

**MIGRACTION EUROPA**  
Periodical analysis bulletin on migration policies in Europe

**SPECIAL ISSUE**

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**“MORE DEVELOPMENT FOR LESS MIGRATION”  
OR “BETTER MIGRATION FOR MORE DEVELOPMENT”?  
Shifting priorities in the European debate**

**1. "Tackling root causes of international migration": a misunderstanding?\***

The idea that we should foster at-home development, in order to stop migration or, in a slightly more sophisticated version, to reduce migration pressure, is certainly not new.

But this simple and attractive idea has experienced a revival in Europe, since the historical twist in Western European migration policies, at the beginning of the 1970s.

For some leftist political forces, the slogan "Let us help them at home" was a nice way to conciliate old *tiermondiste* attitudes and new protectionist stances, quickly adopted by trade unions in most European countries, when faced by recession in the early 70s.

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But the same slogan was also appealing to the right, as a way to dissimulate nationalistic, eurocentric and xenophobic temptations under a respectable form of universalist altruism.

This kind of demagogic discourse was in fact often used, although in a totally abstract and instrumental way, both by the Lega Nord in Italy and the Front National in France, as well as by other right wing movements during the 80s and early 90s.

But we cannot reduce the "root causes approach" to such hypocritical forms of political rhetoric. There is certainly much more to it. There is a technocratic version of the same approach, which is certainly far more respectable and which has produced much more substantial consequences.

In the documents of the Commission, for instance, we find since the late 80s the notion that migration policies should not operate only downstream, but should instead incorporate a close consideration of the "push factors" and try to influence them, to mitigate them.

This was very clear and prominent by 1994, in the Communication by the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament on the immigration and asylum policies (COM(94) 23).

This sort of progressive, technocratic version of the "root causes approach" spread rapidly during the 90s and it brought, as a ripe and valuable fruit, some of the key concepts of the Tampere Conclusions.

It is perhaps worth quoting one of the most often cited passages of that declaration, which remains indeed as a landmark in the history of migration policies in Europe:

\* Revised version of a presentation made by Ferruccio Pastore at the Cicero Foundation International Seminar for Experts on "European Migration and Refugee Policy: New Developments" (Rome, 14 November 2003).

"The European Union needs a comprehensive approach to migration addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit. This requires combating poverty, improving living conditions and job opportunities, preventing conflicts and consolidating democratic states and ensuring respect for human rights, in particular rights of minorities, women and children. To that end, the Union as well as Member States are invited to contribute, within their respective competence under the Treaties, to a greater coherence of internal and external policies of the Union. Partnership with third countries concerned will also be a key element for the success of such a policy, with a view to promoting co-development" (Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Point 11).

In these lines, the "root causes approach" reaches such a width that migration policy seems almost to incorporate the whole of development policy and, indeed, the whole of European external action.

What is particularly important to stress is that, during those years, the "root causes approach" starts to apply not only to economic push factors, but also to political ones. As a matter of fact, the golden years of the "root causes approach" were also the rising years of the doctrines of conflict prevention, peace-keeping and peace-enforcement. And indeed, both the decision to establish a "no-fly zone" in Northern Iraq, in 1991, and that of creating "safe havens" in Bosnia a couple of years later, and also the decision to trigger "Operation Alba", in Albania, in 1997, were influenced, more or less deeply, by the undeclared aim to contain forced migration.

In some cases, these applications of the "root causes approach" to actual or potential forced migration flows were successful (it was the case with the Albanian crisis in 1997) without prejudice of the protection obligation. In other cases, as in Srebrenica, the same approach was a tragic failure.

