in cooperation with the WEU Institute for Security Studies, the Rome office of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation Rome Office, and Istituto Affari Internazionali, and with the support of the Rome office of USIS, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and the British Council. CeSPI would also like to thank ENI for its hospitality at Villa Montecucco, Castelgandolfo.

Lamberto Dini, Italian Foreign Minister

Dopo la crisi del Kosovo: la stabilizzazione e ricostruzione nei Balcani

Speech delivered at the public session of the Castelgandolfo Colloquium p. 3

Conference Report

by Rosa Balfour and Roberto Menotti p. 7

Tim Garden & John Roper, University of Birmigham

Next steps to a common defence policy

Paper presented at the Castelgandolfo Colloquium p. 19

Antonio Missiroli, WEU Institute for Security Studies

The case for setting convergence criteria for a common European

security and defence policy

Paper presented at the Castelgandolfo Colloquium p. 23

David Calleo, SAIS Washington

The role of NATO and the future of ESDI

Paper presented at the Castelgandolfo Colloquium p. 30

Michael Emerson, CEPS Brussels

After the war is over

First published in Financial Times, 17 May 1999 p. 34

Marie-Janine Calic, SWP Ebenhausen

Europeanising the "other Europe"

First published in Le Monde Diplomatique, July 1999 p. 36

Anna Maria Corazza Bildt, CEMiiS Stockholm

Let’s stop demonising the Serbs

First published in Expressen, 1 June 1999 p. 39

Karsten Voigt, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Germany

Euro-American relations and the Balkans

Keynote speech delivered at the Castelgandolfo Colloquium p. 42

List of Participants p. 46

Ho accettato volentieri di chiudere la vostra riflessione sulle prospettive dei Balcani dopo la guerra nel Kosovo. Anche se il silenzio delle armi è di ieri, è già tempo di primi, necessariamente provvisori bilanci. La guerra testé conclusasi alle porte di casa proietta anche sul nostro futuro interrogativi ai quali forse ci illudevamo di non dover rispondere. Le vicende balcaniche spingono la politica a ritrovare la propria grandezza, la propria progettualità, senza perdere il contatto con un mondo necessariamente violento, imperfetto, improntato ad interessi in conflitto. Un compito non facile ma sicuramente ineludibile. Sicurezza e difesa tornano ad essere una priorità imprescindibile per il vecchio continente. Si conferma fallace l’assunto secondo il quale la fine della guerra fredda, con il superamento della strategia della dissuasione nucleare, avrebbe reso superflui vigili e forti presidi militari. La guerra del Kosovo appare destinata ad imprimere tempi rapidi alla creazione di una forza comune di difesa, solo implicita nel Trattato di Amsterdam.

I Balcani appartengono alla storia non ancora conclusa delle tre grandi fratture del nostro secolo: le due guerre mondiali e la caduta dei sistemi comunisti. I vecchi e i nuovi nazionalismi vi cercano protezione contro il crescente assalto di un mondo nuovo, mobile e soprattutto estraneo. Li favorisce la libertà ineguagliabile del nostro tempo. Nei Balcani sentono gli avvenimenti remoti, lontani nei secoli, come se fossero di ieri. Vivono la loro storia, anche antica, come un passato prossimo strettamente legato al presente. Dopo aver gravitato per tanti anni intorno ai grandi imperi della storia europea, asburgico, ottomano, sovietico, i paesi dei Balcani hanno bisogno di un’autorità superiore che li costringa a convivere e progredire civilmente. Alla NATO chiedono di essere difesi, non tanto da un nemico esterno quanto da se stessi, dalle proprie tentazioni, dai propri fantasmi. All’Unione europea chiedono di essere guidati verso la terra promessa della buona economia e della democrazia. La NATO è intervenuta per porre fine a una violazione su larga scala dei diritti fondamentali, ad espulsioni e repressioni di massa che avevano suscitato orrore e indignazione, generato una forte solidarietà etica. Non è stata, la campagna dell’Alleanza, una campagna diretta contro il popolo serbo. Anche se il dittatore Milosevic ha potuto forse far leva su un nazionalismo che si nutre talvolta di una visione tragica e pessimista, al punto di fare di una sconfitta di sei secoli fa un mito contemporaneo.

Dobbiamo evitare che la sconfitta di oggi alimenti di nuovo frustrazioni e rancori. Carlo Sforza, attento osservatore della regione negli anni verdi della sua carriera diplomatica, così scriveva: "C’è nei serbi un fondo di tristezza e di pessimismo che noi chiamiamo slavo (parola con cui spieghiamo ciò che non comprendiamo) e che forse altro non è che il solco lasciato nei cuori da secoli di sofferenza". La Serbia ha grandi riserve di coraggio: al cuore della Jugoslavia, si era opposta sia ad Hitler che a Stalin. Presupposto di ogni sua rinascita è il ritorno della democrazia. Le agitazioni di questi giorni, il riemergere delle forze politiche consentiranno al popolo serbo di sottrarsi al suicidio che Milosevic avrebbe voluto imporre al suo paese. Fa sentire la sua voce una nuova classe politica, al posto di quella che ha portato la nazione al baratro. In una prospettiva di ricostituzione dell’intera regione vorrei così riassumere le lezioni della crisi: il peso debordante dei diritti umani nella politica degli Stati; l’aggiornamento della strategia dell’Alleanza; le ambizioni più vaste dell’Europa; una nuova stabilità attraverso le grandi istituzioni internazionali.

L’Alleanza ha iniziato l’ultima guerra del secolo soltanto per non assistere inerte alle deportazioni in massa di un popolo. La vittima più illustre della guerra del Kosovo è stata la sovranità nazionale, quale si era venuta costruendo dai Trattati di Westfalia, alla metà del XVII secolo. Allora, con la fine degli imperi religiosi, gli Stati più forti del continente accettarono di considerare inviolabile il recinto delle loro sovranità, fondando il moderno sistema internazionale. La sovranità è stata erosa a più riprese, negli ultimi cinquant’anni. Ma il colpo più forte gli è stato inferto dalla NATO, il 24 marzo di quest’anno, con il primo attacco multinazionale inteso ad arrestare nel Kosovo una aperta e criminale violazione della legge delle genti. Lo stesso giorno la Corte britannica asseriva che l’ex-Presidente Pinochet avrebbe potuto essere inviato in Spagna per esservi giudicato.

Il tribunale di Norimberga aveva introdotto il principio della sicurezza nello Stato e dallo Stato. Le Nazioni Unite, con la Convenzione Universale del 1948, avevano avviato il ridimensionamento dei poteri sovrani. Non dimentichiamo che la Carta delle Nazioni Unite comincia con l’espressione "Noi, popoli delle Nazioni Unite". Solo un altro grande documento, di oltre due secoli ormai, la Costituzione americana, comincia con le stesse parole – "We the people". Dopo la guerra nel Kosovo sarà più evidente che i principi delle Nazioni Unite pongono l’individuo al centro di tutto e che la sua protezione è la vera universale ragion di Stato dei nostri giorni. Occorrerà, certo, meglio prevenire. Affinare gli strumenti per reprimere. Nei giorni scorsi il Parlamento italiano ha ratificato la Convenzione che istituisce il Tribunale Penale Internazionale delle Nazioni Unite. Sarà una delle nostre priorità sollecitare presso gli altri paesi il numero di ratifiche – sessanta – indispensabile per l’istituzione del Tribunale.

Aveva già detto il Presidente Wilson: "nelle relazioni internazionali occorre occuparsi tanto degli equilibri di forza che del regime politico delle nazioni". Una teoria dalla quale gli europei hanno tratto beneficio in due guerre (anzi tre, se consideriamo la guerra fredda), nella ricostruzione del Piano Marshall. Certo, anche nella maturazione dei diritti umani occorre saper fare affidamento, in certi casi, sulla paziente pedagogia del tempo, delle istituzioni, dell’emulazione. Lo stesso Henry Kissinger aveva riassunto nei due termini del "Faro e del Messia" la vocazione americana, oscillante tra l’esempio e l’intervento. E proprio nei giorni della guerra nel Kosovo uno dei più intelligenti collaboratori del Segretario di Stato, Strobe Talbott, ricordava che "gli Stati Uniti hanno impiegato due secoli per rispettare i valori universali. Sono diventati indipendenti nel 1776. Hanno atteso undici anni per darsi una Costituzione. Novanta prima di abolire la schiavitù. Centoquarantaquattro prima di dare il diritto di voto alle donne. Centottantotto prima di estendere la protezione costituzionale a tutti i cittadini". Primato dunque dei diritti, avendo tuttavia a mente una scala di gravità delle violazioni e anche processi che talvolta necessitano di orizzonti temporali non brevi.

La guerra è intervenuta nella fase conclusiva di un processo di riflessione sull’avvenire dell’Alleanza Atlantica, avviato sin dalla caduta del Muro. Ha contribuito a ridefinire i caratteri della NATO; le sue finalità; i suoi limiti geografici, in riferimento ad esempio al Mediterraneo; il mandato ad operare in rapporto alle Nazioni Unite; i poteri di decisione; gli equilibri interni della stessa Alleanza. Legittimità e confini geografici dell’uso della forza sono quesiti ai quali la tragedia del Kosovo ha dato una prima risposta. Abbiamo convenuto a Washington, nell’aprile scorso, che la forza della NATO deve esplicarsi intorno all’Europa, avendo presente, peraltro, l’esigenza di colpire una minaccia anche prima che essa investa il perimetro alleato. Abbiamo convenuto, al di fuori delle esigenze di autodifesa, una definizione della legittimità che non rischi di essere paralizzante, pur riaffermando il primato delle Nazioni Unite.

Ma siamo preparati alle nuove guerre, nuove non solo tecnicamente e militarmente ma anche culturalmente? Guerre condotte talvolta da forze paramilitari, sullo sfondo di Stati in disgregazione. Esse, come ricorda Dahrendorf, ci costringono ad interrogarci su dove inizi e dove finisca la civiltà europea. Guerre che alcuni analisti definiscono post-moderne; altri tecniche lontane dal campo di battaglia e basate invece sulla repressione etnica. Nella prima parte del secolo il rapporto tra perdite militari e civili era di otto a uno, esso si è invertito nelle guerre balcaniche. Prepariamoci, d’altro canto, alla evoluzione degli apparati militari dall’uno e dall’altro lato dell’Atlantico. Gli Stati Uniti conoscono una rivoluzione che integra nelle loro capacità, totalmente, le nuove tecnologie. Cambia la natura delle forze, la strategia fondata sugli effetti di massa, sulla capacità di trasferire rapidamente un gran numero di uomini. Agli Stati Uniti saranno meno necessarie, per proiettare la loro potenza, basi distanti dal loro territorio. Emblematico il ritorno al di là dell’Atlantico dei loro bombardieri dopo ogni missione nel Kosovo. Alla lunga questo non potrà essere senza conseguenze sulla cultura ormai cinquantennale dell’Alleanza.

