subject to manipulation. The country preferred objective criteria, a higher threshold for the minimum number of member states to launch the structure cooperation mechanism, unanimous decision-making procedures, and the statement of the principle of inclusion. The final version of the protocol that leans towards capability-based criteria, reasonable inclusiveness and assured transparency was therefore considered an acceptable compromise. The Czech government recently declared that it would like to take part in it if it can meet the criteria. One general objective is to remain in the EU mainstream. An important step in this direction was taken when it decided to participate, together with Austria, in the German-led Battlegroup, as was declared during the EU Pledging Conference in November 2004.

Slovakia too plans to allocate the same troops for either a NATO or an EU-led operation, depending on the need, but will thus not be able to offer units for NATO and EU operations simultaneously - it will be an either/or decision. Slovakia will contribute about 150 - 200 people to the EU Battlegroup created together with Poland, Germany, Lithuania and Latvia. This EU Battlegroup should be ready for deployment by 2010 and Slovakia is likely to contribute a mechanized unit, an engineering unit and a protective radiation and biological unit plus transport helicopters Mi-17.²⁸ Poland's attitude towards the idea of flexible integration or closer cooperation amongst a group of bigger members states began to evolve as soon as it became clear that Poland could actually be one of the "ins". Warsaw's view on the idea of a structured cooperation became positive as expectations were raised that Poland could be amongst the élite group of member states launching this initiative. Poland also welcomed the Council's suggestion to create Battlegroups. On 22 November 2004 it was announced that Poland would become the major contributor to a battle group to be formed jointly with Germany, with a smaller troop contribution from Slovakia, to be operational by 2009.

The possibility of an autonomous EU planning cell or even fully-fledged operational EU headquarters was strongly opposed by the Czech military, seen as a step towards undermining NATO and wasting resources on structures and capabilities that are easily available from the Alliance. In the end, the civilian-military cell was seen as a reasonable compromise allowing for the planning of operations where the EU has a comparative advantage.

CFSP and the European Security Strategy

Iraq was a difficult test for the dual loyalty of the then candidate countries. It represented a crisis of credibility in the CFSP. The new EU member states, Poland in particular, have always supported the strengthening of the EU's standing at global level, but within the framework of transatlantic relations. They therefore will push for the two areas to develop together.

The fear of exclusion is a recurring paradigm through which analyse the positions of the new member states (indeed, it regards many old member states too), including on CFSP. The emergence of a *directoire* in security and international matters formed by Britain, France and Germany represents a method that many new member states oppose. The Czech Republic, for example, required consultation prior to the negotiations of the three with Iran, and Poland argued that such trio should have included the High Representative for CFSP. During discussions on the new

²⁸ Slovak Press Agency *TASR*, 21 April 2005.

constitutional treaty, the candidate countries had supported the gradual development of CFSP through consensus-building and the maintenance of the intergovernmental decision-making mechanism. They also supported the empowerment of the EU by giving it a legal personality, the creation of the EU Minister for Foreign Affairs (although reservations were expressed in several countries over the title to be given to the new position) and of an EU diplomatic service, the creation of the European Defence Agency and approved the European Security Strategy, to which they participated in drafting.

The European Security Strategy (ESS) is the EU's first attempt to define its international priorities, its risk assessment and the tools to resort to confront these challenges. Similarly to the US National Security Strategy, the ESS identifies terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures and organised crime as the main threats to global security. But it departs from Washington's view with regard to assessing the intensity of the threats, the hierarchy of priorities, their causes, the ways through which identify solutions, and the tools to address them. The EU emphasis on the root causes of the risks, that include socio-economic causes and the consequences of conflicts, the importance ascribed to multilateralism and the UN as the central forum to address global threats, and the use of force considered only as the last resort to tackle a threat,²⁹ all differentiate the EU as a whole from the US. In other words, the Vilnius-10 might have sided with the US on a the particular question of the Iraqi intervention, but share with the other EU members a security and strategic vision encapsulated in the ESS. In addition the ESS identifies the neighbourhood as the priority area as much as the new member states do.

