

European migration policy on Africa

Trends, effects and prospects

1. The reshaping of the European migratory field: opening to the East and closure to the South?

The subject of this policy paper is European migration policy in respect of Africa - understood as the outcome of action by the European Union and that of its Member States. In the following pages, we will briefly outline the current trends in European migration management in relation to the African continent, as well as the effects and prospects for renewal of this set of policies.

In order for it to remain grounded in reality and thus prove useful for operational purposes, any such reflection must begin with a careful analysis of current migration trends. From this point of view, it would seem that the fundamental point from which to begin is the profound reshaping of the European migration landscape which started at the end of the 1980s and is still in progress.

The last two decades have seen a partially divergent development of European migration policy strategies towards the migration basins located respectively to the East and the South.

Even if with great hesitance, the European Member States have in part been able (whether temporarily or permanently) to accommodate forced migration flows resulting from very dramatic transition processes in the western Balkans. In more recent times, the EU Member

States have decided - tentatively and with internal differences even here - to gradually open up to human mobility and migration from the eastern part of the continent, first with the progressive abolition of visa requirements for citizens of EU membership candidate countries (initially the CEEC and later, since 2002, Bulgaria and Romania) and subsequently with the recognition of freedom of movement (even if with varying degrees of consistency and for the most part deferred by means of transition periods) to citizens of the new Member States¹.

This hesitant and gradual but real openness to flows from the East of the continent has been accompanied - and often counterbalanced in the political rhetoric used internally - by a growing closure to potential flows from the South. There has been a progressive reduction of European access opportunities, the product of a structured set of measures which range from the extension of visa requirements (even for short stays) to citizens of all African States² to the extraordinary stepping up of immigration controls on the basis of a strategic and operational "concentric circles" model which we will come back to shortly (see Heading 3 below).

This reorientation of migration policy strategy - and more generally of foreign/external policy - has produced and continues to produce important consequences. Measuring the

¹ A further important signal of the propensity, even if limited, to openness of the European Union to population movements from the East is represented by agreements facilitating the grant of visas to Russian citizens, signed by the EU with Russia on the occasion of the 17th EU-Russia Summit (Sochi, 25 May 2006).

² Cf. Regulation (CE) no. 539/2001 of the Council of 15 March 2001 and subsequent amendments. The exceptions to this extended application of visa requirements to African citizens intending to

travel in Europe are the inhabitants of territories located on the African continent or surrounding islands which, however, belong politically to European States; they are: Mayotte and Réunion (belonging to France); Madeira (Portugal); Saint Helena (the United Kingdom); and the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla (Spain). It is worthwhile recalling, in this regard, that these enclaves - when they are not too geographically remote - themselves represent significant poles of attraction for migration flows.

demographic interchange of Europe with the continental areas that surround it with accuracy is an endeavour that is rendered extremely difficult by the current levels of efficiency and comparability of international migration process statistics-gathering systems. Nevertheless, some indicators relating to southern Europe – which today represents the main area of attraction and the most important area of arrival of migration flows on a continental scale – indicate that the implicit “open to the East/closed to the South” strategy is producing wide-ranging effects.

See, for instance, Tables 1 and 2 which contain

the ranking of nationalities most represented in the two most significant immigrant regularisation programmes carried out in Italy in 2002 and in Spain in 2005. In both cases, African nationalities ranked marginally, with the partial exception of Morocco which, however, has lost the top placing that it often held in the past (with reference to Italy, see Table 3).

Table 1: Nationalities most represented (by numbers of applications) in the Italian immigrant regularisation programme of 2002

Romania	142,963
Ukraine	106,633
Albania	54,075
Morocco	53,746
Ecuador	36,591
China	35,647
Poland	34,270
Moldova	31,102
Peru	17,390
Egypt	15,946
Total	700,033

Source: E. Zucchetti (ed.), *La regolarizzazione degli stranieri. Nuovi attori nel mercato del lavoro italiano (The legalization of foreigners. New actors in the Italian labour market)*, Franco Angeli, Milan, 2004, pp. 28-2.

Table 2: Nationalities most represented (by numbers of applications) in the Spanish immigrant regularisation programme of 2005

Ecuador	139,714
Romania	118,298
Morocco	85,969
Colombia	56,652
Bolivia	47,202
Bulgaria	25,549
Argentina	23,848
Ukraine	22,209
Pakistan	15,069
China	13,120
Total	690,679

Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Balance del proceso de normalización de trabajadores extranjeros. Solicitudes presentadas a las 21 h. del 7 de mayo de 2005 en las Oficinas de la Seguridad Social (*Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, Results of the legalization process of foreign workers. Applications presented as at 9pm on 7 May 2005 at the Office of Social Security*) - http://www.mtas.es/balance/Proceso_norm.pdf.

Table 3: Mediterranean nationalities in subsequent Italian regularisation programmes (as a percentage of the total of the top 12 national groups)³

	1986	1990	1995	1998	2002
Morocco	26.3	22.4	14	11	7.4
Tunisia	8.4	12.1	4.2	2.6	
Yugoslavia (and resulting States)	6.2	4.1	3.8	2.7	n. a.
Egypt	3.8	3.5	3.3	4.4	2.4
Albania		1.1	12.2	18	7.4
Algeria			3.1	1.5	

Source: Giuseppe Sciortino on the basis of data from the Italian Home Office.

Another significant indicator relating to Italy is the number of visas granted by Italian diplomatic and consular posts (see Table 4). While the regularisation figures provide guidance on the

composition of irregular flows, the data relating to visas indicates that even the opportunities for legal access to Italy are heavily skewed against the African continent.

Table 4: Entry visas to Italy – Distribution by geographical area of request

	2001	2002	2003	var % (03/02)	2004	var % (04/03)
Europe	542,989	483,765	512,320	6%	538,339	5%
North and South America	61,842	64,467	65,608	2%	70,499	7%
Mediterranean and Middle East	128,867	106,911	114,616	7%	123,928	8%
Sub-Saharan Africa	51,102	47,372	50,003	6%	58,663	17%
Asia and Oceania	162,285	151,020	132,327	-12%	192,070	45%
Total	947,085	853,535	874,874	3%	983,499	12%

Source: Il Ministero degli Affari Esteri in cifre, *Annuario Statistico (The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in figures, Statistical Annual)* 2005, p. 181, http://www.esteri.it/ITA/6_40_222.asp.

Given that migration pressure from (both Mediterranean and sub-Saharan) Africa can hardly be considered in decline - given the overall widening in economic, security and population gaps (see Table 5 and, in rather more detail, the background paper of Mencarini), one

should rather assume that it is on the rise - the most plausible interpretation of this data is that the western European migration space is effectively closing to the South and opening up to the East.

³ The loss of relative importance of flows from Morocco over total flows does not, however, only relate to Italy. While in 2000, Moroccans were the top-ranking national group in relation total immigration flows to European countries belonging to the OECD (with 96,000 legally-registered entries), in 2004 they slipped to

third placing (despite an increase in absolute terms which saw them registering 121,000 entries), after Romania (196,000 registered entries) and Poland (169,000 entries). See OECD, *International Migration Outlook. Annual Report. 2006 Edition*, Paris, 2006, p. 33.

Table 5: Comparison of the population size of Africa and Europe (as a percentage of global population, 1800-2050)

	1800	2000	2050
Africa	8	13	20
Europe	20	12	7
World population (in billions)	1	6	

Source: P. Martin, Migration, in B. Lomborg (ed.), *Global Crises, Global Solutions*, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 448.

This reshaping of the European migratory field is not the product of a united and consistent political strategy, but rather of a series of choices and measures adopted at various levels and in successive periods which, nevertheless, have unfolded and continue to unfold effects which are, for the most part, convergent⁴. Nor does the recent trend of selective openness to skilled and highly-skilled migration flows by traditional immigration destination countries (the United Kingdom, Germany and, lately, France), who for decades remained rather closed to economic migration of a non-seasonal nature, conflict with the picture painted above. Indeed, from an African development-oriented point of view, such selective openness represents more of a risk of

future brain-shortages (especially for the most lagging countries and those that are smaller in size) than any possible benefit (of supposed *brain circulation*)⁵.

Even a casual glance at the long-term prospects clearly indicates that a migration landscape of this kind is bound to face sustainability problems in the medium to long-term. As we will see more clearly in the concluding section of this paper, an approach of gradual openness of European labour markets to African migration seems essential for the purposes of an overall strategy of sustainable management of human mobility in the African continent.

⁴ Such large scale effects are not just the consequence of choices made by public actors, but also of spontaneous preferences expressed by employers in the sectors of labour markets where migrant workforce is more represented. In Italy and in Spain, for instance, there seems to be a widespread preference on the part of employers that operate in illegal work sectors (from agriculture to construction and from domestic help to the hospitality industry) towards European workers to the detriment of non-European (and especially African) workers, who also make up the supply side. This type of preference, in relation to which there is a dearth of quantitative evaluations, must at least in part be attributed to ethno-cultural factors which can undoubtedly cross over into ethnic prejudice, including of a racist nature.