## 2. The re-discovery of the "migration hump"

We will not dwell here upon the *political* version of the "root causes approach", and upon the linkage between conflict prevention (and/or conflict resolution) and asylum policies.<sup>1</sup> Our main focus is rather the policy treatment of the linkage between

<sup>1</sup> A seminal writing on this aspect is J. Thorburn, *Root Causes Approaches to Forced Migration: Part of a Comprehensive Strategy? A European Perspective*, "Journal of Refugee Studies", vol. 9, no. 2, 1996.

economic development and migration and it is on this specific ground that the "root causes approach" quickly demonstrated its fundamental limits.<sup>2</sup>

As soon as policy-makers turned to researchers for advice, they were told that economic and social development do indeed affect mobility, but not in the way they first thought, or hoped.

As a matter of fact, during the last decade, demographers, economists and sociologists were increasingly vocal in reminding policy-makers that - since the Industrial Revolution in Western Europe - development *increases mobility*, both social and geographical. And the simultaneous increase in economic productivity, social complexity and mobility (both internal and international) can last for very long. In the Italian case, for instance, more than a century passed since when Italy entered massively the global migration circuits, right after our national unification (1861), to the reversal of Italy's migration balance, from negative to positive, sometime in the early 1970s.

The curve which shows the increase first and then the decrease of outwards mobility at the growth of national economic productivity is often labelled as "migration hump". Whoever is the scientific "father", or "mother", of this nice expression,<sup>3</sup> it is undisputable that the degree of policy awareness of the formula and of the underlying phenomenon has been growing very rapidly during the last few years. As a result, the somewhat naive cognitive framework that we have termed "root causes approach" has been gradually abandoned in favour of a more sophisticated approach, that we could define instead as a "migration hump approach".

In its balanced, although very preliminary, Communication on Migration and Development, which was issued exactly one year ago, the European Commission fully adopted this new approach.<sup>4</sup> The paradigm shift was influenced and

<sup>2</sup> For an overall critique: S. Gent, *The Root Causes of Migration: Criticising the Approach and Finding a Way Forward*, Working Paper N. 11, Sussex Centre for Migration Research, available on [http://www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/publications/working\\_papers/](http://www.sussex.ac.uk/migration/publications/working_papers/).

<sup>3</sup> Among the first to use the concept, to our knowledge, are P.L. Martin, & E.J. Taylor, *Managing Migration*, in Zolberg, A.R., & Benda, P.M., "Global Migrants, Global Refugees", Berghahn Books, New York, 2001.

<sup>4</sup> The full title of the document is: *Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Integrating migration issues in the European Union's relations with Third Countries - I. Migration and development - II. Report on the*

partially driven by an in-depth study that was promoted under the Danish Presidency in the previous months.<sup>5</sup>

What emerges from these recent developments is a policy approach that takes international mobility as an unsuppressible dimension of development, not just a "side effect", but more deeply a *fundamental facet*, one might even dare say an *essential condition*, for economic and social development.

In this new conceptual framework, the strategic aims of the external dimension of migration policies change deeply.

On the one hand, we have an ever more complex, costly and integrated system of migration control, which remains the most visible and pressing priority. But on the other hand, a central goal becomes to manage mobility, in order to maximize its positive impact in terms of development, or co-development, if one wishes to use the neologism that was successfully introduced in the debate by the French, in the mid-1990s.

*This does not mean that root causes do not interest any more.* Indeed, as the European Council concluded in Seville (21-22 June 2002), "an integrated, comprehensive and balanced approach to tackle the root causes of illegal migration must remain the European Union's constant long-term objective" (Seville European Council, Presidency Conclusions, Point 33). One could say that the idea to "tackle root causes" remains, but it fades in the misty regions of "long-term objectives."

Incidentally, it is worth stressing here how peculiar and partial is the notion of root causes which dominates most European debates. The roots of migration seem, by definition almost, to dig exclusively in the ground of the countries of origin. Root causes seem to identify with what old migration theories call "push factors". We still talk too little in Europe of another powerful set of root causes, which operate here, in large European cities.

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*effectiveness of financial resources available at community level for repatriation of immigrants and rejected asylum seekers, for management of external borders and for asylum and migration projects in third countries*, COM/2002/0703 final, 3 December 2002.