This said, there still are grey areas and differences in perception. Some new member states, such as Poland and the Czech and Slovak Republics, do not share those doubts that were expressed by many of the 'old' members over the concept of 'pre-emptive action', the phrase that was deleted in the second draft of the ESS and substituted by the concept of 'prevention', considered by many EU member states to be more in line with the activities that the EU has been carrying out since the 1990s. In fact, Warsaw, Prague and Bratislava all partially justified their participation in the Iraqi mission with the principle of pre-emption, even if the Bush Administration's expanded notion was not accepted uncritically. Other arguments in favour of the military intervention were Iraq's flouting of UN Security Council Resolutions and its record of human rights abuse of its own citizens and neighbours. Poland's reasons for joining in, for example, were based on three objectives: to portray itself as 'America's model ally', to preserve the transatlantic relationship and US presence in Europe, and to dispose of a human rights abusing regime.³⁰

When push came to shove over Iraq, and with the EU-15 split fundamentally split over the issue, the Central European countries sided with the US and the pro-US EU member states. The question is whether this signals an important and enduring shift of the EU-25 towards Atlanticism. While the new member states, except for the non-aligned Malta and Cyprus, do have a history of loyalty towards the US, there also are a number of structural elements that need to be considered. All the new member states are small in size and aware of their limits, and thus prefer multilateralism as opposed to the creation of ad hoc coalitions of the willing. They also are all committed to further integration in Europe in military, defence and foreign affairs, provided the national veto is maintained. Finally, they all ascribe great importance to the idea of *participation*; in other words, most of the new member states consider it their interest to participate and thus influence decisions rather than be left out. Finally, one should also consider the impact of one year of accession. Poland illustrates this point: it was one of the countries that had posed most difficulties during the discussions in the Convention, for example, but has moved to a far more constructive position since accession.

²⁹ European Council, *A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy*, 12 December 2003.

³⁰ Zaborowski (2004), p. 12.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Throughout the 1990s enlargement has been a crucial policy through which the EU intervenes abroad to promote security and stability – an alternative to a fully-fledged foreign policy that the EU was lacking. Furthermore, it remains a policy for stability and democracy. Indeed, enlargement represented one of the EU's most successful projects, fundamentally transforming the European continent. Precisely because of its success, the EU has pledged to expand to Southeastern Europe and to Turkey, and to intensify relations with the rest of its neighbourhood, thus radically changing the map of Eurasia. The new member states have much to contribute to this transformation, by promoting further enlargement and developing foreign policies, especially when dealing with the countries on the EU's periphery.

The main conclusions on the impact of enlargement on EU foreign policy can be summarised as follows:

- On the whole enlargement is strengthening the EU despite the fears that decision making at 25 would lead to paralysis. This has so far not occurred. Instead, there seems to be a greater awareness of the EU's responsibilities
- The macro-regional dimension is the area in which the EU is mostly strengthened, albeit with a significant tilt, towards Eastern Europe rather than the Mediterranean basin. Relations with Russia are still marred by the difficulties of historical legacy, though there is scope for improvement. This will also depend on the old member states' priorities.
- The global outreach of the EU is not significantly enhanced. For now, the new EU member states do not have much of an interest in development cooperation and in relations with Latin America, Africa and Asia. It is more likely that there will be competition for resources, with the neighbourhood, especially the Eastern one, privileged.
- At a general level the picture is more complex. The Franco-German axis is certainly weakened, but this does not imply that the new internal balance has shifted towards Britain. On many other themes, the new member states are strong integrationists. The enhanced diversity and the challenges ahead mean that, in the midst of a crisis over the future of Europe, traditional prescriptive models for its development, between a 'Europe of nation states' and federalism, seem redundant, in favour of more flexible and imaginative models of integration.