L’Europa si candida in prima persona a governare il dopoguerra, nel Kosovo e nei Balcani. Senza gli Stati Uniti non si vince la guerra. Ma spetta soprattutto all’Europa costruire la pace. Sarà questa, forse, la prima vera pietra di paragone di una politica estera comune, senza la quale l’Unione europea resterebbe sempre in una condizione di minorità. Saprà, l’Unione, divenire, di fatto, tutore politico ed economico; contribuire a garantire elezioni libere; ricostruire un tessuto di istituzioni civili; finanziare la ricostruzione? L’Europa ricca prende sulle proprie spalle un pezzo di continente che altrimenti andrebbe alla deriva, per additare a quei popoli un possibile futuro oltre la guerra, un percorso che possa condurre nell’Unione, seppure in tempi non brevi, anche gli slavi del sud. Può sembrare sorprendente che i governanti dell’Europa, nonostante i tempi rivelatisi più lunghi e l’adesione di Polonia, Repubblica Ceca, Ungheria, facciano ora promesse cosi audaci a paesi cosi arretrati. Ma la guerra ha avuto il potere di accelerare e modificare gli orizzonti della costruzione europea, rivelando anche la fragilità di un edificio che fosse costruito solo sull’economia e sulla moneta.

Il punto di partenza della Commissione di Romano Prodi è un drammatico deficit di integrazione politica. Ma la volontà di colmare questo deficit si scontra con contraddizioni profonde. Non appena si passa dalle analisi generali ai progetti concreti, gli Stati minacciati nella loro sovranità hanno reazioni di rigetto. In Francia, il solo fatto che nel Trattato di Amsterdam il controllo delle frontiere diventi istituzionalmente europeo appare come una ferita aperta alle tradizioni nazionali. La Gran Bretagna resiste a modesti progressi nell’armonizzazione fiscale, indispensabili perché l’unione monetaria non sia monca e squilibrata.

Di fronte a queste miopie, appare quasi miracoloso che dal Consiglio europeo di Colonia sia scaturito un così forte impegno per affrontare il travaglio, costoso e doloroso, della difesa europea. La guerra del Kosovo potrebbe avere, per la sicurezza europea, lo stesso impatto che la guerra di Corea ebbe per la sicurezza atlantica. Fu, come noto, dopo la guerra di Corea che si addivenne alla creazione di una struttura integrata, all’accesso della Germania nell’Alleanza, alla formulazione di una dottrina nucleare. A Colonia si è convenuto di rafforzare le capacità europee in materia di intelligence, trasporto, comando e controllo. A più lunga scadenza, ci si può chiedere se tra i paesi dell’Unione non sarebbe opportuno, come a Maastricht, vincolarsi a criteri di convergenza anche in materia di sicurezza, ad esempio nella quota dei bilanci militari riservata alla ricerca, nella percentuale della popolazione in anni, nella componente delle forze nazionali da proiettare oltre il perimetro dell’Alleanza. La nomina di Solana ad Alto Rappresentante della politica estera è comunque significativa. Ora sarà necessario un Segretario Generale della NATO che sia un europeista convinto, così come Solana è un convinto atlantista.

La guerra del Kosovo ci ha ricordato che non si può, sempre e comunque, prescindere dall’uso della forza nelle relazioni internazionali. Questo vale anche per noi, per la nostra statualità precaria ed incerta in taluni settori. Saremo chiamati a sostenere, in termini anche finanziari, il nostro contributo per l’ingresso nel sistema in formazione della difesa europea. Portiamo sulle nostre spalle il peso di una identità nazionale debole, che ci ha reso meno coesi, meno disciplinati nel difendere gli interessi del sistema Italia. Questa fragilità può anche essere la nostra forza. Abbiamo meno remore storiche nell’affrontare il grande salto in avanti verso l’unione politica.

In campo militare, per un singolare paradosso, l’industria italiana potrebbe arrivare in condizioni migliori all’appuntamento dell’integrazione. Legata all’esperienza della crisi Efim e della ristrutturazione Finmeccanica, si è trovata ad attuare con largo anticipo quel processo di concentrazione in atto su tutti i maggiori mercati nazionali europei. A confronto con l’inizio degli anni Cinquanta, il settore ha oggi meno addetti ed una organizzazione produttiva passata da un’alta percentuale di dispersione e di sovrapposizione ad una concentrazione a pochi poli industriali. La leadership degli Stati Uniti è stata legittimata dalla storia di due guerre mondiali ed alcuni paesi europei possono considerarla più rassicurante della preponderanza di paesi vicini del nostro continente. In assenza di una forza europea sufficientemente organizzata per essere credibile, e soprattutto in assenza di una volontà dell’Unione di porsi come attore strategico responsabile, gli Stati Uniti saranno, in ogni crisi, costretti ad intervenire. In qualche modo, tanto più essi sono potenti, tanto meno sono liberi. Per questo l’ascesa dell’Europa coincide anche con l’interesse americano. Mi sembra, del resto, che le conclusioni del Vertice atlantico del cinquantenario ne siano la riprova.

La tragedia del Kosovo rilancia pienamente il sistema delle istituzioni internazionali. Abbiamo visto, a guerra ancora aperta, una riflessione sull’avvenire dei Balcani, tradottasi poi, dopo la fine del conflitto, nel Patto di sSabilità e nella assunzione di responsabilità delle Nazioni Unite per la riconciliazione e la ricostruzione. Del resto l’architettura economica mondiale che ha garantito il nostro benessere per mezzo secolo era stata varata a Bretton Woods nel 1944, ben prima che finisse la guerra. Tale era la lungimiranza degli alleati che, senza ancora la certezza di vincere, già preparavano una pace durevole.

L’Alleanza Atlantica, dal fallimento di Rambouillet fino alla ripresa del negoziato attraverso il G-8, era stata l’unica istituzione internazionale impegnata nella crisi. È grazie al G-8, alla sua iniziativa, che si è ricomposto il binomio forza-diplomazia. rilanciando le prospettive di una soluzione politica e anche, a più lunga scadenza, il ritorno della Jugoslavia nel novero delle nazioni democratiche. Il ricorso al G-8 conferma quanto sarebbe erroneo voler tener fuori la Russia dalla definizione degli assetti europei. I russi, come i serbi, sono popoli europei, ma gli imperi di cui sono figli lo erano solo in parte. Russi e serbi sono le due nazioni sfortunate dell’Europa post-comunista, parzialmente eterogenee, come l’Europa ortodossa rispetto al continente, traumatizzate e ferite nel loro orgoglio, nel crollo dei sistemi politici che avevano imposto anche ad altri. Ma proprio perché a Mosca non regna più un regime totalitario, sarebbe un errore ricacciare ai margini del continente la nazione russa, ignorare i suoi interessi di sicurezza, la sua aspirazione a partecipare alle decisioni che riguardano l’Europa. Il negoziato ha preso le mosse dal G-8 ma si è concluso nel contesto delle Nazioni Unite. Le Nazioni Unite hanno conferito alla pace il crisma di una autorevolezza superiore.

Due considerazioni mi sembrano importanti per l’avvenire. Innanzitutto il ruolo crescente del G-8 come strumento di prevenzione e di gestione delle crisi internazionali. Lo abbiamo visto nel Kosovo, ma anche, in precedenza, nel conflitto India-Pakistan. Forse, domani, in altri conflitti irrisolti. In secondo luogo, è giusto che l’Alleanza intervenga in situazioni di emergenza, è opportuno che possa agire con rapidità, non essere ostacolata da veti pretestuosi. È tuttavia ineludibile che, a più lontana scadenza, ogni assetto duraturo di pace venga ricondotto alla logica universalmente accettata delle Nazioni Unite. Interessante è stato, nella crisi del Kosovo, il rapporto tra l’azione del G-8 e quella del Consiglio di Sicurezza.

Ecco dunque l’ultima lezione del Kosovo. Portare avanti la riforma delle Nazioni Unite, in termini di efficacia e rappresentatività. Soprattutto dell’istituzione responsabile in primo luogo della pace e della stabilità internazionale, il Consiglio di Sicurezza.
 
 

Contents
 
 
 
 

1. The security dimension: the role of NATO and the future of ESDI

• The NATO campaign in Kosovo

• The evolution of a European security architecture

• After Bosnia and Kosovo

2. The economic and civilian dimension: the role of the EU and other multilateral organisations

• EU strategies of stabilisation and integration in the Balkans

• The Stability Pact

• Democratisation in South-eastern Europe

3. Post conflict regional politics

• Stability in South-eastern Europe
• The future of the FRY

The NATO campaign in Kosovo

The NATO campaign in Kosovo not only was the first war conducted by the Alliance against a sovereign state, but also a war fought for somewhat unusual purposes: it was not a war of vital interests in a traditional sense. Some participants argued that, had vital national interests been at stake, the West (and especially the USA) would not have been so careful about its own losses. Nonetheless, public opinion was rallied for the campaign through two arguments: humanitarian intervention and the fact that the "Balkans" belong to the European region. Thus, in a sense what we have witnessed is a partial redefinition of the meaning of "vital interests", moving in much more inclusive direction.

In terms of success or failure of the campaign, and, more importantly, of the entire strategy, much depends on how either of them is defined and which goals were actually set by the major players during the crisis. Significant ambiguity derives from the circumstance that "success" was redefined in various ways – upwards, downwards and, one might say, sideways – in the course of the air campaign, by emphasising different aspects (stopping ethnic cleansing, standing up to internal repression, creating the conditions for rapid refugee return, etc.) and different time frames (affecting events on the ground in Kosovo, offering the Kosovo Albanians a better prospect for the future, stabilising the region for the long term, etc.).

From both a military and a diplomatic-political viewpoint, it certainly was not an impeccable campaign: there were major conceptual flaws, incorrect assumptions, and operational mistakes. Both the Europeans and the Americans are to be held responsible for these serious limitations, while assigning responsibility for specific events or decisions is difficult and probably pointless. Part of the reason for the failures which did occur, especially in terms of deterrence, is that the West did not act at the right time. With regard to Kosovo, the West had an early warning ten years ago, so an appreciation of the risks was certainly not lacking. According to some participants, what was lacking was the political will to act rapidly, for instance by building up forces in Macedonia and Albania, a situation that was compounded by the insufficient level of deployable forces actually available. These two aspects – political will and usable capabilities – can hardly be separated and provide a powerful rationale for the West’s decision-making process.