⁵ Over the course of the last decade, these widespread concerns, associated with the theoretical awareness of significant potential, have considerably revived the interest of the major international organizations in the topic of skilled-worker migration and the brain drain. See, for instance, the vast research programme

commissioned by the International Labour Organization (ILO) entitled "Skilled Labour Migration (the 'Brain Drain') from Developing Countries: Analysis of Impact and Policy Issues": <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/protection/migrant/projects/skillmig/index.htm>.

The data on skilled-worker migration is incomplete and not easily pieced together. Nevertheless, important efforts in this direction are being made by both the OECD (with its dataset on "Emigration rates for highly educated persons by country of birth" within the database on immigrants and expatriates: http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,2340,en_2649_33931_34063091_1_1_1_1,00.html), and the World Bank (with its "database on skilled migration"): http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTRESEARCH/EXTPROGRAMS/EXTKNOWLEDGE/CHANGE/0,,contentMDK:20244690~menuPK:499487~pagePK:64168182~piPK:64168060~theSitePK:491543,00.html#International_Migration).

2. The “comprehensive approach” and persistent imbalances in European migration policy

It is since its foundation with the Treaty of Maastricht that the European Union has exercised functions relating to immigration and asylum. However, for about a decade now (following the approval of the Treaty of Amsterdam), the European Union has officially pursued the objective of a rather innovative (at least on paper) common migration policy compared to the tradition of its member States.

Summarizing the characteristic and innovative aspects in brief, this common policy may be described as:

a) balanced, i.e. capable of balancing restrictive and controlling measures with actions supporting legal mobility and the integration of migrants;

b) comprehensive (another key term in the official language of European institutions in this field), that is, capable of comprehending the migration phenomenon in all its complexity and dealing with it using a variety of mechanisms (internal and external, controlling and safeguarding, etc.) by means of an inter-institutional and interdisciplinary approach. The important Conclusions of the Presidency of the extraordinary European Council of Tampere (October 1999) spoke, for instance, of a “comprehensive approach to migration

addressing political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions of origin and transit”. The Hague Programme, adopted by the Heads of State and Government in November 2004, confirms this approach, calling for “a comprehensive approach, involving all stages of migration, with respect to the root causes of migration, entry and admission policies and integration and return policies” (doc. 14292/1/04 REV 1, p. 16);

c) proactive, that is, not limiting itself to reacting to current migration trends, but acting even on their root causes, and at the same time enhancing the positive impact of human mobility; and

d) negotiated and consensual, i.e. not unilateral, but based on dialogue, negotiations and a search for convergences and common interests with the States of origin and transit of the migration flows.

In reality, however, the common European policy has encountered considerable difficulties in shaking off the prevailing approach at the level of its Member States, which often manifests itself in an opposite manner, that is, as biased towards restrictiveness and weighted towards controls (by way of example in relation to Italy, see the data contained in Table 6), sectoral, reactive and essentially unilateral.

Table 6: Resources allocated by the Italian State for migration policy purposes⁶

	2002	2003	2004
Resources allocated for the purposes of countering illegal immigration	65,469,100	164,794,066	115,467,102
Resources allocated for the purposes of immigrant reception assistance and support to integration	63,404,004	38,617,768	29,078,933
Total	128,873,104	203,411,834	144,546,035

Source: Corte dei Conti, 2005, Programma di controllo 2004, Gestione delle risorse previste in connessione con il fenomeno dell’immigrazione, (*Italian Court of Accounts, 2005, Control Programme 2004, Management of forecast resources in connection with the immigration phenomenon*) by Cons. V. Chiarotti, Cons. S. Martelli, pp. 7-8; see also the Control Programmes for 2002 and 2003.

⁶ This Table relates solely to the activities of State administrations; the activities of the Regions and local authorities are not included despite their importance especially in the area of integration policies. The overall financial impact of the sub-national dimension of such policies is, however, difficult to establish, since the related activities are not easily distinguishable from social policies as a whole. A second caveat relating to the Table concerns the fact that the activities of State administrations, which in addition to their

general aims also play a role in the specific aims of migration policy, are likewise not included in the Table (for instance, it is almost impossible to establish, at an aggregate level, what share of general expenditure for activities relating to the maintenance of public order and the fight against crime goes towards the specific goals of countering clandestine immigration and people smuggling).

As far as the so-called “external dimension” of European migration policy is specifically concerned, in recent years it has come to be defined and reinforced through intense dialogue between institutions (particularly the Commission and Council, with an increasing role being played by the European Parliament more recently). At first, this very important dimension of common migration policy was essentially characterized as an external projection of the policy field traditionally called Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)⁷. Only recently has Brussels’ “external migration policy” been enhanced by a more significant component of development cooperation and other EU external action instruments⁸.

Despite these important policy and programming developments, at an operational level the control

component in European migration policy remains predominant. This becomes clear when looking at the distribution of finances for the 2007-2013 period, during the course of which period a large increase in resources allocated to building “an area of freedom, security and justice” (where the “internal dimension” of migration policy belongs) is envisaged: from 637 million euro in 2007 to 1,661 million euro in 2013 according to the Multiannual Financial Framework⁹. In this context, according to the proposals of the Commission that are currently being discussed in the Parliament and the Council, the principal items of expenditure under Heading 3a (Freedom, Security and Justice), which correspond to as many multi-annual programmes, should be the following:

Table 7: The principal items of expenditure of European migration policy for the period 2007-2013

Programme	Allocations (in millions of euro)
External Borders Fund	1,820
European Fund for integration of third-country citizens	825
European Refugee Fund	699.3
European Return Fund	676

Source: European Commission, Q&A on the legislative package of EU programmes for the financial programming period 2007-2013, MEMO/06/213.

It is evident that despite the important rebalancing efforts undertaken with the establishment of the integration fund, slightly less than 2/3 of these allocations are destined for migration law

enforcement agencies and activities.

On the other hand, as far as the external dimension of European migration policy is concerned, distinguishing expenditure geared to

⁷ Among the earliest significant programming documents, see the document entitled “Priorities and objectives of the European Union for external relations in the field of Justice and Home Affairs” (doc. 7653/00), annexed to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of Feira (19-20 June 2000) and, more recently, the Communication of the Commission on “A strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice” COM(2005) 491 final, 12 October 2005.

⁸ This widening of perspective appears evident starting from the Communication entitled “Integrating migration issues in the European Union’s relations with third countries” (COM/2002/703 final, 3 December 2002). Over the last year, the search for synergies between development cooperation policy and the external dimension of migration policy has become a particularly marked tendency: see the Communication of the Commission on “Migration

and Development: Some Concrete Orientations” (COM(2005) 390 final, 1 September 2005) and the Communication entitled “Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court” (COM(2005) 621 final, 30 November 2005). See also the Conclusions of the Council on “Migration and External Relations”, adopted during the session of 21 and 22 November 2005 (doc. 14172/05), and especially the important Annex I to the Conclusions of the Presidency of the European Council of 15 and 16 December 2005 (doc. 15914/1/05 REV 1, “Global Approach To Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean”).

⁹ See European Commission, Statement of Estimates of the Commission for 2007 - Document I – Expenditure analysis by multiannual financial framework headings, SEC(2006) 531 final, p. 47.

control objectives and expenditure for other purposes is a rather more complicated exercise. For instance, within the sums that the Commission intends to allocate in 2007 to

cooperation with third countries in the area of immigration and asylum, there is not an *a priori* distinction based on the aims of such cooperation (see Table 8).

Table 8: The external dimension of EU migration policy – Proposals of the European Commission for 2007

Heading	Appropriations 2007	
	Commitments	Payments
Cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum — Activities under horizontal and geographical coverage of the European Neighbourhood Policy instrument (ENPI)	22.897.000	6.000.000
Cooperation with third countries in the areas of migration and asylum — Activities under horizontal and geographical coverage of the Development, Cooperation and Economic Cooperation Instrument (DCECI)	23.347.000	6.000.000

Source: European Commission, Statement of Estimates of the Commission for 2007 - Document IV – Figures by budget line, SEC(2006) 531 final, p. 61.

The debate on how to allocate what are, in any case, meagre finances is still in its initial stages. What may be highlighted at this stage is the substantial equivalence between the sums allocated for cooperation on migration with countries belonging to the “neighbourhood belt” on the one hand, and with the group of developing countries on the other. It is certainly understandable that countries situated in the area of proximity might be privileged as areas of origin of migration flows that are still significant and, above all, as a necessary area of transit for more far-reaching migration flows headed towards Europe. Nevertheless, one might ask if the sums that the EU intends to allocate to cooperation on migration with the group of developing countries are sufficient, even if just in terms of setting truly significant experimentation initiatives in motion.


3. The “outsourcing” of migration controls to Africa: trends and issues

Since the advent of the Schengen system (that is, the second half of the 1980s), whose approach still profoundly influences migration policies of (and within) the EU, the European approach to migration controls has been inspired by a

“concentric circles” model.

The strategic decision to abolish systematic controls on movements of people (and goods) across internal borders of the common space, operated under the Schengen Treaty and later, by way of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997, adopted at the European Union level, has in fact brought about a radical rethinking of the forms of traditional security controls (and of migration controls in particular).