<sup>5</sup> N. Nyberg Sørensen, N. Van Hear & P. Engberg-Pedersen, "Migration-Development Links project": *Final papers and reports*, Danish Institute for International Studies (<http://www.diis.dk/>), Copenhagen. All the materials are available on

<http://www.cdr.dk/ResTHEMES/conflict/migdevfinal.htm>. Revised versions of the studies were published in *The Migration-Development Nexus*, Special Issue 2, "International Migration", Vol. 40, No. 5, 2002.

The reference is made to such mighty and structural pull factors, such as the growing share of "black labour" in European economies and the massive migration impact of European agricultural protectionism.

To go back to the main thread of this short paper, if one had to summarize in as slogan the ongoing "copernican turn" in the Migration&Development debate at European level, one could say that from a "More Development for Less Migration" logic, we are moving to a logic of "Better Migration for More Development". In other words, the *mot d'ordre* seems to be not any more "Development instead of migration" but rather "Migration for development".<sup>6</sup>

### 3. Linking migration and development in practice

What we have described until now belongs to the remote realm of intellectual foundations of politics and partly to the more close and familiar one of political rhetoric. Let us try now to turn to actual policies and see what is currently being done, in practice, in order to link, or better to influence the linkage between migration and development.

The picture here becomes much more intricate and fuzzy. A lot is happening, at different levels, but we know little about this new wave of policy dynamism.

Many policies on M&D, as a matter of fact, remain at the stage of pilot projects, micro-initiatives, or even mere declarations. And on what is actually implemented there is a dramatic lack of impact evaluation and overall assessment.

One could nevertheless try to give a very rapid overview of recent developments at different institutional levels (from the local, to the supra-national).

In some countries, like Italy and Spain, where *decentralised cooperation* is a rather vital and powerful reality, an important role in linking migration and development policies is played by local and regional governments.

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<sup>6</sup> For an updated overview on the ongoing debate, see the *Anniversary issue on Migration and Development* of "Migration Information Source", <http://www.migrationinformation.org/whatsnew.6.03.cfm>. With a regional focus, see also: G. Hugo, *Migration and Development: A Perspective from Asia*, IOM Migration Research Series, No. 14, November 2003, available on:

<http://www.iom.int/iomwebsite/Publication/ServletSearchPublication?event=detail&id=2835>.

Given the persistent importance of the local dimension in contemporary migration processes (even in a context of intense globalisation), this sub-national level in M&D policies is quite promising. This is true in spite of a number of very serious structural limits, among which the lack of coordination among regional and local governments and their lack of human resources to manage effectively activities in the M&D sector.<sup>7</sup>

Then, obviously, we have a number of initiatives at the national level, in several Member States. Here again, the picture is too fragmented and too little known, in order to make a general assessment. But in order to bring some order in this broad and moving picture, a fundamental distinction can be drawn between three basic policy attitudes that can be observed at national level.

A) In the first place, we have a "*purist*" attitude, in those countries in which national development agencies are firmly and strongly committed to universal goals, such as poverty reduction, and therefore tend to refuse any confusion of roles with migration policy aims.

This seemed to be the case, until recently, in Scandinavian countries as well as in the UK (at least, as far as the DFID was concerned) and elsewhere. Now things may be changing (in Denmark, for instance, the shift is particularly evident, due to major changes on the domestic political scene), and indeed the shift to a "Migration for development" approach could facilitate new policy convergencies.

B) The second attitude that can be singled out could be termed "*instrumentalist*". Within this framework, development goals are generally linked, if not subordinated, to migration control goals.

One could think, for instance, of the early versions of French programs on *co-développement*, which did not go beyond a limited number of assisted repatriation for irregular African residents.