It was also argued that, paradoxically, the NATO air campaign succeeded precisely because it was failing: Milosevic decided to give in just as NATO was pushed into a corner and was about to resort to the use of ground forces or at least was ready to threaten such a move. On the other hand, and on the basis of different assumptions, it can be argued that NATO’s campaign was successful, if by this we mean that it ultimately bent the will of the opponent. Furthermore, its "success" was achieved by following its original strategy, i.e. without resort to ground troops in an offensive mode. This however does not imply that the strategy itself was a good one, much less a perfect one. One way to evaluate the success of NATO’s campaign is to look at hypothetical alternative scenarios. Had NATO not intervened, one possible scenario would have been the displacement of hundreds of thousands of refugees, maybe even up to one million, the continuation of fighting between the UCK and Serb forces that could have led to the creation of a UCK-governed mini-state in northern Albania and perhaps even in western Macedonia, and to a radicalisation of ethnic tensions in Macedonia.

The question whether the war was "right" was another issue raised. It was argued that the West fought the wrong war: the objectives were not sufficient, because uprooting the political regime in FRY did not constitute one of the stated aims. In any event, NATO’s success was not in achieving a solution to instability: it was primarily in preserving its own role as crisis manager. In other words, it was argued that NATO’s success consisted of demonstrating the unity of the alliance at a time of great pressure. This unity was centred on the perception that Milosevic was the core problem of regional instability. But this view does not add up to a policy. NATO’s success thus may well evolve into a partial failure in that, at least under current conditions, it cannot lead to stability. If the strategy of the West simply consists of continuing to wage war to Milosevic – not necessarily an open war – no amount of military force or allied cohesion will ever be a substitute for a consistent policy. The West may have shown its ability to conduct a sustained bombing campaign, but certainly has not demonstrated its potential for stabilising a troubled region.

Ten years ago it would have been almost impossible to imagine that NATO would be so deeply involved in Balkan politics in the span of a decade. But it is by no means clear that this growing role is the result of "learning" and thus increased effectiveness.

The outcome of the war in Kosovo

The future of Kosovo is still unclear: there is no clear mandate, no peace settlement and thus no smooth path to a positive political evolution. Behind these uncertainties, there is no agreement on how the province should be run, notwithstanding the enormous objective difficulties on the ground and in the surrounding region on the way to political, economic and social/civic development. What appears to be clear according to many participants, is that Kosovo’s independence is likely, if not inevitable. On the other hand, it was argued that the ambiguities of the Kosovo settlement could create a positive outcome compared to the settlement in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because they allow space for evolution. One of the problems with Bosnia and Herzegovina is precisely that its settlement is almost set in stone. The degree of ambiguity left in Kosovo might become constructive and useful, allowing space for evolution. Lasting security or stabilisation must also include internal and trans-border security issues, such as organised crime and widespread corruption.

The evolution of the European security architecture

The crisis-driven rationale of the European security architecture does not appear to be waning, and Kosovo is not necessarily the last crisis in South-eastern Europe, although it may prove to be the one but last. The Europeans have so far done very little to learn from their experiences, such as the Bosnian one. The Treaty of Amsterdam, with its extremely modest – and mostly linguistic – changes with regard to the evolution of a Common Foreign and Security Policy, is one example forcefully illustrating the argument. It was only during the first half of 1998, when the UK held the Presidency of the EU, that Tony Blair realised the inadequacies of the European military capabilities. This is the background to the St. Malo bilateral agreement between the UK and France, with the important novelty of these two key countries seeking consensus on such issues. Germany also seized the momentum by helping to push the process forward, and Austria played a part under its Presidency during the second half of 1998.

The case for strengthening the EU as an international actor in political and military terms as well as economic is reinforced by the evolution of US politics and of the EU itself. In the US there is a growing deconstruction of the political system and a divergence between its perspectives on security problems and those of the EU. The US is increasingly concerned with Asia as opposed to focusing primarily on Europe. In the EU, partly because of the "domestication" of the traditional foreign policy arena, security problems are bound to increase – not decrease – as the Union expands. The threat is no longer external, but increasingly internalised. The momentum of European integration requires a whole new level of decision-making. The EU will probably have to become more "imperial" in dealing with external issues. More centralised decision-making would be part of such evolution towards a more imperial type of structure and policies.

There is a growing willingness among the European countries to start tackling defence issues as a collective problem. But, with regard to the relations with the US and, more specifically, to burden-sharing, the US still wants to see the actual defence capabilities deployed – or ready to be deployed. Indeed, various participants questioned the sustainability of current burden-sharing arrangements of the Kosovo type between the US and the Europeans: if we assume that continuing American commitment at current levels is unlikely, then either "constructive abstention" on the part of the US in the context of the CJTF mechanism, or "benign neglect" in the context of EU-led crisis response arrangements will be the norm in the near future. Both solutions will place high demands on the Europeans.

A broad consensus emerged on the principle that without capabilities there are no responsibilities. But a discussion on the means to achieve strengthened European capabilities revealed different views of the participants. The Kosovo campaign has shown that the major European powers have the capacity to perform some limited functions in a satisfactory manner, and the possibility of improving their capabilities significantly in the span of about a decade from now. In this perspective, it was argued that the most obvious convergence criterion might be to bring the key indexes of military effectiveness, such as resources spent on R&D, to current British levels. At the same time, the war in Kosovo displayed the overall weakness of the European states’ military capabilities, though not so much in terms of the quality of individual platforms and aircraft. The real difference is that the European states do not possess the right equipment in the right proportion (even leaving aside the quantitative "firepower" gap vis-à-vis the US).

The combined European defence expenditure is equal to 60% of the US’s, a fairly high proportion given that Europe does not have the commitments the US has in the Pacific. Yet the average European levels of productivity are infinitely smaller that those of the US. European security industry is fragmented and its production is not in demand any longer. Territorial protection belongs to the past; what is now needed is power projection.

In a sense, the whole debate on a European Security and Defence "Identity" is probably misguided, as ESDI as a concept (and as an acronym) is never mentioned in any EU document. How exactly to get from a common appreciation of the problem at hand to an acceptable solution still remains an open question. Some advocate the adoption of a strategy of convergence criteria for defence in a process à la Jean Monnet, within a firm institutional framework and a strong collective commitment to be made from the inception of the process. Of course, the specificity of the defence sector should not be ignored: the notion of convergence criteria need not be understood in a strict sense, and complex qualitative indicators would have to be adopted in order to identify benchmarks. An alternative path would resemble the Schengen mechanism, in which a new ad hoc regime is created and later placed back into the EU institutional framework.

The main objection to the notion of convergence criteria as such was its viability as a policy tool, given the practical and rather urgent nature of the European requirements in the defence sector. A second major obstacle emerges when confronting the issue of what Europe wants to be in terms of its presence in the world and the development of its still embryonic Common Foreign and Security Policy. It is hard to imagine a Common Defence Policy without an established a recognisable CFSP. Indeed, the Council of Defence Ministers meets within the General Affairs Council. The implication is that the development of a Common Defence Policy is foreign policy led. And with regard to implementation, it is up to the Council to decide whether to recourse to NATO capabilities or not. Thus, the institutional machinery that the EU would put in place to govern a future Common Defence Policy will have an important role on the development of the policy itself and on its chance of success.

Another basic problem for the development of an EU Common Defence Policy is the incomplete overlap between EU and NATO members, which will inevitably complicate the institutional machinery. In any case, there is a compelling agenda for the near future that includes three major requirements:

• solving a number of technical problems;

• focusing all efforts on achieving the goal of more deployable forces, rather than pursuing "a bigger bang for a buck";

• answering a much broader question: what kind of international actor does the EU aspire to become? This is especially important because the Common Security and Defence Policy comes under the CFSP pillar and is thus inherently linked to the general policy choices the EU will make.

After Bosnia and Kosovo

The West seems to have learnt very little from the transformation of the world since the fall of the Berlin Wall; at present, the "international community" seems even less eager to learn from experience. Nonetheless, after the war in Kosovo, none of the European and Transatlantic institutions will remain the same. Adopting a market analogy, the question today is how to shift NATO’s and the EU’s "products" toward what is now in demand in the security field. The additional difficulty is that in this particular case defining a "demand" requires strong institutional decision-making body with a clear leading role in determining what is required of each organisation.

A fundamental weakness of our collective "security architecture" is that it remains essentially crisis-driven, and often poorly connected to the local implications of allegedly "stabilising" initiatives and various types of external interventions. To make matters much more complicated, the "lessons" we appear to learn are ambiguous or even misleading. Among other things, very different "lessons of Bosnia" were drawn in Washington and London and in the European capitals: the Anglo-Saxon world seems to have concluded that only NATO can do things; the rest of Europe seems to have become convinced that the European allies should do more. This difference in perceptions has wide implications. Another lesson learned in Bosnia is probably that a division between military and civilian dimensions is needed, but this means that in Kosovo the EU is practically relegated to dealing with economic issues. Also as a consequence of the Bosnia experience, a sort of formal dictatorship of the UN has been set up in Kosovo, where UNMIK has responsibility even for police tasks.

Some participants drew attention to the danger of a certain trend in the US Congress and in some quarters of the military, which would favour letting the Europeans take care of the minor crises while the US would be more willing to opt out. Some recent European proposals seem to be designed to actually encourage this opt out solution.

Again, from the experience in Bosnia, it also has emerged that there are two dimensions crucial to the definition of security: the internal and the external. At the internal level of individual security the institutions are in need of better coordination and improved warning systems. In particular, the military needs to coordinate with the police. Moreover, from the point of view of institutions, reliance on the International Tribunal of The Hague for the indictment of war criminals is no longer sufficient. At the level of external security, there is an underlying but crucial problem in the definition of the region: where does the region end, and how should regional cooperation be pursued in practice? In particular, how much should the West invest in the region as opposed to investing in countries that seem to have a much higher geopolitical importance in the long run, e.g. Ukraine? If we include South-eastern Europe into the broader European security framework, on what basis do we practically exclude a country like Russia? Thus, despite some evidence that an open door policy provides a good incentive to stabilisation, it remains doubtful whether it consists of the best policy. The other fundamental and unresolved issue is whether the mini-states that have been created are viable and what conception of security can realistically be applied to them in the absence of strong external guarantees.

All of these issues combined raise the question on the fundamental nature of our security institutions and the principles on which they are based, as well as the practical mechanisms on which they operate. The learning process may well have reached the point where basic questions of principle need to be answered: absent this effort of clarification, only ad hoc remedies will be possible.

In the long-term, a tripolar security architecture might be emerging, formed by the Cold War actors of the bipolar world plus the European Union. The EU is a superpower in the making, though it still requires an entirely new level of decision-making.

It was suggested that Europe is developing a new kind of Breznev doctrine. The sphere of influence is limited to Europe, although there is no clear view of what Europe actually is and where its frontiers are. In practice it means that the EU will exercise greater pressure on Turkey with regard to the Kurdish question, but not necessarily on Russia with regard to Chechnya. With regard to relations with Russia, it was agreed that the involvement of the former superpower in seeking a solution to the Kosovo crisis was a necessary step. Yet doubts were expressed whether the NATO campaign has improved in any way the West’s relations with Russia, not to mention China and the non-aligned world.