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ANNEXES

MEMBERSHIP OF THE NEW EU STATES TO THE MAIN INTERNATIONAL AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Malta	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
CBSS			X		X	X		X		
CEFTA		X		X				X	X	X
CEI		X		X				X	X	X
Council of Europe	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
EBRD	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
EEA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
EIB	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IAEA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IFAD	X						X			
ILO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IMF	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IMO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
IOM	X	X	Observer	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
NATO		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
NEA		X		X					X	
OECD		X		X				X	X	
OSCE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
PfP		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
SPSEE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UE	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UN	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X
UNDP	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UNEP	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UNESCO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
UNHCR		X		X				X		
UNICEF		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
WB	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
WEU		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
WHO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
WTO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

MAIN TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS SIGNED BY THE NEW UE MEMBER STATES

	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Malta	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia	
UN	Charter of the United Nations*	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	
	Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees	D	D	A	A	A	A	A	D	D	
	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination	R	D	A	R	A	R	R	D	D	
	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights	R	D	A	R	A	A	R	D	D	
	Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women	A	D	A	R	A	A	A	D	D	
	Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	R	D	A	R	A	A	A	D	A	
	Convention on the Rights of the Child	R	D	A	R	A	A	R	R	D	
	Convention on climate change	R	Ap	R	R	R	R	R	R	Ap	R
	Geneva Conventions and their additional protocols										
		R	D	A	R	A	A	A	R	D	D

		Cyprus	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Malta	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
OSCE	Charter of Paris for a New Europe	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
	Convention on Conciliation and Arbitration within the OSCE	R	R		R	R	R	R	R	R	R
	Treaty on Open Skies		R		R				R	R	
	Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
COUNCIL OF EUROPE	European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
	Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
	European Social Charter	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
	CCWC**	A	D	A	R	A	A	A	R	D	D
IAEA	Biological weapons convention	R	D	A	R	A	A	R	R	D	R
	Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	R	D	A	R	A	A	R	R	D	R
	Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
	Chemical Weapons Convention	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R

	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Lithuania	Latvia	Malta	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court	R	-	R	R	R	R	R	R	R	R
Kyoto Protocol	A	Ap	R	A	R	R	R	R	R	R

NOTES:

Ap: APPROVAL - A: ACCEPTANCE - D: SUCCESSION - R: RATIFICATION - S: SIGNED

*Among the new EU Member States, Poland is an original Member of the UN, while the other countries were admitted later in accordance with Article 4 of the Charter and the "Declarations of acceptance of the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations".

** CCWC: Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects.

THE TEN NEW MEMBER STATES: VITAL STATISTICS

1. MAIN MACRO-ECONOMIC INDICATORS – 2003

	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Malta	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
GDP at current prices (mln euro)	11645.1	80096.5	8042.1	73213.0	9868.1	16271.0	4332.5	185175.5	28822.4	24576.4
Real GDP growth rate (%) at constant prices (1995)	1.9	3.7	5.1	3.0	7.5	9.7	-0.3	3.8	4.0	2.5
% of GDP – Value added in: Agriculture	-	3.8 (2002)	5.4	4.3 (2002)	4.5	7.3	-	3.1	3.7	3.1 (2002)
Industry	-	39.6 (2002)	30.1	31.2 (2002)	24.4	33.9	-	30.7	29.7	36.2 (2002)
Services	-	56.7 (2002)	64.5	64.5 (2002)	71.0	59.0	-	66.1	66.6	60.7 (2002)
Inflation rate (%)	4.0	-0.1	1.4	4.7	2.9	-1.1	1.9	0.7	8.5	5.7
Total unemployment rate (%)	4.5	7.8	10.2	5.8	10.4	12.7	8.0	19.2	17.5	6.5
Public balance (% of GDP)	-6.4	-12.6	3.1	-6.2	-1.5	-1.9	-9.7	-3.9	-3.7	-2.0
General government consolidated gross debt (% of GDP)	70.9	37.8	5.3	59.1	14.4	21.6	71.1	45.4	42.6	29.5
Total external debt (% of GDP)	38.4	40.8	75.2	53.1 (2002)	91.9	46.0	-	34.0	56.3	-

Sources: Eurostat, World Bank (World Development Indicators database August 2004), IMF (International Monetary Fund's Dissemination Standards Bulletin Board - DSB), Offices for National Statistics.