<sup>7</sup> A broader analysis of the actual and potential role of sub-national governments in linking development cooperation and migration management can be found in the background materials for the Conference on "Interregional Partnership and Migration Policies" (Italian Presidency of the EU & Regione Puglia, Bari, 23-24 October 2003) and particularly in P. Mezzetti, A. Rotta, A. Stocchiero, *Il ruolo delle Regioni nelle politiche di co-sviluppo nel Mediterraneo e nei Balcani*, and in T. Caponio, *Il ruolo delle Regioni nelle politiche di accoglienza e integrazione dei migranti*; both studies were coordinated by F. Pastore and are available on <http://www4.regione.puglia.it/quiregione/avviso.php?op=modload&name=conferenza.htm>

We do not want to say here that any instrumental connection between development and migration control is illegitimate, blamable or inopportune. On the contrary, in certain cases migration law enforcement cannot be successfully implemented *but* by coupling repressive with preventive and development tools. Mass expulsions from European countries, as they are increasingly performed today - as mere deportations without any kind of aid to economic and social reinsertion - are a very clear example.

The only requirement, with such instrumentalist M&D programs should be to declare explicitly their instrumental nature and not try to "sell" them as altruist policies. Otherwise, they can badly backfire. C) Finally, one can single out a third attitude, that we will call "*mobility-friendly*". Such attitude inspires all programs and projects that take for granted a certain degree of mobility and - consistently with a "migration hump" cognitive framework - try to maximize the positive impact of such mobility in terms of development.

An interesting example of such approach is given by IOM's MIDA (Migration for Development in Africa), a broad framework-programme which is implemented autonomously in a number of destination and origin countries.<sup>8</sup> In 2003, an Italian MIDA was launched, which is aimed at mobilising financial and human resources of Sub-Saharan communities in Italy in order to promote local development in the source areas. The program is still at an exploratory stage, and it is too early to make a result assessment. But in our typology this sort of program certainly marks a distinct and relatively new type of approach.

#### 4. EU policies on M&D: credits and shortcomings

So, this is what happens at national level. What is going on then at EU level?

In broad policy documents, such as the M&D Communication of December 2002, we find a very rich and promising blend of all three attitudes:

- *purist*, because it is clearly stated that migration control goals should not pervade the whole of EU development policy;
- but we have also a very clear *instrumentalist* drive, as for instance when the Commission, picking up a policy model from Italy and Spain,

<sup>8</sup> For a general description, see: <http://www.iom.int/mida/>.

thinks of *European legal immigration quotas*, as a mobility tool to mitigate illegal migration pressure;

- finally, in the Commission's doctrine, which is still very much at an embryonic stage - we should not forget this - we also find a growing space for *mobility-friendly* proposals, i.e. proposals that view mobility as an essential resource for development.

We will come back on this latter conceptual drive in EU policy-making. But it is useful to say first a few words on actual policy moves, on practical and also financial policy choices that are made at European level. This is needed because the strategic menu is indeed very rich (although not yet clear and detailed enough), but the real agenda is much less advanced. And this can be said both a) from the methodological and b) from the substantial point of view.

a) *As for the method*, whatever policy which aims at affecting the structural linkage between M&D cannot be but a negotiated policy, bilaterally or multilaterally.

On the contrary, it seems almost paradoxical to remind that the very first official experiment in a targeted M&D approach at EU level - which is the High Level Working Group on Asylum and Immigration - was vitiated by a *rigid unilateralism*.<sup>9</sup> Now, fortunately, this is not any more the case. But nevertheless, a permanent forum for in-depth policy-oriented migration dialogue with most regions of origin of migration flows to Europe still does not exist. In the meantime, and quite paradoxically, for some regions, as in the Mediterranean basin, we witness a mushrooming of dialogue initiatives, that are nevertheless insufficiently and unclearly linked with actual policy-making circuits.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> For an excellent analysis, see: J. van Selm, *Immigration and Asylum or Foreign Policy: the EU's Approach to Migrants and Their Countries of Origin*, in S. Lavenex & E. M. Uçarar, Eds., "Migration and Externalities of European Integration", Lexington Books, Lanham-Boulder, New York-Oxford, 2002.