Under the converging thrusts of European integration and globalization, a security model for the most part hinged on inter-State borders as frontlines entrusted with responsibility of control has been abandoned in favour of an approach that is rather more complex. The scope and modes of control have been diversified and multiplied, in two main directions: towards and towards the outside, away from national borders. Only the external border of the Schengen/EU area of free movement has retained and indeed increased in its strategic importance for the purposes of internal security. In relation to the specific field of migration controls, this has progressively resulted in a model that we can define as one of “concentric circles” and which it may be worthwhile setting out here in a simplified diagrammatic form:



¹⁰ Namely, controls entrusted to third parties (public or private) by the State in whose primary interests it is for such controls to be carried out.

Africa today is perhaps the main area of application of this migration control model. This complex and flexible paradigm has seen its greatest development in Africa in relation to current and potential migration movements from that continent. This overall assessment is based on three levels of considerations:

- in the first place, the Mediterranean is currently one of the world's maritime areas in which migration controls are more intense and sophisticated (including from the point of view of forms of international cooperation that are being experimented: the growing role in this field of FRONTEX, the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, is a case in point)¹¹;
- secondly, migration law enforcement has these days risen to a privileged (even if contested) cooperation field in relations between the European Union (and its Member States) and the States of Mediterranean Africa; and
- finally, relations between the European Union and its Member States, and the States of sub-Saharan Africa (and particularly the Sahelian region, with Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Senegal being currently in the frontline) are becoming a field of intense experimentation for that second level of delegation of government functions in relation to human mobility, which represents the latest evolutionary frontier of the concentric circles migration control model.

The growing trend of "outsourcing" by Europe of migration controls to Africa is today at the heart of a large debate and heated controversy. From the perspective within the policy community of those who are professionally involved in

migration controls, a central concern is obviously that of the effectiveness of this strategy and thus that of identifying the most efficient political-institutional structures and methods in this area. We will return to this issue under the next heading. For now, we would like to dwell briefly on the impact of the externalisation strategy, particularly considering three levels of consequences that generate concern and debate well beyond the confined realm of those engaged in this field of work:

- the impact of outsourcing migration controls on human rights (and, in particular, on the right of asylum);
- the impact of outsourcing migration controls on the internal political organization of African States; and
- the impact of outsourcing migration controls on international, political and economic relations within the African continent.

The first aspect has for a while been the subject of a wide and heated debate. It is indisputable, as has been repeatedly stated by authoritative NGOs and institutions, among which the European Parliament itself¹², that the current migration management outsourcing practices in Africa do not, in many cases, contain adequate guarantees for the rights of migrants, especially in relation to the prohibition on forced repatriation. The Regional Protection Programmes, on which EU action relies to alleviate this serious and structural inconsistency in its external action, are still at the stage of being studied and, in any case, have a limited geographic coverage (with Tanzania being the first area of experimentation in Africa).

In relation to the second aspect, the growing phenomenon of transit migration towards EU territory has given new strategic importance to

¹¹ See, in particular, the agreement reached in Madrid on 29 May 2006 between representatives of eight Member States (Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom), the European Commission and the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union (FRONTEX) for the purpose of operational cooperation in support of the Spanish authorities patrolling the waters between the western African coast and the Canary Islands (cf. European Council on Refugees and Exiles, *ECRAN Weekly Update*, 1 June 2006).

¹² See, recently, the Report of the European Parliament (A6-0158/2006, by Richard Howitt, approved by a very wide majority at the June 2006 session) on the Annual Report of the EU on

Human Rights adopted by the Council on 3 October 2005. In the report, the Parliament "reiterates that the EU's internal policies must not simply be consistent with, but must be exemplary in their compliance with, international human rights law; expresses concern in this respect that current migration management measures do not always, in practice, safeguard access to protection for refugees; calls on the Council and the Commission to ensure that migration management does not become a condition for development cooperation with third countries, and that the pilot Regional Protection Programmes remain protection-oriented, are well-resourced and long-term, are fully coordinated with EU humanitarian and development policies, and are based on the principle of international solidarity" (Point 98).

certain African (especially Sahelian) countries which are generally characterized by particularly low levels of human development and good governance. This new strategic importance has favoured unprecedented forms of cooperation and attracted European (and, in general, western) funding. Such funds have been directed mainly towards state organization sectors in these countries that are in charge of internal and external security policies. This asymmetric inflow of resources, if not monitored and accompanied by adequate checks and balances, risks reinforcing centralizing, autocratic and oligarchic tendencies that are unfortunately already very much present in the political systems of these countries. Moreover, the establishment of restrictions on intra-African mobility resulting from European pressure generates opportunities for corruption and extortion on a vast scale which, if not combated, may contribute to a deterioration of administrative and governmental practice in the relevant African countries.

The third set of negative effects which migration control outsourcing measures may produce is at the level of international relations, both of a political and economic nature, within the African continent. As far as the political dimension is concerned, it is important to highlight that the emphasis - legitimately placed by the international community (and the EU in particular) - on the high priority to give to international mobility controls, may nevertheless translate into a cause of tension and even international conflict. A particularly delicate example is provided by the relations between Rabat and Algiers, on which the migration issue has recently had a negative impact, generating additional tensions fuelled by mutual accusations of laxity in controls over transit flows, unauthorized forced accompaniments to the border and so on. Even on an economic level, migration conditionalities imposed by the EU and its Member States may produce negative effects, in the form of disruption of cross-border (that is, local, and hence not aimed at subsequent

clandestine immigration to Europe) trade and migration circuits, which often represent important sources of livelihood for isolated and particularly underdeveloped border areas (a very clear example is the north-eastern area of Niger, in relation to which see the report prepared for the CeSPI-SID project by Stefano Liberti).

4. Structuring Euro-African cooperation on migration: progress and obstacles

The tensions and contradictions resulting from the imbalances highlighted in the preceding paragraphs became very apparent during 2005. In addition to the endless stream of accidental deaths (or deaths directly caused by the ruthlessness of certain smugglers) of migrants in the waters of the Strait of Gibraltar, the Sicilian Channel and around the Canary Islands, a new event of great symbolic importance signalled the unsustainability of the strategy followed thus far and the urgent need to change strategy. Between the end of August and the beginning of October 2005, on a number of occasions, the very well-guarded external borders of the European Union around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla in Moroccan territory were subjected to desperate attempts at crossing by thousands of sub-Saharan migrants. Among them, hundreds of injured people and a number of fatalities were reported (5 on the day of 29 September alone, around the fence that surrounds Ceuta), some were trampled and others hit by gunfire. Without dwelling here on specific responsibility for these events, it must be noted that these were probably the first killings at European borders since the Second World War¹³.

The media and political impact of these events was massive, both in Africa and Europe. As far as our continent in particular is concerned, the events at Ceuta and Melilla had a determining influence on triggering a political-institutional escalation which has led to the management of African migration being placed at the top of the European agenda.

¹³ During the "Cold War" there were numerous victims of border controls between the Eastern and Western bloc (in particular, but

not solely, in Berlin); in those cases, however, they were "exit" controls carried out by authoritarian States.

We have already referred (see footnote 8) to the pressing sequence of meetings and documents which culminated in the adoption, by the European Council of December 2005, of the important strategy-programming document entitled "Global Approach to Migration: Priority Actions Focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean". It seems important to dwell here, on the eve of the first Euro-African Conference on migration and development, planned for 10 and 11 July in Morocco, on certain specific features of the political-institutional dynamics which are unfolding.

The tragic events of Ceuta and Melilla – together with other events which are in some senses similar and no less serious, even if less publicized¹⁴ – have made the limits of the European approach to the management of migration from Africa dramatically evident. These limits relate both to the merit of the policies pursued and the method with which they are formulated. As far as the former, decisive, aspect is concerned, the fundamental question is how to renew development cooperation – and more generally, economic and trade policies of the EU and its Member States towards Africa – in such a way as to bring them into line with the strategic objective of fair and sustainable management of human mobility. This is the specific topic of the CeSPI-SID policy paper on "Migration and Development in Africa". Here, however, we would like to dwell briefly on certain considerations of a political-institutional nature and of international relations methodology. Indeed, while they may be preliminary to the merit of the issues, these considerations correspond to areas which may

represent definitive obstacles to the development of a truly innovative operational approach.

The new course of programming of European policy on migration from Africa has received an important political-diplomatic boost from the country most directly hit by the events in Ceuta and Melilla, namely Spain, and from France, another important country of destination, both traditionally tied by significant political and cultural relations with the Kingdom of Morocco¹⁵. Thus, as has often happened in recent years, an increased role for the European Union has resulted from an explicit demand for Europeanization of the issue by certain Member States more directly affected by migration dynamics considered to be in need of intervention¹⁶. In this particular case, the demand for Europeanization has been accompanied by a demand for wider multilateralization, based on an increasing awareness of the macro-regional nature of the migration processes that currently affect Africa. Indeed, the scope of the processes that are being witnessed in the area (for a general survey, see the background paper of Aderanti Adepoju) renders a political-institutional framework for the identification of issues and formulation of responses, which is not capable of taking into consideration the actual Euro-African dimension of the issues at stake, clearly insufficient.