2. The economic and civilian dimension: the role of the EU and other multilateral organisations

EU strategies of stabilisation and integration in the Balkans

A conceptual map of Europe was proposed and discussed as an analytical tool to devise an overall strategy for South-eastern Europe. According to this reading, there are three major dynamics in the post-communist transition and in the evolving geopolitics of Europe. The first dynamic converges towards the EU’s imperfect order, what can be symbolically described as Cosmos and illustrated by the relatively successful cases of Poland and the other countries in line for the next round of EU enlargement. The second is Chaos, a road that leads to uncertainty and is exemplified by Russia. The third dynamic is represented by former Yugoslavia and can be best described as Conflict. The EU and the international community in general now have three options: the integration of the countries of South-eastern Europe into the structures of the EU; the establishment of an international regime in the region; or to leave the region to its own devices. In order to launch a complex strategy, a vision becomes necessary, no matter the obstacles that will be encountered along the way. The alternative is to wait and be driven or pushed by successive crises. As a cautionary note, it was added that although is important to have a vision and set ambitious goals, one must be careful about offering unrealistic expectations.

In terms of policy and of means, proponents of innovative integration strategies argued very strongly in favour of the establishment of a Free Trade Area with the EU and between the countries of the region. This is viewed as a top priority because the economies of these countries have no chance of survival as protected economies. A related requirement is to tie the countries of South-eastern Europe to the euro through the interim step of adopting the Deutsche-mark as the only currency. However, it was also noted that the euro-isation of the currency is not necessarily a recipe to success: in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the established currency board has not succeeded in attracting foreign direct investments. Another priority is to increase the efficiency of the EU’s programmes, where some improvements might soon be visible under the new Prodi administration. Also, in order to promote a truly regional approach, the European Agency for Reconstruction should not only be limited to Kosovo.

The proposed overall strategy, centred on the role of the EU, would prescribe a series of urgent practical steps, such as directly helping Montenegro develop more institutional structures by also channelling significant amounts of financial aid, in addition to the needed diplomatic support and encouragement. The surrounding countries that have not been directly involved in the conflict but have suffered damage, such as Bulgaria and Romania, should have accelerated prospects of accession to the EU.

However, integration strategies would be accompanied by numerous problems, sufficient to foster scepticism among some participants in the Colloquium. Current conditions in the region constitute a serious obstacle to an integration strategy into the EU. The first paramount problem regards the political and territorial order. Bosnia and Herzegovina does not function as a state and the status of Kosovo is yet unsettled and likely to remain so for the foreseeable future. Montenegro and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia both risk disintegration. This territorial instability and uncertainty over statehood and sovereignty clash with the traditional model of Western European integration that rests on the "pooling" of sovereignty on behalf of established nation-states.

Integration strategies also do not take fully into account the socio-economic conditions of the area and its underdevelopment, which makes the definition itself of a South-eastern European region extremely fragile. With an official illiteracy rate of 25% – and with a much higher rate of secondary illiteracy –, with a societal structure in many areas based on extended families and clan networks, South-eastern Europe is better defined as a non-region. The modernisation implicit in the integration project cannot function overnight. This issue of timing has profound implications because a major problem connected to the structure of these societies is that of organised crime and of the links between politics and criminality, which we often disregard while devising our regional strategies. Therefore, not only the formal institutional structure of local societies needs to change, but also deep-rooted practices and customs.

A controversial question is that of prestige and influence over local leaderships and societies: some argued that in the region, prestige is a key asset that could help implementation. But in the area the only international organisation that has prestige seems to be NATO, which is perceived overwhelmingly as North American. Instead, the EU is not seen as having a sufficient capacity to attract local societies and elites. Yet the entire approach based on the above mentioned conceptual map of Europe presupposes a strong EU capable of attracting the countries of the region and affecting their choices.

The Stability Pact

The first response of the international community to the reconstruction of South-eastern Europe and its integration into European institutional structures is the Stability Pact. The Stability Pact should be interpreted as a shell, a framework within which to channel international involvement. Although characterised by ambiguity, it constitutes an attempt to build a long-term approach and is considered appropriate because it addresses a wide range of areas. The Stability Pact also presents a number of shortcomings. Justice, arms control and corruption, for example, also need to be addressed, as well as the implication of freedom of movement of the labour force. With regard to the FRY, it reveals no clear-cut view on the conditions imposed by the international community: when and how should FRY be included in the Stability Pact? For how long should its international isolation last? Other uncertainties regard the role of Russia, a difficult negotiator in the Stability Pact, and how it will develop its role in the region.

The Stability Pact confirmed the principle that all countries of South-eastern Europe could integrate into the EU. This leaves open the question of Turkey. Overall, the Stability Pact seems to represent more of a pact between international institutions than a pact for the region. In this perspective, it was argued that the biggest problem with regard to integration strategies may not be the policies themselves – which may be optimistic but at least express a vision – but rather the institutional rivalries that might emerge. The difficulty is compounded by the fact that member states of international organisations have a tendency to support different positions in different international fora. This being the case, some participants argued that the only solution to this major coordination dilemma is for the EU to be in the driving seat in implementing the Stability Pact.

But it is also likely that the EU member states themselves will be reluctant to integrate countries with such a disproportionate economic, political and social structure compared to the member states of the EU. Doubts range from the capacity of the institutions to absorb such diverse countries and such a long list of them, potentially reaching a total number of thirty five including Turkey, Moldavia and the Ukraine. To give an example, the EU as it stands does not have the institutional capabilities to control criminality within its borders. The risk is to empty the EU of its political significance.

Democratisation in South-eastern Europe

The complex issue of democratisation is paramount in South-eastern Europe, especially in former Yugoslavia. If economic reform and growth do not go hand in hand with democratisation, they will have a limited impact. Economic reform and growth alone do not bring democracy. Also, a little democracy – i.e. an incomplete or cosmetic transition to democratic practices – can be dangerous. What is instead necessary is to develop democracy at the level of the citizens. With regard to Kosovo, the timing of the elections is critical and it should occur only once a degree of democracy at the level of the citizens is established. And without the rule of law there can be no democracy.

Cross-sectoral ties help repair horizontal solidarity; trans-frontier cooperation can foster better inter-ethnic relations. All these processes are linked to each other and will have to occur in parallel, if not simultaneously. What is crucial is not give up on the notion of multi-ethnicity. A multi-ethnic society needs to be created from below; it would consist of a long "war" conducted on the ground, a process to rebuild institutions and good relations with neighbours starting from the grassroots.

Once again, a major challenge will be the coordination between the various organisations and agencies involved. In this context, the role of NGOs is particularly important, especially local ones, precisely as promoters of grassroots democratisation and more open societies. The concerted effort of the international community will also present numerous challenges. The first problem will be in defining its approach to local leaderships: whether and how to support local leaderships and which ones to support. In this area bilateral initiatives tend to prevail over multilateral ones, especially in Serbia, but the same problem exists in Albania. Therefore, there is a need to establish a balance between bilateral and multilateral activities.

The complex issue of democratisation cannot be circumvented because it is inextricably linked to Western policies: in particular, what kind of conditionality should be applied in implementing any of the programmes for the region. On the one hand, it was argued that the integration strategy proposed for the countries of South-eastern Europe upsets the principle of conditionality that has formed the basis of the current rounds of enlargement, consisting rather of a pledge to integrate the countries of South-eastern Europe into the EU. On the other hand, conditionality has to become an incentive, and its principle will remain in place at the level of opening the negotiations for the Association Agreements. Indeed, the prospect of integration does consist of a different concept of enlargement, different from the classic enlargement method.

With regard to individual countries, it was mentioned that Croatia is an especially relevant case: according to some, the country should be told unambiguously that it should change government; in Serbia the chances of a change of government are increasing with opposition taking to the streets, but that process also needs to be encouraged as much as possible.

The future of Kosovo is inextricably tied to that of the FRY and its future as a multi-ethnic society is at risk. In fact, war in Kosovo raised expectations of separatism, perhaps making the multi-ethnic ideal unrealistic. Yet the West should not encourage separatism in any way. Redrawing the boundaries to create mono-ethnicity leads to instability. The economic reconstruction of Kosovo needs to be accompanied by economic reform and economic policy. Reconstruction alone does not solve the problems of economic growth. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, economic output is still less than half its pre-war levels, though the country has been largely reconstructed. One incentive and policy option would be for the international community to give up on aid and start relying on local resources to stimulate growth and productivity.

At a broader level, doubts were voiced by some participants on the realistic possibility of applying a Western model of democracy to the Balkan region, especially if this is to be attempted within a short time frame in order to be able to show visible results. The wars in former Yugoslavia have only touched the tip of the iceberg. What is left after the wars is the iceberg, and it is debatable whether the West has the capabilities of changing the world the way it wants. The international community can probably only tackle the periphery by producing some improvements on the margin. In any case, the pace of change is bound to be slow and frustrating, testing the West’s will, endurance, and especially its ability to generate an adequate level of public and political attention.

The difficulties in implementing the "best" policies, suitable to the region as well as to the "international community", therefore reveal a deeper problem at the political and philosophical level. The regional perspective is probably the best approach, but how does one define the region of South-eastern Europe? The impact of the disintegration of former Yugoslavia on the broader area has been such that a definition of South-eastern Europe limited to segments of former Yugoslavia is not sufficient or comprehensive. One definition could include former Yugoslavia plus Albania, and go further to include Bulgaria and Romania and perhaps even Hungary. A broader definition could extend to Greece, Turkey and Italy. A circumscribed definition of the region implies that the region is one of continuing weakness and that includes a cultural dependency where everything comes in from the outside. A broader definition would become one of weaknesses and strengths, characterised by ties with equally involved partners.

3. Post conflict regional politics

Stability in South-eastern Europe

The debate on the political evolution within the countries of South-eastern Europe revealed differences in perspectives, especially between those foreseeing a gradual, albeit slow and difficult, transition to greater democracy and those fearing an outbreak of further ethnic conflict and territorial disputes. There was consensus in recommending change in political leadership as paramount not only in Serbia but also in Croatia and in Bosnia.

South-eastern Europe, intended as the broader region, has always risked marginalisation. The area is now on the agenda, is now worth more than one of Bismarck’s Pomeranian grenadiers. Yet, without considering former Yugoslavia, the whole area has actually been relatively stable. None of the neighbours of former Yugoslavia, such as Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania, Greece and Turkey have lived up to the disastrous predictions that circulated after the end of the Cold War and none fostered or in any way wanted 1991. For example, there has not been a revival of Bulgarian aspirations towards Macedonia; on the contrary, the two countries have recently concluded important agreements. Greece has moderated its positions. The region should not be perceived only as one of weaknesses.