<sup>10</sup> The most comprehensive, but unfortunately not very productive, forum for migration dialogue remains the Euromediterranean partnership. Also the recent Euro-Med Conference of Naples (2-3 December 2003) touched upon migration issues, but without making substantial steps ahead: see the Presidency Conclusions, Point 61,

[http://www.ueitalia2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/D33FB0C7-4B19-4F4D-B9FB-1003734AC339/0/1202ConclusionsEuromed\\_EN\\_.pdf](http://www.ueitalia2003.it/NR/rdonlyres/D33FB0C7-4B19-4F4D-B9FB-1003734AC339/0/1202ConclusionsEuromed_EN_.pdf).

Besides the Barcelona Process, a sub-regional dialogue limited to Western Mediterranean is conducted within

In spite of recent improvements, a rigid and unilateralist approach to migration issues is still very much alive in the European polity, as was demonstrated by the confuse but worrying debate on the use of *negative conditionality* and of *financial sanctions against uncooperative source countries*, which was held last year during the Sevilla European Council.

b) Also at the *substantial level*, the European Union's M&D strategy is still rather unbalanced and incomplete.

Let us have a quick look at the overall reconstruction of "financial resources programmed for external aid 2000-2006 and linked to the migration issue" (Heading 4 of the financial perspective), which is a very interesting annex to the already-cited December 2002 Commission's Communication.<sup>11</sup>

Of 934 million Euros allocated altogether for migration-related purposes, almost half, namely 442 millions, are spent for the "management of migration flows". (This latter category including "management of borders", "combating illegal immigration" and generic "migration management" programs which cover, for instance, voluntary return of immigrants or institution building in the field of migration policies).

Furthermore, these 442 million Euros are added to the smaller but not irrelevant Community budget invested in migration controls under Heading 3 of the financial perspectives (which is available for "internal affairs")<sup>12</sup>.

Next to these 442 millions for migration control, we have 274 millions for the so-called Relief, Rehabilitation and Development Programs (RRD), targeting refugees and other displaced persons, and only 121 millions for all other kinds of development programs in source countries.

All these calculations may be (to some extent) disputable, as it is often questionable how to label specific projects, which are most of the time multi-sectorial and quite articulated. But still, the relative

the so-called 5+5 initiative (more information is available on: [http://www.iom.int/en/know/dialogue5-5/rabat\\_en.shtml](http://www.iom.int/en/know/dialogue5-5/rabat_en.shtml)). Furthermore, in the past two years, ICMPD (International Centre for Migration Policy Development, based in Vienna) has managed a Mediterranean dialogue on transit migration with Commission funding (budget line B7-667; <http://www.icmpd.org/default.asp?nav=news&folderid=1&id=279>).

<sup>11</sup> See below, Annex 2 at page 7.

<sup>12</sup> See below, Annex 1, p. 7.

magnitude of the large budget sections that we have mentioned is very telling and - we believe - unsatisfactory.

The temptation to centre the external dimension of EU migration policy on large investments in border controls in a belt of buffer States situated around Europe is a very strong temptation, and it is also particularly worrying, as most of these external agents of EU migration controls are certainly not reputed for their embedded liberalism. So, the risk is that, without a tight net of human rights conditionality, the external dimension of EU migration policy will be reduced to a large scale *outsourcing* of police functions to some dubious and unaccountable "guardians of the gate".

### 5. Towards transnational partnerships for regulated mobility and co-development?

To come to a conclusion, if what we have described is the current state of EU policies on M&D, where should we aim next?

Some of the trends that have been briefly illustrated are certainly promising, and they should be pursued with more energy and consistency: we refer primarily to the shift from a unilateralist to a negotiated approach to M&D policies, in the relations with transit and origin countries.

At least equally important is the gradual upgrading of the financial resources available for EU migration policies (both internal and external).

Although still at a too slow pace, this process has already started, but it will enter its decisive phase only in 2007, with the opening of the new financial perspectives, that will have to fit a Union enlarged at 27, 28 or maybe more.

But the most important trend emerging at EU level, that now needs to be turned into practice, is the conversion from a "Development instead of migration" to a "Migration for development" approach.