2. MAIN SOCIAL INDICATORS – 2003

	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Malta	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
Population (thds)	715.100	10.203.000	1.356.000	10.142.400	2.331.500	3.462.600	397.300	38.218.500	5.379.200	1.995.000
GDP per capita (PPS: purchasing power standards) EU-25=100	81.3	68.8	48.7	60.5	41.0	45.8	75.1	46.0	52.1	76.8
Private final consumption expenditure (mln euro)	7424.7	40764.1	4553.1	40026.8	6220.5	10564.9	2635.3	122281.3	15943.8	13376.0
Population growth (annual %)	21.2	0.8	-4.0	-2.5	-5.3	-4.8	6.5	-0.7	0.2	0.7
Total fertility rate (%)	1.46	1.18	1.35	1.30	1.29	1.25	1.40	1.24	1.17	1.22
Life expectancy at birth (years)	76.1	72.1	65.3	68.4	64.8	66.3	75.9	70.4	69.9	72.7
Persons in employment avg (1000)	-	4731.3	592.5	3969.3	997.0	1441.8	-	13616.8	2061.8	892.8
Adult literacy rate (% ages 15 and over)	97.6	99.9	99.8	99.4	99.8	99.6	93	99.8	99.7	99.7
% of the pop. aged 20 to 24 having completed at least upper secondary education	82.2	92.0	81.4	85.0	74.0	82.1	43.0	88.8	94.1	90.7
Internet users 2002	210.000	2.600.000	444.000	1.600.000	310.000	500.000	82.880	8.900.000	863.800	750.000
Passenger cars (per 1000 inhabitants) 2001	370	344	298	244	249	326	497	272	240	444

Sources: Eurostat, World Bank (World Development Indicators database August 2004), IMF (DSBB), Offices for National Statistics.

3. MAIN COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS – 2003

	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Malta	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP)	49	67.5 (2002)	96.2	67.6 (2002)	56.9	59.9	89.0	26.4	79.5	59.7
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP)	43.1	65.2 (2002)	84.0	65.4 (2002)	47.0	53.9	87.8	21.0	78.0	59.7
World										
Competitiveness Indicator* (USA=1)	n.d.	43 (35)	28 (22)	42 (34)	n.d.	n.d.	n.d.	57 (55)	40 (46)	45 (40)
Avg of inward and outward FDI flows (% of GDP)	5.8	1.6	5.8	2.4	1.5	0.6	3.3	1.0	1.1	2.2
Avg hourly labour costs (Euro) – 2002	9.91	5.39	3.67	–	2.39	2.90	–	5.27	3.59	–
CPI score 2004**	5.4 (36)	4.2 (51)	6.0 (31)	4.8 (42)	4.0 (57)	4.6 (44)	6.8 (25)	3.5 (67)	4.0 (57)	6.0 (31)
Democracy ratings***	n.a.	2.00	1.50	1.25	1.75	1.75	n.a.	1.50	1.50	1.50
Electoral process										
Independent media	n.a.	2.25	1.50	2.25	1.50	1.75	n.a.	1.75	2.25	1.75
Governance	n.a.	2.25	2.25	2.50	2.25	2.50	n.a.	2.00	2.25	2.00
Constitutional, Legislative and Judicial Framework	n.a.	2.50	1.75	1.75	2.00	1.75	n.a.	1.50	2.00	1.75

Sources: Eurostat, World Bank (World Development Indicators database August 2004), IMF (DSBB), Offices for National Statistics, Transparency International, Freedom House.

* IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook 2004 - (Positions in brackets show the 2003 overall rankings for the new EU Member States).

** Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2004 – CPI Score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts and ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt); Positions in brackets show the new EU Member States rankings in global index.


*** Freedom House, Nations in Transit Ratings 2004 – The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest level and 7 the lowest level of democratic development.