In Croatia political change, at long last, is likely to be on the way. Tudjman’s mandate is until 2002, but he is gradually losing his grip and the next elections must be held by January 2000 and are likely to produce a defeat of the ruling party, which is in a state of disarray. In the country various signs indicate that there is growing confidence in the opposition. Indeed, there is opposition to Tudjman even within his party. The one issue that now makes Tudjman particularly unpopular is not so much with regard to his aspirations to partition Bosnia and Herzegovina between Croatia and the FRY, but is relationship with the Herzegovina lobby. According to one participant, the Croats have no desire to make claims over Herzegovina.

Opinion polls in Croatia are revealing a consistent growth in support to the opposition, and a credible inner core among the parties of the opposition is forming. Various signs point to political change. But there is a darker side, not least a dreadful economic situation which means that the coalition that will come to power will find state funds depleted, making every level of governance wrought with problems that could cause social unrest, in a context where social tension is increasing with privatisation. The country will have to go through a second transition under very difficult circumstances, the first one having failed. Yet prospects of a change in leadership do not mean that ethnic tensions belong to the past. Croatia is not ethnically homogeneous (nor is Slovenia) and the presence of Serb minorities could be the focus of renewed tensions. The same applies to Macedonia.

Over the fate of Bosnia and Herzegovina, still a virtual country, there are many question marks. The worst case scenario of a partitioning and of the Republica Srpska joining the FRY has not yet occurred, and even during the Kosovo war there were no lasting signs of such a scenario. The Dayton Agreement is perhaps the best deal we could have obtained though it provides barriers to Bosnia and Herzegovina’s possibilities of evolution. Changes of leadership in Croatia and in the FRY could also have a positive impact on Bosnia and Herzegovina. Corruption remains a paramount problem in Bosnia as much as it is in Croatia. Nonetheless, it was argued that the possibility of secessionist movement in Republica Srpska attempting to unify with FRY should not be ruled out. Serbs living in Bosnia might have different cultural histories from those in the FRY, but similarly, East and West Germany had developed over fifty years different economic and social structures, but this did not constitute an impediment to unification.

In Albania the question is of law and order. It is in many ways a protectorate. There was little agreement over the prospects of the idea of a Greater Albania. Some argued that fears of a nationalist/irredentist movement for a Greater Albania are not plausible given the great diversity between ethnic Albanians in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia. On the other hand, should the UCK get its way in governing Kosovo, there would be numerous cross-frontier contacts and the different ethnic Albanian groups would get to know each other. The possibility of a Greater Albania revival should thus not be dismissed. In this case, the possible emergence of a nationalist Albanian movement will also depend on Tirana and on the successful integration of UCK fighters into the governance of Kosovo.

While many participants viewed the epicentre of regional instability in Serbia, other areas of potential instability should not be forgotten. Montenegro for example remains an open chapter. Internal as well as international elements will try to prevent dismemberment, but again, much will depend on internal developments in Serbia. With regard to Albania, the problems posed by that country should not be confused with Greater Albania. The issue lies in the Albanian minorities outside the country’s borders, such as ethnic Albanians in Macedonia.

An argument in support of European integration strategies, and in particular for opening up trade, also emerged from an understanding of conditions in South-eastern Europe. Albania needs an open border with Montenegro; Montenegro needs open borders in general; and Macedonia desperately needs trade. Throughout the region political risk is the main deterrent to foreign investments. Also Romania and Bulgaria need economic normalisation, underpinned by transformation in Serbia. It seems crazy to spend money on alternative transportation routes to avoid Serbia. The greatest dangers are massive unemployment and criminal organisations, which flourish in the political vacuum of unregulated regimes. The role of neighbours is vital, especially in this earlier period, and it was argued that Italy should abandon its foreign policy position supporting a strong Serbia. Now that Serbia is weak, it is time to support countries like Montenegro. Greece is another country that can play a very important role in the reconstruction of the region.

The future of the FRY

Shifting the focus to former Yugoslavia, the defeat of Milosevic is likely to lead to a new balance of power, potentially creating a basis for the stabilisation of relations within the region, even though in realist terms the military balance of power is shifting in favour of Croatia. The amputation of Kosovo from Serbia is probably the best step towards democratisation. Serbia’s defeat could be a cathartic defeat. Currently, opposition and public opinion are deeply divided. Public opinion is in a state of shock and ranges from anger towards Milosevic, simple suffering, feelings of betrayal and bitterness over the loss of Kosovo, and there is potential of radicalisation stemming from the Serb refugees from Kosovo. Furthermore, given their international isolation, the Serbs are in denial. There also is a huge potential for the criminalisation of the economic system.

The transformation of Serbia was widely recognised as a precondition for regional stability; until there is political risk, the region will not be able to grow economically and until the economy grows, the region will remain unstable. Thus stabilisation actually means change and change is not going to happen on its own: it has to be prepared. Given the current conditions in Serbia, negative outcomes are likely. But the risks of instability are changing. The greatest risks in the region are no longer wars (with the war in Kosovo, Serbia as a military power has been defeated) but the consequences of unemployment and organised crime.

With regard to Serbia, there are three possible scenarios, though it is hard to make predictions at this time. The most likely scenario is that Milosevic will stay in power. He has so far managed to succeed in holding power by forming coalitions and by playing members of any opposition against each other. The Serb population will blame NATO and the West for their misery. In Kosovo, the UCK will de facto govern the province and will start gaining an increasingly political role in Macedonia. This scenario is one of great instability that would produce new outcomes.

Another less likely possibility is that Milosevic loses power over the next 3-4 months. Opposition groups within Serbia are adamant that there will be a change in leadership; Montenegro is strongly emphasising its economic desperation and its immediate need to open up to the West. Indeed, there is huge disappointment within the Serb population as the numerous demonstrations are proving. Yet the alliance in opposition to Milosevic has lost its binding feature since the NATO campaign: a pro-Western attitude. The Alliance for Change is gathering over 50 political and social groupings but it still lacks the support of Draskovic, and it will take time to rally him to its side. It will also take time for new leaders to emerge. The opposition forces in Serbia need more time and more exposure to the West. They are not ready to take political risks. Institutionally, it is hard to get rid of Milosevic who cannot resign because of his indictment by the International Tribunal.

The third possible scenario is total collapse through state failure, on the lines of Albania in 1997. This would be exacerbated by an unemployment rate which officially is at 33%. The consequences of state failure are fragmentation in Montenegro, Vojvodina, and perhaps in some towns. This would definitely determine the loss of Kosovo on part of the FRY, would make Bosnia even more frail, and could cause spillover consequences not only in Macedonia but also in other parts of the wider region, such as in Transilvania. Within Serbia Milosevic would have free rein in creating a truly Serbian nation-state, which in turn would provoke a huge refugee flow into Western Europe. With regard to Kosovo, the province is virtually independent, though the continuation of relations between Pristina and Belgrade will be essential whatever the developments between the two countries: they will have to find a rapprochement.

Some policy recommendations for western policy towards Serbia emerged.

• In the economic sphere, the EU can have a role in providing aid and cooperation. Aid should be directed to Serbia and can be done without going through the government and government-related channels. Aid can be targeted to a wide range of bodies without supporting the regime, such as the private sector and elements of society, such as education institutions, without following the territorial rationale generally used by the West. The aim should be to change the conditions that have kept Milosevic in power so far, not to change the leadership. If the conditions remain unchanged, the next leadership will face the same problems.
• Give time to the Serbian democratic forces: they need exposure to the West and to learn to take political risks.
• Help Montenegro not to have to make the choice of independence from the FRY. Indeed, Montenegro is a key element within FRY. The redefinition of its status might be opposed not only by Milosevic but also by any other Serb leadership.

• Minimise the duration of protectorates in Bosnia, Kosovo, Albania and Macedonia. Until they are protectorates, there is no trade, no contact and exchange with neighbouring countries and there is no chance for economic recovery.
• End sanctions.

Three recent developments mean that European Defence and the effective development of a Common Defence Policy for Europe are now on the agenda. These are the recognition by the British govemment that there is no contradiction between being a good Atlanticist and a good European, linked with the acknowledgement both in London and Paris as well as other European capitals that what is now important is not endless discussion of institutions but how to establish deployable European military capabilities. The third development is the growing recognition that, as the armed forces of European countries are reduced in the post-Cold War situation and adjusted to the expeditionary aspect of their new roles, there is a strong case for reducing the duplication in the national support for the armed forces of Europe by creating common elements and services. As front-line combat forces have been reduced, the necessary supporting infrastructure including headquarters, planning centres and training units have been maintained at disproportionate cost to provide for the much reduced combat capability.

What are now needed are ways of developing a European Security and Defence Capability which will make both the European contribution to the new tasks of NATO more effective as well as giving the European Union access to a defence capability which will give credibility to its foreign and security policy. It now seems likely that following the Franco-British agreement in December at St. Malo institutional arrangements will be made to integrate the military planning capabilities of WEU into the CFSP and make them available to the Council and all the EU member states. The collective defence guarantee of Article V of the Brussels Treaty can be preserved, as a protocol to the Treaty of European Union (TEU) for the present ten full members of WEU. It also seems possible that a grand-fathering arrangement can be made for Turkey, Norway and Iceland to preserve their rights as Associate Members of WEU, comparable to that made for Norway and Iceland as members of the Nordic Passport Union when the Schengen provisions were incorporated into the TEU at the Amsterdam IGC. The three might become known as Security Associates of the European Union.

The development of the Common Defence Policy for the European Union, like the United Kingdom’s Strategic Defence Review, should be foreign policy led; that is the scale and the scope of the armed forces will be determined by the objectives of foreign policy developed within the CFSP as well as those derived for those member states who are also members of the North Atlantic Alliance from their NATO obligations. This should not lead to any decoupling of European countries from their NATO obligations. Nor should there be any duplication of the critical contribution to military cooperation provided by NATO, namely its command structures and headquarters, although certain developments of "double-hatting" could take place. The most effective way for the members of the European Union to "get more deployable forces for a euro" is by systematically developing economies of scales in the support, training and operational management of their armed forces.

In the present situation, we are more likely to be able to improve Europe’s effectiveness by eliminating such unnecessary duplication rather than trying to increase the defence budgets of the member states of the European Union. This is the most practical way of tackling the challenge of the recent analysis by the Brookings Institution which asserts that "despite spending two thirds of what the United States does on defense, European NATO countries have less than 10 per cent of the transportable defense capability for prompt long range action". An equally challenging demonstration of Europe’s relative ineffectiveness is provided by the claim of a senior British official that if NATO had undertaken air strikes in October/November 1998 against Serbia, 86% of the sorties would have been provided by the United States.