In the new *neighbourhood policy*, that is currently being worked out by European institutions, this positive linkage between mobility and development seems to be established. The long-term vision of the Euro-Mediterranean basin as a political space where partner States share "all but institutions" - as the Commission's President has repeatedly summarized his grand strategy - points out at a future where unrestricted circulation of goods, capitals, ideas *and persons* could be the real engine of co-development, as it was indeed in the case of integration between Mediterranean and Atlantic Europe, during the last half-century.

In this new neighbourhood framework, the economic, political and cultural fractures - that we call "root causes of migration" - would gradually heal. And migration would gradually evolve into welcome and free mobility.



Previous issues are available on CeSPI's website ([www.cespi.it](http://www.cespi.it)).

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The MigraCtion Programme has just ended its first two years of activity. The 2004 edition of the programme is now being planned.

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**Annex 1 - EU FINANCIAL RESOURCES AVAILABLE FOR POLICIES ON ASYLUM, IMMIGRATION AND MANAGEMENT OF EXTERNAL FRONTIERS 1998-2003 - Heading 3 of the Financial Perspective (Internal Policies)**

Title	Budget heading	Outturn 1998	Outturn 1999	Outturn 2000	Outturn 2001	Budget 2002	PDB 2003
European Refugee Fund	B5-810 (1998-99: headings B3-4113, B7-6008 and B5-803)	26 559 894	34 918 413	25 500 270	34 404 166	45 810 000	40 000 000
Eurodac	B5-812			7 428 048	1 158	1 100 000	1 000 000
European Migration Monitoring Centre	B5-814					1 400 000	2 600 000
Integration of nationals of non-member countries	B5-815						3 000 000
Training, exchange and cooperation programmes in the fields of justice and home affairs (Odysseus, Argo)	B5-820	3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000	3 000 000
<b>TOTAL</b>		<b>29 559 894</b>	<b>37 918 413</b>	<b>35 928 318</b>	<b>37 405 324</b>	<b>51 310 000</b>	<b>49 600 000</b>
<i>Emergency measures in the event of mass influxes of refugees - reserve</i>	<i>B5-811</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>0</i>	<i>10 000 000</i>	<i>10 000 000</i>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>29 559 894</b>	<b>37 918 413</b>	<b>35 928 318</b>	<b>37 405 324</b>	<b>61 310 000</b>	<b>59 600 000</b>

**Annex 2 - EU FINANCIAL RESOURCES PROGRAMMED FOR EXTERNAL AID 2000-2006 AND LINKED TO THE MIGRATION ISSUE - Heading 4 of The Financial Perspective**

		Community budget	EDF	Total	%
<b>Management of migration flows</b>	Management of borders	321 971 760	0	321 971 760	34.5%
	Combating illegal immigration	65 042 256	2 720 000	67 762 256	7.25%
	Management of migration flows	51 367 336	1 250 000	52 617 336	5.63%
<b>Total management of migration flows</b>		<b>438 381 352</b>	<b>3 970 000</b>	<b>442 351 352</b>	<b>47.34%</b>
<b>General JHA programmes</b>		<b>96 500 000</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>96 500 000</b>	<b>10.33%</b>
<b>Link between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD)</b>	Refugees and displaced persons	42 750 000	37 688 000	80 438 000	8.61%
	Voluntary return of refugees from other third countries	157 018 459	36 591 000	193 609 459	20.72%
<b>Total LRRD</b>		<b>199 768 459</b>	<b>74 279 000</b>	<b>274 047 459</b>	<b>29.33%</b>
<b>Development (sources of emigration)</b>		<b>71 569 477</b>	<b>50 000 000</b>	<b>121 569 477</b>	<b>13.01%</b>
<b>GRAND TOTAL</b>		<b>806 219 288</b>	<b>128 249 000</b>	<b>934 468 288</b>	<b>100.00%</b>
		<b>86.3%</b>	<b>13.7%</b>	<b>100.0%</b>	