EUROBAROMETER 2004 - PUBLIC OPINION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION


Support for a common defence and security policy By country (%)			
Country	2003	2004	Difference
POLAND	73	79	+6
BULGARIA	75	79	+4
CYPRUS	87	91	+4
HUNGARY	79	82	+3
NMS	76	79	+3
ROMANIA	76	79	+3
MALTA	51	54	+3
EU 15*	70	72	+3
SLOVENIA	76	78	+2
ESTONIA	76	77	+1
CZECH REP.	79	78	-1
SLOVAKIA	83	82	-1
LATVIA	80	77	-3
LITHUANIA	75	70	-5
TURKEY	58	46	-12

	Elements of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Change in affirmation over time % of tend to agree and differences					
	EU 15			NMS		
	Autumn 2003	Spring 2004	Diff.	Autumn 2003	Spring 2004	Diff.
The EU should guarantee Human Rights in each member state	76	79	+3	74	80	+6
The EU should work to guarantee Human Rights around the world	74	76	+2	65	67	+2
The EU should have a common immigration policy towards people from outside the EU	71	71	0	66	68	+2
The EU should have a common asylum policy towards asylum seekers	71	70	-1	67	68	+1
EU foreign policy should be independent of United States foreign policy	73	77	+4	76	75	-1
Member states which have opted for neutrality should have a say in EU foreign policy	47	50	+3	49	48	-1
When an international crisis occurs, EU member states should agree a common position	81	81	0	84	83	-1
The EU should have a rapid military reaction force	69	70	+1	74	72	-2
The EU should have its own Foreign Minister, who can be the spokesperson for a common EU position	63	64	+1	63	61	-2
The EU should have its own seat on the United Nations Security Council	64	65	+1	66	62	-4

Support for „European Army”




Decision-making regarding European defence policy




Fieldwork: June-July 2003
Publication: September 2003

Role in maintaining peace in the world, the EU vs. the US sorted by the difference between EU and US % „positive role”



Fieldwork: June-July 2003 - Publication: September 2003


Support to a common defence and security policy among European Union member states



Fieldwork: October - November 2004 - Publication: December 2004

Role played by the European Union - % "Positive"

■ Peace in the world □ The fight against terrorism



**Fieldwork: October-November 2004
Publication: December 2004**


What is your opinion on each of the following statements? Please tell me for each statement, whether you are for it or against it.

Option: One common foreign policy among the member states of the European Union, towards other countries

Answers: For

Country Results	
Belgium	82%
Slovenia	81%
Germany	80%
Greece	80%
Cyprus	78%
Poland	78%
Slovakia	75%
Luxembourg	74%
Spain	73%
Italy	72%
The Netherlands	72%
Austria	72%
Latvia	71%
Lithuania	71%
Estonia	70%
EU25	69%
France	69%
Hungary	69%
Ireland	62%
Finland	61%
Denmark	60%
Czech Republic	59%
Portugal	58%
Sweden	52%
Malta	50%
United Kingdom	47%

Candidate Countries Results	
Romania	75%
Croatia	71%
Bulgaria	69%
Turkey	54%



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RESULTS OF THE REFERENDA FOR EU ACCESSION

	Date	Yes (%)		No (%)		Turnout (%)
		No referendum on membership				
Cyprus						
Czech Republic	13-14 June 2003	77	23			55
Estonia	14 September 2003	66.9	33.17			63.4
Hungary	12 April 2003	84	16			46
Latvia	20 September 2003	67	32.3			72.5
Lithuania	10-11 May 2003	91	9			63
Malta	8 March 2003	54	46			91
Poland	7-8 June 2003	77	23			59
Slovakia	16-17 May 2003	92	6			52
Slovenia	23 March 2003	90	10			60

Sources: European Commission, National Electoral Commissions

RESULTS OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT ELECTIONS IN THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES (10-13 JUNE 2004)

	Turnout (%)	EPP-ED	PES	ALDE ADLE	The Greens EFA	EUL/NGL	IND/DEM	UEN	N.A.	Total seats in the EP	Distribution of votes in the Council of the EU
Cyprus	71.2	3		1		2				6	4
Czech Rep.	28.3	14	2			6	1		1	24	12
Estonia	26.8	1	3	2						6	4
Hungary	38.5	13	9	2						24	12
Latvia	41.3	3		1	1			4		9	4
Lithuania	48.4	2	2	7				2		13	7
Malta	82.4	2	3							5	3
Poland	20.9	19	8	4			10	7	6	54	27
Slovakia	16.9	8	3						3	14	7
Slovenia	28.3	4	1	2						7	4

Sources: European Parliament, Eos Gallup Europe, Council of the EU

EPP-ED: Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats.