Throughout its development successive stages of integration in the European Union have been argued for by demonstrating the "costs of non-Europe". Now this is becoming apparent in the area of post Cold War defence, where duplication of support elements of European defence structures which at least provided some extra resilience for Cold War scenarios is no longer justifiable or affordable. Another technique derived from the historical experience of the European integration has been to go for a progressive stage-by-stage approach rather than a "big bang". The application of this to the case of defence has recently been argued by Emma Bonino in an unfortunately titled but useful analysis. She draws on the model of the EMU but there are also lessons to be learnt from the Common Agricultural Policy which was introduced over a period of years with a series of different regimes for different commodities. The parallel for this in the development of a Common Defence Policy would be to build on a series of common European Force Elements (EFEs).

There are two approaches whereby duplication between European armed forces could be eliminated and additional resources thereby made available for increased force effectiveness. One would be in the common development of new projects, the other is the development of common support and logistic services. An existing Alliance example of the former is in the common procurement and operation by fourteen allies of the AWACS, (airborne early warning and control) aircraft. An example of the latter is the way in which the four Nordic countries providing troops to IFOR/SFOR are supported by a common logistic battalion. In a different way the agreement by the Netherlands and Belgian navies to develop common headquarters and support services for their fleets is an elimination of expensive duplication.

In attempting to identify early candidates for the fìrst approach of common procurement of new projects, the fact that the armed forces of different countries want new tanks or new fighter aircraft at different times will be produced as a major objection. This can best be solved by concentrating on new projects on which there is a widely shared common requirement. The second approach could be a systematic analysis of support and logistic services to see where these could be provided on a Europe wide basis or for a group of countries procuring a common item of equipment.

An immediate example is the Medium Scale Transport Aircraft for which common tenders are being sought by seven European countries, as well as the proposed large Strategic Air Lift projects; these are two examples where common procurement and common operation could be considered with the reduction of the number of operating bases leading to more cost effective solutions. These could be early examples of European Force Elements. The development of a common European flight refuelling service could also be examined. In the longer term the common support and servicing of helicopters could make sense.

The Eurofighter, already ordered by five countries, could provide a trial for a number of the concepts. There have been many lessons learned from the National Tornado Training Establishment at RAF Cottesmore. One might imagine an operationally ready force of some 400 Eurofighters made up of 20 multinational squadrons distributed over five airbases. In addition an operational training base on a sixth base would be required. The training base could also provide a home for the European Union Eurofighter HQ (the equivalent of an RAF Group HQ). The operating costs would be much less than the planned national arrangements. The key to success would be the application of common training procedures and aircraft modification programmes. By making each unit truly multinational and by developing the overall operational policy through the EU HQ, the weaknesses of the TTTE would be avoided. In the marine environment one can cumulate existing capacities and provide common supply services, possibly leading to a rationalisation of the number of European naval bases. Fleet auxiliaries can be envisaged as developing a common European service. Moving to European Force Elements, an early candidate would be a European mine counter measure service, and the principle could be applied lo larger ships. France, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom all wish to have some aircraft carrier capability; could it be provided by a common squadron thereby providing savings in support and logistic chains, while also ensuring that a viable force was available at all times? In addition a European lead Combined Joint Task Force in the maritime environment at present lacks a satisfactory headquarters ship; one, or more, of these could be acquired on a common basis.

It would make sense to begin the approach to land forces by looking at engineers, communications, transport and medical services, which could provide the first common programmes. The wider fìeld of logistic support could follow and an early candidate would therefore be the development of common IT systems for logistics. The question of outsourcing logistic and support services is now under active consideration in a number of European countries. There would be economies through the working out of common specifications and the use of a limited number of common suppliers. Success in these areas would enable a subsequent application of the approach of European Force Elements to artillery, armour and infantry units.

There are some force elements which are provided jointly to all armed services. Some of these, like protection against nuclear, biological and chemical warfare are obvious candidates for common provision. Others, such as intelligence and mapping, are more difficult because of traditional transatlantic patterns of cooperation, but it would be a mistake for the development of a separable NATO for any capability to depend on a single ally, even the United States.

These examples suggest some areas where the development of European Force Elements and common support and logistic services could provide building blocks for the strengthening of European defence capabilities by the more effective use of European defence budgets through the removal of the cost overhang of separate support systems. It would also be necessary to develop common budgeting arrangements in order to avoid any accusation of countries getting a "free-ride". Columns 1 and 2 suggest how this might develop on a staged basis over 15 years.

The development of a Common Defence Policy in this way could have parallels in increased force planning at a European level to ensure that there were the required capabilities for the Petersberg tasks of peacekeeping, the use of the military for humanitarian tasks and peace-enforcement which the European Union would undertake as part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy. This would not in any way reduce the importance of the NATO force plannlng process, it might in time simplify it. Nor would it change the continued use of NATO headquarters through CJTFs, but could progressively lead to a higher degree of integration of European forces within the Alliance Command Structure. Columns 3 and 4 suggest how this could develop to ensure a European military pillar of the Alliance. It suggests that the highest European officers in the NATO command structure would be double-hatted for their European functions in exactly the same way as the most senior US commanders have always had US command responsibilities.

These suggestions do not move in the much more sensitive area of national allegiances. Servicemen and women would still be recruited, given basic training, and paid by national governments to whom their basic loyalty would remain. In any event those nations with defence commitments beyond NATO, such as France and the United Kingdom would continue to mantain the necessary independent capability in some areas despite the additional costs. For others the opportunity costs of continuing a policy of conscription will need to be addressed. The issues in these areas which would push a Common Defence Policy even further will have to be addressed at some stage but are certainly not on the immediate agenda.

Instead the immediate need is to concentrate on tackling problems of military integration that have never, or only very partially, been attempted within NATO, because of the convention to leave logistics as essentially a national responsibility. The historical wish to maintain autonomous forces now conflicts with Europe’s requirement to have effective deployable forces. The proposals for the first five years are relatively modest and will enable the underlying concepts to be tested, and could build confidence to proceed to the more ambitious second and third stages.

The stages for the development of a Common Defence Policy

Stage 1

2000-2005 Force elements Budgeting Force Planning Command

Individual Ad hoc (W)EU Military Development of programmes. arrangements for Staff develop European role of Analysis of early funding specific force goals for DSACEUR.

candidates for programmes. Petersberg tasks European

common support and structure for elements within elements by common European CJTFs identifìed. (W)EU Military submissions to

Staff. NATO force

planning.
 
 

Stage 2 Common support Introduction of EU Military Staff Planning for

1. Why convergence is difficult – and why it is necessary

Today’s Union hardly appears to be up to the challenges it has just decided to meet with Art.17 cons. TEU (the so-called Petersberg tasks) and with the Cologne European Council Declaration "on strengthening the common European policy on security and defence". A simple look at the figures is telling. Collectively, NATO’s European members (including Turkey) count 2.5 million military personnel and EU members 1.9 million, as compared to 1.4 million Americans in uniform. Although most of the European soldiers are inexpensive conscripts, the over-manned force structures created by this excess of largely draft personnel are quite costly, with the corresponding infrastructure, training, and cadres crowding out much needed resources for the sort of equipment that is necessary to cope with the requirements of the post Cold War era. According to a much quoted analysis by the Brookings Institution, the European members of NATO’s aggregate budget expenditure on defence amounts to some 60% of the US total (63% in 1997), whereas their capacity to project military force is just 10-15% of Washington’s. The problem, therefore, does not lie with overall spending per se, especially because the EU does not have the United States’ worldwide commitments and global ambitions for military power projection. The composition and the distribution of national expenditures on defence, however, are a problem. The net result is that, with its 2.5/1.9 million military, Europeans are hard-pressed to field the few tens of thousands soldiers required in theatres such as the Gulf War and the Balkans and are heavily reliant on the US (although some, namely the UK and France, do better than others). In addition, with more than 60% of the population of the Alliance, NATO’s European allies provide 40% of the total defence spending, less than one third of the total equipment spending, and around a quarter of the Research and Development (R&D) spending.

NATO’s "Allied Force" Operation in former Yugoslavia has dramatically displayed the imbalance in strategic assets between the US and the European allies (and among the Europeans themselves): almost three quarters of the aircraft, more than four fifths of the ordinance delivered and most of the intelligence have been provided by the US. Such imbalance heavily influenced the planning and conduct of military operations, with obvious political implications.

The need to downsize and restructure is widely acknowledged across the EU. Yet within the Union there is an extraordinary diversity of situations in terms of conscripts vs. professional soldiers, availability of rapidly deployable forces, manpower vs. population, defence budget share of the overall spending, and public expenditure per military person. Usually, the UK lies at the one end of the spectrum, Italy and – alternatively – Greece (conscripts/manpower) or Belgium (expenditure) at the other. Germany too clings onto the over-manned/small spenders’ side.

There is plenty of scope, therefore, for more coordination in restructuring as well as investing. If it is somewhat unrealistic to consider adopting treaty-based, legally binding convergence criteria along the pattern of EMU, it would not be out of place to aim at a collective effort towards some convergence of goals and means – in order to reap political benefits combined with efficiency gains – and to select some common policy targets to be met in the medium term. Experience has shown, in fact, that in most EU countries painful reforms are more readily accepted if it can be shown that they are part of an agreed EU-wide endeavour. After some hints were made in passing by British officials at the end of 1998, it was European Commissioner Emma Bonino who suggested a few months ago to try and replicate the EMU logic – specific convergence criteria plus a timetable – not only for defence but also for CFSP in general. Yet her proposal was flawed in that it entailed no compelling rationale for what she called DMU, "Diplomatic and Military Union". The key to the policy dilemma, however, lies precisely therein: how to make such convergence not only desirable but also beneficial, "profitable" and therefore feasible. In light of the EMU experience, in fact, convergence criteria may serve various purposes: they are meant to embody the emerging consensus on a common policy, to set benchmarks (partially arbitrary, perhaps, but intended also as tests of political will), and to devise a mechanism for compliance embedded in a workable and coherent institutional framework. Their overall effect should be to generate political pressure on member states and to help gradually bridge the gap between still diverging policies and "cultures".

2. Economic and military convergence

Following this line of thinking, and considering the present situation, common policy targets for convergence could be sub-divided into a) economic/quantitative and b) military/functional ones. The former could for instance involve:

• roughly comparable levels of defence expenditure: a minimal quantitative threshold could be set e.g. at 2% of GDP – as recently suggested also by French Defence Minister Alain Richard – but with some qualifications. In fact, this is already the average level for NATO’s European allies, according to the NATO-SIPRI definition: below the 2% threshold, however, still lie such countries as Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Benelux. So do four out of five EU non-aligned countries (the only exception being Sweden) as well as Hungary – among the three new Central European members of the Alliance – and, among the most likely candidates for NATO/EU accession, Slovenia. Yet if one does not include 1) military and staff pensions, 2) special paramilitary/police forces (such as the French Gendarmerie, the Italian Carabinieri, the Spanish Guardia Civil), and 3) nuclear expenditure (for France and Britain) – as it would be only fair for a common policy target – the overall result would be a net increase in spending for almost all EU countries. By contrast, if one does include (some of) them, the 2% minimal threshold would change very little, and it should therefore be raised. Meanwhile, such medium-term commitment should be accompanied – as François Heisbourg suggested recently– by an immediate pledge not to reduce defence spending per capita any further. What is important here is that the accounting criteria be common, transparent, strict and verifiable, or else the temptation to fudge them would be hardly resistible.