This has resulted in the innovative and certainly positive decision to hold a Euro-African Conference, which aims precisely at building a communicative and decision-making bridge between two areas traditionally separated by EU external action: Euro-Mediterranean

¹⁴ Reference is made, in particular to the events which occurred in Cairo in December 2005, when at least twenty Sudanese asylum-seekers who were protesting to demand, among other things, resettlement to a western country of asylum, were killed by Egyptian forces during an attempt to clear the central area of the city where the protesters had been camped out for weeks (for a detailed account, see, for instance, D. Williams, Police Attack Cairo Refugee Camp. Many Sudanese Killed in Clash Over Resettlement Demands, Washington Post, 31 December 2005, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/30/AR2005123001331.html>, consulted on 14 June 2006).


¹⁵ See the joint declaration of Chirac and Zapatero issued at the conclusion of the Informal European Council at Hampton Court (27

October 2005), during which the issue of migration from Africa was raised for the first time in this context around the table of the Heads of State and Government (cf. <http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.asp?liste=20051110.html#Chapitre1>). France and Spain, in close liaison with Morocco, have maintained a leading role including in the preparatory stage of the Conference in Rabat, which has also given rise to controversy (cf., for instance., I. Cembrero, La UE y 12 países africanos lucharán contra la inmigración irregular con ayudas y represión, El País, 12 June 2006, p. 32.)

¹⁶ For an example closer to home, see the role played by Italy, in ways that have not always been agreed with or effective, in pushing for the European Union's direct involvement in dialogue and cooperation with Libya in relation to migration management.

relationships and relations with sub-Saharan Africa, till now predominantly managed, from an operational point of view, under the umbrella of framework agreements with the ACP countries. The choice to establish a Euro-African forum for dialogue on migration, unexceptionable from a general point of view, has however given rise to

a complex network of political-institutional bodies that have different structures and aims but which are all to some measure charged with dealing with the issue of African migration to Europe. Below is an attempt at providing a rough idea of the resulting framework.



5. Conclusions: towards a comprehensive and sustainable governance model for mobility between Africa and Europe

Towards what model of comprehensive, participatory and sustainable governance of African migration should we move in the future? More considered assessments should obviously be left till after the Euro-African Conference in Rabat, the results of which will need to be closely analysed and considered. However, it can already be seen that the first steps towards new and more comprehensive Euro-African cooperation on migration have brought to light certain **obstacles of a structural nature**¹⁷. The following is a list of the main ones:

- An insufficient knowledge base. There is an evident lack of statistical and socio-economic expertise on international migration (not just in relation to flows, but more widely regarding their causes and their impact) which encourages the formation of structural divergences in the perception of the migration phenomenon between EU and African countries, with profound misunderstandings even within each continent;
- An inadequate governance framework. As we have seen, the relationship between the *bilateral level*, the *sub-regional multilateral level* (the so-called 5+5) and the *macro-regional multilateral level* (in its various geo-institutional incarnations: EU-ACP; EU-AU; the level of the Euro-African Conference, which is distinguishable from the previous level because it includes certain countries that are not part of the AU whilst it excludes others that are) is extremely problematic. The resulting governance framework is fragile and inadequate for the purposes of sustainable and effective African migration management;
- A shortage of human and administrative resources at the various levels. In particular, reference is made to the shortage of competent and reliable institutional and administrative interlocutors in various African States, for the purposes of fair and

sustainable migration process management; and

- The fragility of the African international context, weighed down by situations of international tension (such as that already mentioned between Algeria and Morocco) that risk being intensified by a potential new conflict-inducing factor such as unauthorized international migration.

In light of this above summary analysis, certain **areas of intervention that seem to be preconditions** for the formulation of detailed cooperation programmes aimed at fair and sustainable management of international mobility in Africa can be identified. The following is a list of the most important ones:

- enhancement of the knowledge bases of policies by means of investment in Euro-African networks for research on the relationships between the dynamics of development, population and human mobility in Africa, with special attention to the Sahel region (in relation to the specific importance of this geographical area, see the research document by Andrea Di Vecchia and the background paper of F. Lovisolò et al.);
- Institution building and capacity building directed to the field of human mobility management planned and implemented in a manner that counterbalances the pre-eminent role assumed in many cases by security and military agencies in this field. The vast and diversified experience which the EU has accumulated in the field of migration institution building within the enlargement and pre-accession processes could provide useful models and lessons, while taking into account the profound diversity of migration and political-institutional contexts;

The institution building actions mentioned in the preceding bullet point are inseparable from wider political-administrative pluralism enhancement and good governance promotional strategies.

¹⁷ We will concentrate here on the structural obstacles of a political-institutional nature. Those of a socio-economic nature are

the subject of the second part of this policy paper and of several background papers prepared for the CeSPI-SID project.

On the basis of what has been said so far, it is possible to formulate certain possible **specific objectives (and related instruments)** of European policy, aimed at fair and sustainable management of African migration (we will limit ourselves here to instruments of migration policy; instruments of development cooperation will be dealt with in the abovementioned policy paper on Migration and Development). By way of example, the following is a list of pilot-programme options with their respective specific objectives:

- The Interreg-AFRICA Programme, aimed at preserving and enhancing intra-African mobility circuits (cross-border, regional and continental, starting with those already existing, such as the CEDEAO free trade area), simultaneously adopting measures which strengthen its positive impact in terms of co-development. The experience gained under the Neighbourhood Policy (and its forerunners, including Interreg) may furnish useful parameters and be a source of specific expertise;
- The Euro-African Gates Programme, aimed at opening limited, but concrete and visible, channels of legal mobility from Africa to the EU. It is important that such new legal access opportunities be widely communicated (but with restraint, without creating a stir that is capable of generating illusions), with the aim of mitigating the perception of a European

continent that is irremediably closed to access for African citizens who do not belong to very confined elite groups. Given the current considerable diversity of legal immigration policies within a 25-member Europe, it is probable that any privileged legal entry channels for African migrant workers will, initially, inevitably be based on enhanced cooperation initiatives which are launched at first within the limited circle of the Member States;

- The Euro-African Learning Programme, aimed at developing African human and intellectual resources (but it would also be possible for applications to be experimented with that benefit European students and young researchers who wish to specialize in Africa) through circular mobility projects (including professional internships, scholarships, etc.); and
- The Euro-African Circuits Programme, aimed at gradually, and in a targeted fashion, easing visa procedures for entrepreneurs, professionals, researchers, local administrators, artists and other specific categories. Even in this case, given the diversity of sensitivities in the various Member States, it would probably be necessary to assume that there would be initial recourse to the instrument of closer cooperation.

Migration and Development in Africa

Reconciling two policy agendas

1. The links between demography, migration and development in Africa

The existence of certain long-term empirical regularities, defined forty-five years ago by Nicholas Kaldor as “stylized” facts and which apply to all countries¹, still constitutes today a fundamental reference point for the analysis of economic development. They include physical and infrastructure capital, education of the work force, a network of social relations and quality of institutions. In the light of numerous analyses, continuous growth in the aggregate volume of production and work productivity at a steady rate over the long-term, a growing capital/labour ratio, a constant rate of profit in relation to capital, a stable capital/product ratio, a steady rate of profit and a stable proportion of salaries in relation to income, appear to be relationships that resist different forms of measurement.

Even more controversial are the relationships between economic development, population and migration. Disregarding for a moment the process of demographic transition, taking into account the long-term historical series data (1961-2004) available in World Bank's *World Development Indicators 2006* database, the positive correlation between income growth and per capita income growth² is clear, as shown in the scatter diagram in Figure 1. Moreover, there is no correlation (nor a significant relationship of direct dependence) between growth in per capita

product and population growth. It is especially the relative strength of the numerator (income) that determines the performance of per capita income; African countries are lagging economically not so much because of the high rates of population growth as because of the vicious circles that are set in motion by the multiple determinants of economic development (of which demographic variations are but one aspect and not the main one).

While the effects of demography on development in Africa are less cut-and-dry and clear than the neo-Malthusian pessimism of Ansley Coale and Edgar Hoover³ or, by contrast, the optimism of Ester Boserup and Julian Simon⁴ would suggest and, if anything, a mutual cause-and-effect prevails (that is, poverty contributes to high fertility which, in turn, bolsters the vicious circle of poverty), as far as migration and development are concerned, the dynamics of migration do not alone constitute the explanatory factor for the performance of African development and vice versa.

There is no shortage of links between migration and development in Africa. They are numerous, of various natures, non-linear and have frequent feed-back effects. Migration is as complex and multidimensional a phenomenon and process as development is. In Africa, migration is a result of political and ethnic conflicts, the violation of human rights, slow and uncertain democratization processes, an absence of human

¹ These regularities apply even in cases where there is no absolute or conditional convergence (that is, taking into account the differences in the underlying structural characteristics of countries) between high income and low income countries.

² A correlation which, however, is stricter in the case of the thirty African countries considered compared to European countries and with an interpolating curve slope, expressing the median

relationship, that is essentially similar in the two continents.


³ A. Coale and E. Hoover (1958), *Population Growth and Economic Development in Low-Income Countries*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

⁴ E. Boserup (1965), *The Conditions of Agricultural Growth*, Allen and Unwin, London and J.L. Simon (1981), *The Ultimate Resource*, Princeton University Press, Princeton.

security, social and economic factors such as poverty, unemployment and inequalities, environmental and geographical issues, historical traditions and health and demographic conditions. Today, African migration takes in diverse phenomena, both traditional and new, which co-exist, where structural conditions interact with freely-made decisions which, in turn, combine with the forced choices of wars,

persecution and natural catastrophes. They involve individual choices which, very often, involve familial and group decisions and which are linked to the specific characteristics of gender relations that exist in any given context. Thus, even looking at just the aggregated data (see Table 1), generalizations are very difficult to make. This has direct consequences on the policy choices to be made.