PES: The Socialist Group

ALDE/ADLE: Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for

Europe

The Greens/EFA: Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance

EUL/NGL: Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left

IND/DEM: Independence/Democracy Group

UEN: Union for Europe of the Nations Group

N.A.: Non-attached Members

COMPARISONS OF DEFENCE EXPENDITURE AND MILITARY MANPOWER IN THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES (31.12.2002 - constant 2000 USD).

	Total (US\$ m)	USD per capita	% of GDP	Numbers in armed forces (‘000)	Estimated reservists (‘000)	Paramilitary (‘000)
Cyprus	227	245	2.4	10.0	60.0	0.1
Czech Republic	1,401	136	2.1	49.4	20.0	4.7
Estonia	93	68	1.6	5.5	2.4	2.6
Hungary	1,083	110	1.8	33.4	90.3	14.0
Latvia	141	60	1.8	5.5	14	3.2
Lithuania	233	63	1.8	13.5	25	13.8
Malta	25	62	0.7	2.1	n.a.	n.a.
Poland	3,400	88	1.9	163.0	234	21.3
Slovakia	439	81	2.0	26.2	20.0	4.7
Slovenia	311	156	1.5	9.0	20.0	4.5

Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, OUP, 2003

PARTICIPATION OF THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES TO THE MAIN ESDP AND NATO OPERATIONS

	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Malta	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
ESDP Operations	DRC/Artemis*	X			X					
			X		X	X		X	X	X
	EUPOL	X	X					X		X
	EUPM	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X
	ALTHEA		X	X	X	X		X	X	X
NATO Operations	ISAF		X	X	X	X		X	X	X
	Operation Allied Harmony		X		X			X		
	KFOR		X	X	X	X		X	X	X
	SFOR		X	X	X	X		X	X	X
Multinational Force in Iraq		X	X	X	X	X		X	X	

Sources: Council of the EU, NATO, National Ministries of Foreign Affairs, National Ministries of Defence, SIPRI Report 2004, The Military Balance 2004

NOTES:

ESDP OPERATIONS:

DRC/Artemis: EU Military Operation in Democratic Republic of Congo (12 June 2003 – 1 September 2003).

EUFOR(Fyrom/Concordia): EU Military Operation in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (31 March 2003 –15 December 2003).

EUPOL/Proxima: European Union Police Mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (15 December 2003).

EUPM: European Union Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1 January 2003).

EUFOR/ALTHEA: EU Military Operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina (2 December 2004).

NATO OPERATIONS:

ISAF: International Security Assistance Force – Afghanistan.

Operation Allied Harmony - Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (ended on 31st March 2003).

KFOR: NATO Kosovo Force – Kosovo.

SFOR: NATO Stabilization Force – Bosnia-Herzegovina (ended on 2nd December 2004).

PARTICIPATION OF THE NEW EU MEMBER STATES IN THE MAIN UN PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS

	Cyprus	Czech Republic	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Malta	Poland	Slovakia	Slovenia
MINURSO				X				X		
MONUC		X								
UNAMSIL		X						X	X	
UNDOF								X	X	
UNFICYP				X					X	
UNIFIL								X		
		X						X	X	
UNMIK		X		X		X		X	X	X
UNOMIG		X		X				X		
UNTSO			X						X	X

Sources: SIPRI Report 2004, The Military Balance 2004, UN Missions Offices of Information and Press, National Ministries of Defence

NOTES:

- MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara.
- MONUC: United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo.
- UNAMSIL: United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone.
- UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force – Camp Four, Golan Heights.
- UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus.
- UNIFIL: United Nations Interim force in Lebanon.
- UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea.
- UNMIK: United Nations Mission in Kosovo.
- UNOMIG: United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia.
- UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organisation – Egypt/Israel/Lebanon/Syria.