• Gradual, at least partial professionalisation of military forces, with the aim of achieving a common rapid-reaction capability and interoperability in action. The overarching goal would be the availability of highly specialised personnel for Art.17 missions, no matter how many conscripts each EU country may wish to keep for territorial defence or for other reasons: Greece and Finland, who still feel they have potential direct military threats to face up to, or Germany – for historical as well as constitutional concerns – may be affected by such concerns. This would be, in other words, a good case for the application of subsidiarity to meeting common requirements. The decision recently taken by the European Council in Cologne to gradually transform the Eurocorps into a rapid deployment force is a first step in this direction: additional incentives should be put on its enlargement to new participants. Here the quantitative target should not be a strictly national one – e.g. how many professional soldiers in percentage of the population or of the overall size of armed forces – but rather European. Some "key" could be tentatively adopted, as it is the case with budgetary contributions to NATO or WEU, and the audit on national forces that is being run these months could nicely serve this purpose: instead of remaining a static inventory, in other words, it should be used as a force-generation exercise.

• On the demand side, common defence procurement: the goal here should be the establishment of a more effective common market by a) building upon the OCCAR Treaty recently signed by France, Germany, Italy and the UK, with the Netherlands and Belgium, plus perhaps Spain and Sweden, as interested partners for the soon to be established European Armaments Agency; and by b) aiming at a more flexible approach to the protectionist barriers still enshrined in Art.223 of the EC Treaty (now Art.296 cons. TEC). Such market opening would in turn allow to try and extract parallel and/or comparable concessions from the US. Here, too, a quantitative element could be put in place, provided it substantially breaks the perverse principle and practice of juste retour.

• Finally, on the supply side, more and improved European cooperation and integration in the industrial field, as urged also by the St. Malo Declaration. Yet these last two points seem harder to conceptualise in terms of common quantitative criteria. In the latter case especially, the main driving factor is the market itself: mergers and acquisitions, in fact, have already become a common feature all across the continent. Yet the market may work both ways: on the one hand, what happened at the end of 1998 with the BAe-GEC Marconi merger was seen to have inflicted a blow, at least temporarily, to the hopes for the creation of a European (British-German-French) military aerospace industry. On the other hand, the recent acquisition of Spain’s Casa by Germany’s Dasa fosters concentration and rationalisation.

Therefore, a possible way to put additional incentives on qualifying and raising public expenditure on security and defence – given the constraints of the Stability Pact, the lack of visible net gains comparable to EMU compliance, and the prevailing mood among EU citizens (welfare being seen as preferable to warfare spending) – might be its temporary/partial exclusion from the accounting rules of the Stability Pact itself. Such exclusion could prove vital for countries whose budget deficit is already dangerously close to the 3% of GDP threshold: Italy and Belgium, for instance, are at the same time the biggest overall spenders and the smallest defence spenders (in percentage of GDP) among the 15. If openly linked, for instance, to a widely shared political goal such exemption, or rather suspension, could find higher acceptance in European public opinion and also significantly lower the risk of "free-riding", especially on the part of the smaller and non-aligned countries.

Such temporary exemption/suspension may be of a general and/or a specific nature. The former would make policy convergence easier, but would also trigger political opposition in that it would set a far-reaching precedent for the Stability Pact: in other words, it could be seen as a Trojan horse put inside EMU rules and as a tool to circumvent them and to break fiscal discipline. It could also end up making efficiency gains more difficult to achieve in that it would take the pressure off getting better value for current budget expenditure. It could therefore be more acceptable, defendable and, above all, "profitable" if limited, for instance, to R&D expenditure and/or procurement: all additional investments, however, should be channelled into common European (and not purely national) endeavours, be it beefing up the Eurocorps, acquiring a reconnaissance satellite capability worth its name, building a specifically European aircraft carrier or providing special equipment (e.g. Eurofighters, perhaps also Eurocopters and Eurofrigates). Needless to say, the exemption/suspension should be temporary and, again, verifiable: its time frame should coincide with the overall "convergence" process.

Finally, and at least hypothetically, it could be worth trying to think the unthinkable: why not link even more explicitly defence expenditure and Stability Pact by deciding that – the EMU criteria notwithstanding – public spending on capabilities (along the lines mentioned above) should coincide with the annual levels of deficit? After all, the difference between the 2-plus of GDP minimal threshold and the 3% ceiling set by EMU is very narrow. By adopting such a general criterion, member states would have some budgetary leeway for adjusting to contingencies, while public opinions across the EU would have a very clear measure of the price of preserving peace and security in Europe.

At any rate, what is important to underline here is that the fiscal/budgetary dimension has to be addressed anyway. In order to spend better and more effectively later on, most EU countries have to spend much more in the short term. It is in the overall EU interest to facilitate them to do so, in order also to prevent the emergence of a burden-sharing dispute inside the Union. And, more generally, this is a quintessential case of "no representation without taxation" – to paraphrase the Founding Fathers – which may apply to the EU as well as to the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) inside NATO.

As for the strictly military/functional targets, the crucial criterion should lie in the integration of national forces: that is, "no (unnecessary) duplication" inside Europe in the first place, or rather further development and better coordination of the present bi- and multinational forces with special emphasis on role specialisation: specialisation, in turn, could be of functional (e.g. maritime/amphibious, airborne, land troops and capabilities) as well as of sub-regional nature (Baltic, Mediterranean, Central European). Here, again, the results of the recent WEU audit should be used to further enhance the existing joint or common capabilities. Yet it may prove tricky and, to a certain extent, counterproductive to entirely separate the two sets of targets. Instead, some combination between force restructuring and defence expenditure and procurement should be seriously considered: countries, in other words, could contribute to the common European endeavour with both money and assets and manpower, but in different mixes according to national traditions, means, and priorities (land/sea/air ratio, strategic capabilities, equipment, human resources). Here, again, some subsidiarity could be introduced and diversity be turned into a plus: the paramilitary/police forces of some countries, for instance, could be matched by extra-money or special assets/facilities provided by others. The primary scope of the exercise, in other words, would be to pool and improve existing capabilities, and some sensible "key" could be devised to offset and fine-tune quantitative/economic and military/functional goals. At the stage of policy formulation and benchmarking, in fact, flexibility in setting the common targets is preferable to opt-outs, that would necessarily be too many to make convergence credible.

3. Institutional convergence

In principle, such common policy targets would only apply to Art.17 TEU (non-Art.V/5 of WEU/NATO Treaties) crisis management tasks: to collective security, in other words, not to territorial self-defence. This would facilitate convergence in many ways, e.g. by making it possible for NATO and non-NATO members to equally subscribe to both the common policy and its execution. At the same time, is also true that in practice the dividing line between Art.5 commitments and Art.17 missions – as the Kosovo crisis, too, has shown – may be blurred: peacekeepers have to be trained and equipped for the full range of military operations, and Art.17 missions can easily escalate to armed conflict, thus requiring substantial political solidarity and adequate capabilities (intelligence, strategic lift, command and control). "No responsibilities without capabilities", one is tempted to say, but this catchphrase, too, might apply to the EU as well as to the ESDI within NATO.

Here lies, in other words, an inherent ambiguity that could, however, be used for the common good. Even the so-called Petersberg tasks now enshrined in Art.17 TEU entail, in fact, a wide range of possible missions, from the rescue of civilians to actual peacemaking, thus covering both the first and the second "generation" of UN peacekeeping: that is, those missions undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter (interposition between parties after a cease-fire or a peace deal, i.e. "blue helmet", Cyprus-type operations), and those humanitarian/peace-enforcement missions undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (e.g. Northern Iraq 1991, Bosnia 1992, Somalia 1992, Rwanda 1994, Haiti 1994, Albania 1997). Interestingly, and perhaps typically, the former have seen a strong participation of neutral, militarily non-aligned European countries (Austria and the Nordics), the latter have been often initiated and run by the US and/or the main European NATO countries.

Such in-built ambiguity may either lead to a blockage, e.g. by (unnecessarily) making Art.5/V a token issue, or help bridge differences by focusing on capabilities, mission profiles, force goals, command and control – the adoption of NATO’s standard should not raise many objections here anyway, given the participation of the EU post-neutrals (bar Ireland) in the Partnership for Peace exercise – and each country’s willingness and ability to participate in what. Convergence criteria may prove crucial to this end, in that they can also force a convergence of "cultures" upon member states, as it was the case in the early 1990s with the "economist" and the "monetarist" schools and between tighter and looser budgetary policies. If the EMU scheme came into being, however, it was also in the wake of (and thanks to) a big "geopolitical" shock, namely German unification. A similar trade-off on convergence for the EU’s security and defence policy may be reached now in the aftermath of the Kosovo war, especially if it has to be the last of the "Yugoslav succession" wars. In the end, a common European crisis management capability would almost inevitably dovetail with a common defence policy dimension: it is not by chance that "EU-led crisis response operations" are envisaged by both NATO’s Washington final communiqué and the European Council’s Cologne Declaration on security and defence policy. This is also why some form of institutional/organisational convergence, too, has to be put in place: just to follow once again the logic and the experience of EMU, the euro would hardly have become a reality without the procedural steps written down in the Maastricht Treaty and the guarantees offered by the setting up of the European Central Bank.

In perspective, of course, it would make much more sense to achieve congruence of membership among the different bodies and fora (W/EU and NATO) involved in the common endeavour: and this not only for political, but also for functional (interoperability) and economic (procurement) reasons. Here, again, the decisions taken at the Cologne summit represent a further step forward: yet the "inclusion" of relevant WEU assets into the EU does not solve per se the problems of fragmentation and differentiation that still affect Europe’s defence dimension. Besides, a perfect/optimal overlap of EU and European NATO memberships seems for various reasons quite hard to achieve in the short-medium term anyway: one of the unexpected consequences of the Kosovo war, on the contrary, could be an increased mismatch, in that NATO may end up expanding to South-eastern European countries (Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Macedonia), whereas all three Baltic Republics may soon be in the "fast-track" of the EU enlargement process. Other institutional solutions should therefore be envisaged to allow at least a relevant core of countries to take up the responsibility to promote and enforce such convergence without being blocked by the others. Again, if the EMU dynamics can be seen as a precedent, the criteria may eventually be met by a large majority of member states, indeed a much larger one than initially imagined.