Figure 1 – Thirty African countries⁵: the relationship between income growth, per capita income growth and population between 1961 and 2004



Source: Based on World Bank figures (2006) *World Development Indicators 2006*, Washington D.C.

According to official data, which should be read with a high degree of caution given the well-known issues of reliability of the statistics in this field, 17 million Africans, equal to 1.9% of the total population of the continent, today resides in a country different to their country of birth. A marked heterogeneity of the data in Africa

emerges with reference to the various items considered and does not relate solely to the particular situation of very small countries, which are characterized by a relatively large stock of emigrants, because even countries such as Burkina Faso, Chad, Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Libya, Namibia,

⁵ These are the African countries for which complete historical series data is available: namely, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Niger,

Nigeria, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

Table 1 – International Migration in Africa

	MIGRANT STOCK: in thousands (2005)	MIGRANT STOCK: % of total population (2005)	REFUGEES: in thousands (2004)	NET FLOWS OF MIGRANTS: in thousands (annual average 2000-05)	NET FLOWS OF MIGRANTS: % of total population (annual average 2000-05)	REMITTANCES: % of GDP (2004)
Africa	17 069	1.9	3 023	- 455	-0.5	2.4
Eastern Africa	4 516	1.6	1 515	- 41	-0.2	..
Burundi	100	1.3	49	38	5.5	..
Comoros	67	8.4	..	- 2	-2.7	3.6
Eritrea	15	0.3	4	56	14.1	..
Ethiopia	555	0.7	116	- 30	-0.4	0.6
Djibouti	20	2.6	18	- 2	-2.6	..
Kenya	345	1.0	240	- 42	-1.3	3.3
Madagascar	63	0.3	..	0	0.0	0.4
Malawi	279	2.2	4	- 4	-0.3	0.0
Mauritius	21	1.7	..	0	0.0	3.4
Mozambique	406	2.1	1	- 4	-0.2	0.9
Réunion	142	18.1	..	1	1.3	..
Rwanda	121	1.3	50	9	1.1	0.4
Seychelles	5	6.1	..	0	0.0	0.3
Somalia	282	3.4	0	34	4.5	..
Uganda	518	1.8	250	- 3	-0.1	3.7
Tanzania	792	2.1	602	- 69	-1.9	0.1
Zambia	275	2.4	174	- 13	-1.2	..
Zimbabwe	511	3.9	7	- 10	-0.8	..
North Africa	1 838	1.0	415	- 294	-1.6	..
Algeria	242	0.7	169	- 20	-0.6	3.0
Egypt	166	0.2	90	- 90	-1.3	3.8
Libya	618	10.5	12	2	0.4	0.0
Morocco	132	0.4	2	- 80	-2.6	8.5
Sudan	639	1.8	142	- 104	-3.0	7.0
Tunisia	38	0.4	0	- 4	-0.4	5.1
Western Sahara	3	1.0	..	2	6.2	..
Southern Africa	1 381	2.6	46	- 1	0.0	..
Botswana	80	4.5	3	- 1	-0.7	0.3
Lesotho	6	0.3	..	- 7	-4.0	25.9
Namibia	143	7.1	15	- 1	-0.6	0.2
South Africa	1 106	2.3	28	10	0.2	0.2
Swaziland	45	4.4	1	- 1	-1.2	2.7
Western Africa	7 543	2.9	407	- 125	-0.5	..
Benin	175	2.1	5	20	2.5	2.1
Burkina Faso	773	5.8	0	20	1.6	1.1
Cape Verde	11	2.2	..	- 1	-2.1	9.5
Ivory Coast	2 371	13.1	72	- 74	-4.3	0.9
Gambia	232	15.3	7	6	4.4	1.9
Ghana	1 669	7.5	42	2	0.1	0.9
Guinea	406	4.3	139	- 60	-6.7	1.1
Guinea-Bissau	19	1.2	8	0	0.2	8.5
Liberia	50	1.5	15	- 49	-15.4	..
Mali	46	0.3	11	- 27	-2.1	3.1
Mauritania	66	2.1	0	6	2.1	0.2
Niger	124	0.9	0	- 2	-0.2	0.9
Nigeria	971	0.7	8	- 34	-0.3	3.6
S. Helena	1	24.8	..	0	-14.9	..
Senegal	326	2.8	21	- 20	-1.8	6.7
Sierra Leone	119	2.2	65	88	17.5	2.5
Togo	183	3.0	11	- 1	-0.1	7.2

Source: UNDESA, Population Division (2006), *International Migration 2006*, New York.

Somalia and Zimbabwe have registered a relatively high number of persons that have emigrated abroad. The situation of net migration figures for the 2000-2005 period evidences a similarly variegated picture. At a continental level, the figure is about half a million Africans less a year but there are particular exceptions, such as Chad, Eritrea and Sierra Leone, which on average have registered high positive figures within a group of a good eighteen African countries that have recorded a positive net figure for the same period. The figure for persons who have recognized refugee status is very significant given that 3 million reside in Africa⁶. Chad, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda each host over 200 thousand refugees pursuant to international agreements. The figure for remittances, in relation to which it is worthwhile repeating the necessary warning given in previous commentaries regarding the probable underestimates thereof, is very significant in relative terms compared to other regions of the world. The flows amount to 2.4% of the continental GDP, corresponding to 19.16 billion dollars (the 2004 figure). Even in this case, there are great differences recorded between countries. An overall figure of thirteen billion dollars was recorded in the balance of payments of five North African countries (namely, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Sudan and Tunisia), half a billion dollars in the cases of Kenya, Senegal and South Africa, 350 million dollars in Lesotho and 300 million in Uganda.

2. African migration policies and the two agendas of international policy

Even with the necessary note of caution regarding the reliability thereof, the qualitative information on African national policies specifically addressing the issue of migration, likewise collected by the same United Nations source, once again highlights a significant heterogeneity between countries but, in particular, reveals an overall lag in Africa in this area.

Zambia is the only country in which there is a


specific policy aimed at increasing the number of immigrants. In relation to the rest, the countries are almost equally divided between those whose governments adopt policies to maintain the level of immigration flows (11 countries) or reduce them (13 countries), while the majority of countries adopt no policy on the issue (28 countries). Even more remarkable is the failure of policy to address movement of highly-skilled workers. Only Zimbabwe has adopted policies to increase their number. Botswana has, by contrast, policies to reduce the number of such immigrants and the Ivory Coast, Egypt, Morocco, Namibia, South Africa and Zambia have adopted policies to maintain the level of inflow. The rest of the African countries, that is the majority, have no policy. Policies for the integration of immigrants have only been recorded in Botswana, Liberia, Malawi, Morocco, Mauritius, Namibia, Rwanda, South Africa, Togo and Zambia. The same applies for policies supporting emigration and in favour of returning migrants: Algeria, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and Zambia are the only countries that have such policies (while Tunisia is the only country which expressly supports an increase in outward migration flows). This is not a majority of the African countries and, obviously, this meagre number of countries would be significantly reduced if we were also to take into account the effectiveness of the policies and the will to give such measures any real priority.

Corresponding to this very heterogeneous migration and national policy scenario, there is a similarly varied mosaic of multiform economic development trajectories in Africa. Development is a multidimensional process in which specific economic, political, social, institutional, cultural and environmental dynamics interconnect. The marked differences that exist between the development paths of African countries are immediately noticeable when reading the Annual Reports of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, of the UNDP and the various agencies of the United Nations, government *Poverty*

⁶ Of a total of around 15 million refugees worldwide, as at the end of 2004, of which 9.2 million come under the UNHCR mandate (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees - the UN's refugee

agency) and 4.2 million under the responsibility of UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East).

Figure 2 - African migration policies



Source: Based on data from UNDESA, Population Division (2006).


Reduction Strategy Papers, the World Bank *Country Assistance Strategies* and the Country Programmes of the European Union, or even the *Investing in Development* study presented in 2005 by the UN Millennium Project in order to monitor the state of progress in achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

There is no shortage of relationships between migration and development. They are significant but at the same time complex and not conducive to generalization. Many studies on economic development have demonstrated that economic growth tends to increase the propensity to emigrate in the short to medium-term, while only in the long-term can development result in a

reduction in voluntary and forced migration (the migration hump theory). Case studies and empirical analyses demonstrate how the sign and coefficient of the relationship between migration and development may change markedly, to the point of rendering migration a fundamental driving force or, on the contrary, an insidious obstacle to development.

Outlining the fundamental points of the international agenda for analysis and policy in relation to African migration, we can gain some useful insights in order to guide future reflection and choices, both in terms of objectives and policy instruments for development cooperation (see Figure 3).

Figure 3 – Outline of the principal policy agendas of international cooperation on migration



Firstly, two intervention philosophies in relation to international cooperation policies on migration emerge which are potentially complementary, but which risk being radicalized as alternative visions of the choices to be made.

Within the limits of simplification, we can talk of one approach focussed on the link between migration and development and of a second approach which centres on the notion of managing migration flows. Skimming through the items listed in the sub-agendas contained in the two macro-areas, it becomes clear that these approaches reflect two perspectives that are important yet different. In the first case, the interest and point of view of the countries of origin of the migration flows is emphasized and development is principally intended to refer to development of African countries, whose strategic objectives should be the guiding force for European development cooperation policies. In the second case, it is the viewpoint of the European countries of destination of the migration flows which prevails, and their interest in creating conditions for better managing and governing migration flows, including those from the African continent.

These are two agendas which, when taken separately, appear to move in different directions, including in relation to the timeframe of reference. The migration management policy pursues short-term objectives, requiring immediate results, including because of the great difficulty involved in contemplating medium to long-term scenarios. On the other hand, development policies establish objectives fifteen to twenty years in the future, as in the case of the MDGs, in what is clearly a long-term outlook.

The difference in the nature, content and objectives of the two agendas translates into a different emphasis on crucial elements of the migration "market".

In the case of the first macro-area, looking at the link between migration and development means focussing on the supply side of migration, in relation to the prime determinants of development and the interrelationship with mobility conditions in African countries. Indeed, from a development-oriented viewpoint, migration management policies should be founded on the recognition of the human mobility needs at the heart of any development process. On the other hand, the migration and

integration policy agenda embodied in the second macro-area assumes the pivotal nature of the demand side of migration, in order to seek out solutions that better manage incoming flows and the various correlated factors in the countries of origin, transit and destination. In this second agenda, migrants, except for highly-skilled professionals chosen by the labour market, are often only taken into consideration as victims, targets of discrimination or a burden/problem and almost never as agents of development.

The relatively new concepts of transnationalism and co-development have the advantage - beyond the limited impact in terms of the operational transformation of development policies which they have thus far had - of seeking to reposition the policy agenda, overturning the conflicting rationale of the two approaches mentioned, thereby building a bridge to join the two sides and points of view of the international agenda on migration. From this perspective, supply and demand, jointly considered the pivotal axes of value, serve to bring use and exchange into comparison, thereby pursuing policy solutions that result in their reconciliation.

Different interests and sources of inspiration are also accompanied by different attitudes. On the one hand, there is scepticism and pessimism regarding the possibility of linking migration and development in an optimal way on the part of those who consider migration a natural response compensating for the failures of development policies in Africa and who, at the same time, fear that development cooperation policies may be reduced to a mechanism which (only partially) compensates for the curb in migration brought about by selective and protectionist policies of European countries and to a means of countering illegal migration circuits. On the other hand, there is the optimism of the possibility of finding appropriate solutions to existing problems of the "uncontrolled" circulation of workers and people in general on the part of those who consider development cooperation might contribute to improving migration flow management systems.

Many of the doubts and resistances of those who work in the field of development cooperation policies come from an aversion to the risk of the priority of good management of migration flows

- that can be traced back to international political interests that are foreign to the core business of official development assistance policies (namely, the fight against poverty and reaching the Millennium Development Goals or MDGs) - contaminating and reorienting the development cooperation agenda. In this very delicate stage of the redefinition of its identity around the MDGs, development cooperation policy may react in three different ways to the challenge of measuring up to the new priorities in international relations:

- (i) it may choose the road of purism, opposing any form of interference from other policy agendas, starting with the migration priority, in the name of the non-negotiability of the mechanism of development cooperation policies and their related objectives;
- (ii) it may choose to go down the road of *Realpolitik*, supporting drives and trends that from time-to-time establish new objectives and priorities as public aid for development, especially in the name of the necessity of continuing to exist as development cooperation policy and receiving greater funding; or
- (iii) it may accept, as development cooperation policy, the ambitious and difficult challenge of influencing the global agenda of international relations, thereby avoiding ending up being caught in the agenda's web of complexities and instead overturning its order and transforming it to give prominence to the rationales for development, viewing migration (like economic growth) as a tool for expanding people's opportunities for choice and entitlements and not as an end in itself.

In the face of these three possible options, it is necessary to recognize that, especially in Africa, the migration phenomenon today is pervasive and has a significant impact not only in terms of the sectoral allocation of human resources, on unemployment and urban underemployment, but more generally on distributive processes. For instance, understanding the determinants and the

consequences of internal rural-urban migration but also urban-urban and urban-rural migration (the so-called circular nature of new migration flows) and that of a regional and continental nature, is fundamental for understanding the nature of development processes in Africa and for formulating international cooperation policies that influence change in a socially-desirable way⁷. In the same way, any national or international economic or social policy which has impacts on living conditions in cities and the rural areas will directly and indirectly affect migration dynamics.

These are the issues that are increasingly the focus of the new European development cooperation policy scenarios.

3. The new European development cooperation policy scenarios

The rationale that drive policy on official development assistance (ODA) are various and tend to change over time, depending on the donor countries and the implementing parties. The balance changes from time to time but, in general terms, now as in the past, moral and humanitarian motivations tend to be stressed greatly in official documents and statements, whereas less "altruistic" interests, both new and old (for instance, the national security aspect, economic interests etc.), exert a constant influence in a less formal form.

Looking at the reality of EU and Member State cooperation, certain interesting aspects emerge in this regard: (1) the increase in financial resources, (2) the search for greater effectiveness of aid, (3) the stress on the importance of coherence between policies, (4) the sedimentation and non-homogeneity of strategic goals and (5) the growing influence of security and migration management in development cooperation.

On one hand, in accordance with the recommendations contained in the commitments in the E.U.'s *Aid Effectiveness Package*, renewed


⁷ On the complexity of the rural/urban/rural system, rural social and economic stratification and the resulting human mobility strategies, with particular reference to western Africa, see the background paper by Flavio Lovisolo and Serena Vitale, "Povertà, sviluppo e mobilità rurale in Africa occidentale" (*Poverty,*

development and rural mobility in western Africa). For a greater focus on urban transformations and the links with migration movements within the same geographical area, see also the background paper by Marcello Balbo "Urban growth, migration and development perspectives in Sub-Saharan Africa".

in March 2006, which are completely in line with those of April 2005, EU and Member State policies intend to link an increased financial commitment with an improved quality and effectiveness of intervention strategies. On the quantitative level, by 2010, the EU-15 members aim to allocate no less than 0.51% of Gross National Income (GNI) and the 10 more recent members 0.17% to ODA, which should translate into an average of 0.56% of GNI and around 20 billion euro extra each year, with the

objective of reaching 0.7% by 2015. The current situation is rather heterogeneous (see Figure 4), with Sweden leading the “virtuous” Nordic countries, while, in contrast, Italy together with the group of Mediterranean countries is very behind the agreed timetable, taking into account the fact that a significant proportion of the increase in funds is tied to foreign debt reduction measures, particularly in favour of Iraq and Nigeria as far as the 2005-2007 period is concerned.

Figure 4 – ODA as a percentage of GNI, net disbursements (2005)



Source: OECD-DAC online dataset, 2006.

In relation to the increase of the effectiveness of international aid, further to establishing the goal of a use of resources that is more focussed on the fight against poverty and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) - starting with the commitment to allocate no less than 50% of additional resources in favour of sub-Saharan Africa – today, at the European

level, direct reference is made to the call of the Paris Declaration of 2005 of the *High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness* to align multi-annual programming cycles to those of partner countries, coordinate policies, harmonize procedures and synchronize initiatives of Member States and of the Commission in order to increase the complementarity of policies.

On the other hand, precisely by reason of the search for greater effectiveness, on which the call for European contributors to increase allocation of funds to ODA was able to be justified, two long-term processes that are subject to periodic reorientation on the basis of the policy agenda of the day converge.

First and foremost is the commitment to pursuing the objective of coherence of policies. At the European level, the Treaty of Maastricht on European Union (1992) laid down an institutional foundation for EU policy on development which, pursuant to article 130-V, presupposes that its objectives will be taken into consideration in other policies adopted which could have an impact on developing countries (DCs). The Treaty of Maastricht has thus implicitly required coherence in EU foreign, trade, financial and security policy with objectives for the development of DCs, defining coherence as the need to take into account development objectives in relation to EU policies that could impact on DCs. In this sense, the coherence objective leads to the necessity of harmonizing the various policies, traditionally conceived in a sectoral manner and responding to diverse interests, namely foreign, trade, environmental, agricultural, security, migration management and defence policies with development cooperation policy objectives. Subsequently, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which came into force in 1999, introduced a new concept of consistency, defining it as the necessity that all EU policies be consistent with common foreign and security policy (CFSP)⁸, thereby detracting in part from the centrality of the objective of development of DCs. This formulation, which was taken up again in the European Convention, seems less central and instrumental in building coherence between policies compared to the position in 1992.

In addition, a typical feature of development cooperation policies has been the progressive sedimentation of ideas on development and of the resulting policies to be adopted which, in the light of the modest results obtained over the

course of decades of international development and cooperation policies, has resulted in a widening of the concept of development (integrating financial, human, social, environmental and institutional capital within the well-known principle of the multidimensionality of development) rather than resulting in its radical transformation. No idea or policy has been abandoned. Rather, there has been a cumulative process of insertion of new aspects and specific roles for ODA. The same principle has driven the progressive establishment of various generations of so-called conditionalities or principles of selectivity of aid. The macroeconomic reforms indicated in the structural adjustment programmes (introduced in the 1980s in order to encourage growth) are still considered necessary, though not sufficient, conditions today for the promotion of development. It is also necessary to ensure the rule of law and good governance of public affairs (in accordance with the second generation of conditionality introduced in the 1990s to promote democracy) and to implement national strategies for the reduction of poverty (the third generation of conditions, introduced in the 2000s following the multilateral initiative in favour of heavily-indebted poor countries). Recently, in this accumulating process of ODA conditionalities, the importance of promoting security on a global scale and countering illegal transnational goods, capital and migration circuits are emerging as a new realm of conditions.

The expansion of the ODA policy agenda and the widening of the tasks entrusted to development cooperation initiatives reflects, on a closer examination, the imprecise and wide nature of the objective of the reduction of poverty, which concretely translates in very different approaches: from the Nordic vision which is traditionally concentrated on the poorest countries, to the new German focus on the so-called "anchor" countries (China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Thailand, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil,

⁸ Articles 11 and 28 of the Treaty on European Union are specifically addressing this. In the consolidated text of the Treaty, which integrates the amendments made by the Treaty of Nice in 2001, the consistency objective, in addition to being mentioned in Title V (Provisions on a Common Foreign & Security Policy), is also expressly mentioned in article 3, paragraph 2 of Title I (Common Provisions), which states: "The Union shall in particular ensure the

consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of its external relations, security, economic and development policies. The Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring such consistency and shall cooperate to this end. They shall ensure the implementation of these policies, each in accordance with its respective powers".

Mexico, Russia and Turkey) and the French and Spanish predilection for countries with strong ties that hark back to a colonial past and linguistic affinities.

A comparison between the current development cooperation systems of European countries reveals a situation of marked non-homogeneity in the strategic orientations and instruments adopted. However, a common feature which cannot be ignored is, in effect, the growing influence of two interlinked strategic priorities at the national level as much as at the EU level of development cooperation: namely, security and governance of the migration phenomenon.

Migration is a cross-cutting issue in the policy priorities of a large part of national ODA strategies and is particularly emphasized by countries which are otherwise very different. Denmark, France and Spain, especially, emphasize the link between migration policies and ODA policies in their programming documents.

In Denmark, the strong emphasis of the new Centre-Right government on issues of international security has translated into a concentration of resources in Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan and into certain initiatives launched in 2003. One of these is the *Near-abroad Initiative*, which aims at directly assisting refugees and evacuees in a specific geographic area in neighbouring countries and which makes the intent of the government to link development and the containment of immigration explicit. Another is the so-called Arab Initiative which, in response to the recognition of the close link between the absence of democracy and extremism, aims at supporting democratization processes in certain Arab countries.

France and Spain have explicitly declared the objective of greater coherence between policies as a priority, referring to the nexus between migration management policies and ordered regulation along South-North routes and development cooperation policies. At the same time, based on a so-called co-development

approach, duly revisited and integrated compared to initial re-entry programmes for migrants to countries of origin, French development cooperation has begun to build on certain interesting micro-level experiences, developed in synergy with the decentralized cooperation approach in order to make migration a cross-cutting theme. These are innovative experiences, as yet not sufficiently significant in quantitative and development impact terms to have a real strategic influence, but which may also be found as interesting innovative signs within the context of Spanish and Italian decentralized cooperation⁹.

In any case, various other European countries such as Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom and Sweden have noted the importance of linking migration policies to ODA policies, during a period in which more restrictive definitions and rules in relation to asylum policies, selection of categories of immigrants and tackling irregular migration are at the same time being adopted (as is the case with Denmark and France).

From what has emerged thus far, the most direct implication of this general approach ought to be simply that of identifying, on the basis of vulnerability maps, the principal areas of origin of current and anticipated migration flows and making them priority areas for initiatives in the fight against poverty¹⁰. Nevertheless, clear approaches do not appear to have been adopted in order to operationally and explicitly transform the recommendations contained in the European Commission Communication of 30 November 2005 into European development cooperation initiatives, according to which a priority measure in cooperation with Africa should be the fight against poverty, and by reason of which general objective, it would be necessary to subordinate any cooperation between countries of origin, transit and destination in order to better manage migration routes, encourage legal migration and counter illegal migration.

⁹ See, in this regard, the various works by Andrea Stocchiero, particularly for the MigraCtion programme, which are available on the CeSPI website (www.cespi.it).

¹⁰ In this regard, see the research document by Andrea Di Vecchia

relating to the situation in western Africa and, in particular, the Sahelian region.

¹¹ A. Marshall (1920), *Principles of Economics*, Macmillan, London.

4. Some observations on linking the international agenda on migration and development in Africa

Illegal migration flows due to poverty and underdevelopment, unemployment and the absence of opportunities for a decent future can be more effectively countered by realistic long-term economic development outlooks, rather than by essentially controlling and repressive policies, or by aid interventions which are short-term or removed from national development policies. From this point of view, distinct and contradictory policies on ODA and migration are costly and unproductive, on par with episodic development cooperation initiatives which are not linked to the national strategic framework of development policies in countries of origin. Points of overlap between the two macro-areas set out in Figure 3 offer areas for the development of synergies and increasing the level of effectiveness of policies.

There have been numerous policy documents and recommendations presented and discussed at an international level on this issue over the last ten years. Discussion over solutions for seizing mutually beneficial opportunities for countries of origin and destination of migration flows, in terms of development, began at the very least with the technical seminar on international migration and development organized by UNFPA in 1998 as a follow-up to the recommendations in the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development in 1994 in Cairo, and the policy document of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) of the same year. The *High-Level Dialogue* to be held by the United Nations in New York on international migration and development on 14 and 15 September 2006, the Euro-African Ministerial Conference on 10 and 11 July 2006 in Rabat on migration and development and the dialogue between the European Union and the African Union on the same topic, following on from the conclusions of the European Council of December 2005 and the informal summit at Hampton Court, clearly mark out the current policy agenda.

The future of African mobility and the possibilities for policy-makers to intervene in the interrelationship between population mobility and development have also been the topic of a series of consultation sessions organized by the research team of the CeSPI-SID Project in the first

six months of 2006. Qualitative interviews with experts and policy-makers in Denmark and France and others with North African migration experts, a workshop in Nairobi which involved around forty African experts and a consultation process carried out on the basis of the Delphi methodology with around sixty African and European experts, were driven by the decision to involve experts from diverse disciplines, who are active in various national and international institutions, linked by the common denominator of knowledge of the African situation. The primary objective at the heart of this approach is that of enriching policy-oriented analysis on the topic of the links between migration and development in Africa with a wide-ranging debate between views that have developed in diverse scientific and geographic contexts, based on different professional experiences, analysis methods and cultural backgrounds.

While, on the one hand, the results confirm certain points which have already been highlighted in recent policy literature and documents, on the other, they allow certain issues to emerge which are not always in the foreground of debate and which we will refer to here as policy observations.

A look ahead at the African population mobility scenario over the next twenty years, on which the calls for the policy options in question are based, shifts the focal point of the discussion towards that continent, counterbalancing the manifest trend towards concentrating attention on African migration movements that have OECD countries as a target destination.

It is not true that Africans migrate to other continents; human mobility in Africa is particularly regional in nature. Above all, it is not true that the poor immigrate to other continents. It is thus necessary to ascribe a primary role to internal movements within the continent, whether confined to a regional area or to a greater radius with migration from all over Africa to certain poles of attraction identified in countries whose level of development is, or is foreseen to be, higher than the continental average, or where the exploitation of mineral and oil resources allows us to predict an influx of labour from abroad.

The shift in the perspective from which African mobility in the near future is viewed impacts on the approach to the overlapping issues between

migration and development with interesting consequences on the prospects of transforming observations into policy recommendations and priority geographical areas. Based on this premise, it is possible to look at development as a determining factor of positive transformation in migration processes, but also at migration and mobility as assets on which to base development-promoting policies. Specific attention should be paid, in this regard, to the cross-cutting theme of the role of women, with particular reference to its growing responsibility for the wellbeing of families and to its impact on welfare systems. Indeed, female migration establishes a different connection between migration and development. On the one hand, women have greater problems of access to the regular labour market and thus have less opportunity to contribute to development, resulting in phenomena of care-drain in the country of origin. On the other hand, migrant women and those who remain in their country of origin play a fundamental role in the wellbeing of families, directing remittances more clearly towards their children's needs and the raising of human capital.

Five central elements emerge as points of departure for an examination of policy: financial, human, social, entrepreneurial and institutional capital.

- First of all, the link between population movements and development may be traced back to the impact of flows of financial capital generated by repatriation in the form of remittances of part of the savings of workers abroad. This is a central topic in the international debate on innovative mechanisms in financing for development policies. In relation to this area of intervention, covered by the more general strand of finance for development, one of the emerging requests relates to the need to add possible interventions geared to increasing flows of remittances and/or guiding them more towards investment in entrepreneurial activities in wider and longer-term programmes that aim at changing the environment to which the financial flows are sought to be attracted. The creation of a favourable climate for the attraction of investment from whatever source (domestic savings, direct foreign investment and investments from those who migrated abroad) appears to be the main avenue for

rendering any policy for the mobilization of remittances for development purposes effective.

- A second macro-theme relates to quantitative and qualitative changes to the stock and flows of human capital resulting from migration movements in countries and areas affected by the flows (namely, countries of origin, transit and destination). The effects of migration movements on stocks of human capital and on the consequences for the possibility of development in African countries is a topic of particular interest in light of future scenarios which foreshadow the development of migration flows pertaining to the high-skilled persons. In this event, the issue of the lack of confidence in the ability of African economic systems to offer employment opportunities for the continent's human resources is raised decisively. The search for a greater efficiency in labour markets and, above all, a review of the priorities and strategies of training systems represents, in this context, one of the areas on which to focus policy recommendations. The linking of education to actual development needs of the territories and the affirmation of a system of cultural values not subordinated to external models emerge as the fundamental elements of this transformation process. In this regard, one can talk of the need for development cooperation interventions and strategies aimed at countering the "internal" brain-drain phenomenon, in other words, the tendency to invest in human capital in priority sectors at an international level, in relation to which the local market absorption capacity is weak and, at the same time, not investing in sectors which are strategic for the development of one's own country (such as, agriculture, infant medicine, appropriate technologies, etc) but in which low local wages offer no incentive. This is where the potential role of migration as an integrating factor between countries and territories comes in. In the face of the existence and estimated increase of the exodus of African professionals and intellectuals, the growing attitude seems to focus on measures that encourage the circulation of professionals instead of the implementation of policies aimed at providing incentives for the return

of high-skilled migrants or limiting their exodus. These solutions would, at the same time, aim to reduce the risks of impoverishment of human capital, limiting the phenomena of underemployment of immigrant resources (brain-waste) and exploiting the circulation of experience acquired in different employment contexts as a factor for capacity building and modernization of the productive sectors and institutions of the affected countries. Once again, proper development cooperation policies would specifically be geared to supporting the reinforcement of African regional integration processes at various (regional and African Union) levels. The principal priorities of this strategic approach are constituted by the adoption of policies aimed at facilitating migration on a temporary basis and on the search for solutions that go towards the progressive building of a regional and continental labour market, starting with specific geographical areas and productive sectors within which to establish forms of partnership – bilateral, regional or multilateral – in the fields of training, planning and management of African migration flows and development.

- A third area for reflection, that of social capital and relational assets, relates specifically to the African scenario which is characterized by the incidence of intra-regional migration. This aspect revolves around the circulation of know how and is, in many cases, connected with the development of not only professional relationships, but also economic and trade, cultural and institutional relationships. The discussion of the enhancement of migrants as a development factor pivots, as the recent literature demonstrates and the results of the consultation sessions confirm, around the notion of their being seen as a potential source of financial resources (remittances) and as an important reserve of human capital (know how, professional skills and entrepreneurship). Relational capital seems to have less influence than what diasporas could bring to bear on the development of

areas of origin. The role of relational assets, widely discussed in the literature on economic development, in this case takes on wider connotations due to the cross-border nature of the relationships in question and because of the particular situation in Africa, which is characterized by low-profile relationships, especially economic ones, in national systems and by the existence of various areas of political tension. The possibility of utilizing the presence of immigrant communities in countries belonging to the same region must be taken into account as an objective of possible international and regional cooperation initiatives. The discussion on possible actions centres around the involvement of diasporas as a component of cross-border ties in an economic, professional, cultural and political sense.

- A fourth essential factor for economic development is the existence and development of a spirit and capacity on the part of economic actors to create and manage businesses (entrepreneurial capital). In this case, the added value of migrants – at the individual and associative level – is essential for entrepreneurial initiatives to be significant in terms of innovation, attention to the importance of the transfer of technologies and the development of skills acquired in the course of productive activities. Above all, it is the technical and technological information in supply and outlet markets, the organizational frameworks, the market potential and entrepreneurial experience, not readily transmissible at a distance, that create Marshall's "industrial atmosphere"¹¹ and which may find crucial transmission agents in migrants. The process of germination and the spread at the local level of networks of micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, with the establishment of collaborative and business links at the international level, may find in Africa a strategic player in relation to this specific dimension of capital, rather than relying solely on foreign direct investment which is often detached from the local context.

¹¹ A. Marshall (1920), *Principles of Economics*, MacMillan, Londra.

- Lastly, the notion of institutional capital at the local, national, regional and continental levels, links management of migration flows with the issue of future development of the continent, in a scenario characterized by the continued existence of economic and political flashpoints, and raises the issue of the promotion of controlled population mobility. On the one hand, this avoids massive and unforeseen movements emerging as a factor of instability and an obstacle to development and, on the other, facilitates the enhancement of the benefits of the circulation of people. From this perspective, it is worthwhile supporting policies which reinforce the managerial capacities of institutions and create a legislative and regulatory framework for the rule of law, starting with the delicate issue of the recognition of land ownership and enjoyment rights. This simultaneously encourages administrative decentralization processes and those relating to the multilateralization of the definition of rules,

conditions and modes of population movement in Africa, within the framework of regional and continental integration processes, potentially capable of attracting greater re-entry flows of skilled workers.

The problems for development are very complex and no single solution exists. Rather, it is necessary to integrate the five aspects indicated above: linkage between financial flows (ODA, direct foreign investment and remittances), stock and flows of human, social and entrepreneurial capital, and the reinforcement of the regional integration institutional processes in Africa (at the level of laws and rules, behavioural standards and modes of population movement). Resort to an approach of decentralized cooperation and international territorial partnerships may prove invaluable in this sense, based on the central role of local development strategies in African countries and the recognition of the existence of potentially mutual benefits.

An example of the application of an integrated approach in the health area

For the purposes of placing the observations above in a concrete context, it is interesting to consider an example of their application. Among the fields of experimentation with this integrated approach, that related to health presents aspects which are particularly challenging in the case of a large number of African countries.

The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends that there be a minimum of 500 nurses and 20 doctors for every 100,000 people, yet a large number of sub-Saharan African countries have less than 50 nurses and 5 doctors without taking into account health crises – starting with AIDS – which require an increase in the minimum thresholds recommended by WHO. At the same time, the United States and Europe increasingly resort to immigration as a source of those professionals. In 2020, a shortage of 800,000 nurses and 200,000 doctors is predicted in the United States, which already resorts widely to health professionals coming from developing countries and especially from other OECD countries, such as the United Kingdom which, in turn, imports more nurses from developing countries than it trains locally.

Between 33 and 55% of people with a high level of education from Angola, Burundi, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Uganda live in OECD countries. A quarter of sub-Saharan African countries do not have medical training schools; half of the countries only have one. Over half of the doctors trained in Africa work outside their country, to the point that doctors from other continents are employed entailing a high level of waste of resources (and additional costs tied, for instance, to the linguistic problems experienced by foreigners). As the 2005 Report of the *Global Commission on International Migration* indicates (on p. 24), it is estimated that only 50 of 600 doctors trained in Zambia practise their profession in their own country and that there are more doctors from Malawi that work in Manchester than work in their own country.

The national policies of European countries should, through institution and capacity building interventions focussed on the local level of decentralized cooperation, mobilize energies and resources in a coordinated manner to assist institutions and educational systems in the health sector in African countries to train and ensure a period of home-country residence (financially supplementing minimum salaries with the support of specific development cooperation interventions).

The same approach should be adopted with reference to African students who succeed in specializing in OECD countries and who could be placed within development cooperation programmes, in the form of technical assistance that is duly remunerated by the donor country, with the assurance of being able to keep any employment position they have obtained in the OECD country. The resort to technical assistance based on the engagement of foreign personnel would be drastically reduced in those areas where it is possible to train and have recourse to local staff or, in any case, the capacity of the local institutions involved to effectively absorb and integrate foreign staff within their ranks would be reinforced. Among the conditions which characterize a favourable environment, remuneration levels are definitely important. Recent empirical studies (J.B. Eastwood et al. (2005), "Loss of Health Professionals from sub-Saharan Africa: The Pivotal Role of the UK", *The Lancet*, Vol. 365, pp. 1893-1900) demonstrate that 57% of the variance in the number of doctors between countries is explained by the level of per capita income. Nevertheless, immigrants could be amply accommodated within the area of technical assistance by making them the preferred managers of planned interventions.

Moreover, European support could focus on the creation of networks of international research centres in Africa, specifically providing for the transfer of specialized sectors on priority illnesses to that continent, with the aim of coordinating public initiatives at a global level and facilitating the regional and continental mobility of skilled researchers between centres of excellence, which would effectively guarantee full control over parts of research agreements.

The WTO agenda and international agreements, and likewise incentives for foreign investment, would need to be duly oriented to support this strategic framework.

On the financial level, this programme could mobilize innovative forms of public-private partnership in relation to finance for development, resorting to development initiative support systems based on the scheme adopted in the Mexican state of Zacatecas (known as "three for one") in which for every dollar sourced from remittances from doctors who have migrated, the national and sub-national public administrations (through development cooperation resources) could add further resources, guaranteeing a maximum level of transparency (the expatriate doctors should themselves be involved in defining interventions). Furthermore, building on some of the initial experiences in Brazil, new public bonds could be issued by the countries of origin, whose underlying collateral would be constituted by the anticipated flows of repatriated funds from remittances.