To begin with, it seems appropriate that such convergence in security and defence policy be addressed and decided by the European Council. As already argued, a treaty-based approach may not be the right one at this stage and, of course, it would be even more difficult to achieve: a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) is scheduled for the year 2000, yet it seems premature to try and define the precise contours of a common defence policy through intergovernmental negotiations at 15. At the same time a simple, if solemn, declaration of intents coupled with a list of indicative targets to aim at would hardly generate a common European policy: at best, it could lead to some bi-, tri- or mini-lateral initiative and to ad hoc operational inititatives. Instead, the convergence criteria could be wrapped into a CFSP common strategy and, like EMU, devise a 5-to-7-year deadline for implementation. The Amsterdam Treaty, now in force, does not prescribe specific contents for such common strategies: the fact that the first one, adopted by the European Council in Cologne, was devoted to Russia, and the prospect that the next ones may be devoted to South-eastern Europe and the Mediterranean do not mean that all common strategies have to be geographically-oriented. So why not incorporate the criteria in a common strategy in its own right – aimed at the "development of common European capabilities for crisis management" – to be adopted before or at the latest during the next IGC? At a later stage – perhaps already at the end of the same IGC – some elements of the convergence scheme (especially the procedural/institutional ones) may be written down in a Protocol to be attached to the TEU. A common strategy would have at least two important pluses: in light of the treaty, it would be politically (but not legally) binding for all member states in all fora, and it would situate CFSP above the first pillar proper, thus making it a bit easier to resort to fiscal and budgetary means. Besides, the time frame and some quantitative or functional provisions could be adjusted without changing the Treaty: if fundamental problems arose along the way a unanimous decision taken at the right time would prevent blocking or even blowing the whole common endeavour.

4. Between EMU and Schengen

It seems necessary to apply to that also a more constraining logic. Here the experience of Schengen, along with that of EMU, can be of some help. Why not try and create an ad hoc "space" where all EU countries willing and able to meet the above mentioned criteria would find their place? In a sense, such new "space" would represent a vindication of the initial idea of a fourth pillar for defence proper. Yet it would not lie out in the cold as that did: instead, it would be fully inserted in the CFSP framework as a specific form of enhanced cooperation. Such pillar "2-A" would be subject to the overarching authority of the European Council and, organisationally, of Mr. PESC, the High Representative for CFSP. The WEU bodies and assets to be incorporated into the EU (including the European Armaments Agency mandated to deal with defence procurement) would also belong to that "space". Inside it, the entire process of convergence (including the much desirable European security and defence review) should be supervised by a Council of Defence Ministers, following up on the precedents set by the informal ones held during the Austrian and the German presidencies. Within such Council, predictably, peer pressure, emulation but also "socialisation" would soon become additional constraining/stimulating factors towards convergence, as it was the case with both EMU and Schengen. The more technical matters could be addressed by a new political-military body emanated by the same Council, backed by a EU Military Committee. In due time, if proven efficient and effective, such institutional design could easily be formalised and brought into the Treaty proper – as it just happened with Schengen.

The Schengen precedent is also relevant – along with EMU’s – for the generation of political pressure to join. In fact, once the common strategy is adopted at 15, the convergence criteria set, and the "space" put in place, it is possible that not all EU members be willing or able to fully converge on time. By definition, however, EU crisis management should be equally open to all members: here two different sets of arrangements can be envisaged for pre-deadline and post-deadline procedures respectively. During the implementation of convergence, all member states should have the possibility to "plug-in" and, if necessary, "plug-out". Once the deadline expired, however, voting rights on further steps towards integration of capabilities should be reserved to the countries that would meet the criteria. The others would retain the right to sit at the table (a solution that was envisaged, but eventually discarded, for the ECB Board) and to opt-in at any given moment, provided they can incorporate the acquis (following the Schengen precedent and procedure). The same would apply to new EU members after the next enlargement. Decision-making would then be subject to general CFSP rules – including "constructive abstention" – but it is likely that the willing and able would form a sort of "critical mass" on any given occasion (as it already happens inside the Ecofin with the euro-11). And this, of course, is expected to put additional incentives on convergence: ultimately, therefore, enhanced cooperation would work once again as a deterrent against divergence rather than as a recipe for a two- or multi-tier EU.

For, as the Kosovo crisis has shown, EU members still diverge – albeit much less now than a few years ago – on a number of political, philosophical and psychological respects that are relevant to a common security and defence policy. As argued for instance by Alyson Bailes divergences, or at least important nuances, can be detected:

1. in their views on the legitimacy of the use of armed force in pursuit of non-vital national interests (including collective EU interests) and on the specificity of the international legal cover for such operations;
2. in their vision of the geographical area across which Europe’s vulnerability as well as Europe’s responsibility are felt;
3. in their willingness and ability to submit their forces to a genuinely multinational structure of command and to leave operational decisions to a non-national judgement;
4. in their acceptance of the risk of casualties: civilian and military, allied and national ones.

One of the obviously critical questions about NATO’s future role in European security, as well as about ESDI, is the role of the United States itself. I thought it might be useful to talk about some of the broader trends likely to affect this American role – trends in the United States itself, in Europe and in the world at large. I would like to speak of five such trends:

1. Growing ‘deconstruction’ of the American political system.
2. Growing domestication of Europe’s security problems.
3. Growing divergence of perspectives on security problems between the United States and the European states.
4. The growing preoccupation of the US with Asian security.
5. The momentum of European integration.

Less and less in the US do we have anything like a Gaullist Presidency – not only because we do not have a de Gaulle, but because we do not want one. The Congress and other parts of the system are no longer willing to leave the Presidency with the enormous power that it came to possess during and after World War II – that is to say a wartime power prolonged another five decades, thanks to the Cold War. Now that the Cold War is over, Congress, the states and the courts all seem driven by an instinct to return to something like the Presidency of the 19^th century. This is a mood that is likely to last at least so long as the US does not feel seriously threatened by anything external. Meanwhile, without an imperial Presidency, the government is in increasing disarray.

We still have most of the imperial institutions of the Cold War – a huge military, a big diplomatic and intelligence apparatus, lots of foreign policy experts – but within an undisciplined political system that is extremely porous, one that is easily penetrated and colonised by special interests for their own particular and often short-term ends. This is a situation that is sometimes very convenient for foreign governments, skillful at getting what they want out of the nooks and crannies of our bureaucracy and Congress, at least in a small way. But it may not be so convenient for states expecting to remain dependent on American leadership for the overall management of their security problems. The kind of policy that emerges from today’s distracted American hegemon is likely to be bombastic, but also inconstant and intermittent. Given the relatively free rein over the huge military establishment, and its intimate ties to the arms industry, American policies may also seem disturbingly aggressive and linked to military solutions – so long, at least, as military initiatives do not involve any serious numbers of American casualties. The military’s aversion to casualties reflects its fear, and experience, that once heavy casualties do occur, the lack of real public support for an imperial foreign policy reveals itself vehemently.

My second trend was the domestication of Europe’s security problems. As we all know, the threat to European security in the Cold War was primarily external. Europe’s security problems are now radically different – ethnic guerrilla warfare, terrorism, drugs, gangsterism. These are increasingly problems internal to Europe – more police problems than the traditional military challenges of the Cold War. This internalisation of security problems can be expected to increase insofar as the European Union expands. It will be increasingly uncomfortable to have the management of such internal problems directed by an external power, however friendly. The legitimacy of the American military role in Europe will grow more and more questionable – for Americans as well as Europeans. The US, moreover, will probably not prove to be very good at managing these sorts of domestic European problems. Again, America’s domestic politics do not give much encouragement for those who expect its leadership abroad to be highly professional, constant and oriented toward long-term perspectives, harmonious with those prevailing among Europeans.

This last point brings me to my third trend: the growing divergence of perspective on security questions between Americans and Europeans. This divergence springs from rather fundamental factors in international politics, above all geography. In the circumstances of the 1950s, de Gaulle was led to observe that: "when all is said and done, Great Britain is an island; France, the cape of a continent, America, another world".1 In present pan-European circumstances, the famous quotation might be altered to read: "Europe is only the cape of a continent, and America is another world". To some extent, the Cold War abolished normal geography. Russia, making itself a Central European power, required the US to become a West European power. Now that Russia has retreated, geography returns to normal. Moreover, since Russia is no longer so isolated from the European system, Europe itself has become Eurasian. Geographically, Europe and Russia are intimate neighbours. An expanding EU must inevitably rethink its relations with Russia. It will not want to think of these relations primarily in antagonistic military terms. For many of the real security problems that confront Europe after the Cold War, like disorder in the Balkans, Russian political and military cooperation is at least as useful as American. Furthermore, over the long run, Russia’s economic and political success seems vital to Europe’s own security and prosperity.

Under these circumstances, permitting a US-run NATO to dominate relations with Russia is a strategy that – for Europe – carries a high risk of self-defeat. Unless Russia goes completely off the rails domestically, European governments are likely to believe their security is better served by finding a modus vivendi with Russia than by emphasising an abrasive military preponderance. Insofar as NATO enlargement and the US’s own active military involvement in Russia’s "Near Abroad" are constant irritants, European governments are likely to see the US as part of their problem with Russia, rather than the solution to it. The same difference of perspective is likely to prevail in European relations with the Middle East. As the memory of the Cold War recedes, these differences of perspective will become more significant and encourage Europeans to take their distance from an overweening American leadership in NATO.

My fourth trend was America’s growing preoccupation with Asian security. In the Cold War, the United States assumed the task of containing both the Soviets and Chinese in Asia, just as it assumed the task of containing the Soviets in Europe. The US undertook these tasks in both regions in part to preclude nuclear proliferation to some of its allies – to Germany in Europe and to Japan in Asia. Instead, the US extended its own national deterrent and coaxed Germany and Japan into the Non Proliferation Treaty. American deterrence was easy to extend at first, when the US had an effective monopoly either of nuclear weapons themselves, as in the very beginning, or of the capacity to deliver them, as it did for considerable time thereafter. After the USSR itself had developed a serious nuclear strike capability, the US was compelled to move from a strategy of "massive retaliation" to one of "flexible response". The latter required extensive conventional forces, was extremely expensive for the US and required large allied forces, achieved in the West primarily by rearming Germany. In Asia, maintaining deterrence involved fighting two significant wars. After the early 1970s, the task in Asia was eased by the deterioration in Soviet-Chinese relations. Without Russia, China lacked a reliable nuclear deterrent of its own.

Today, of course, the situation is changing radically. China is a giant on the move. Its economic growth is so frenetic as to bring into question the country’s social and political stability. Russia, on the other hand, is very weak and its huge and rich Eurasian territory seems highly vulnerable. While there is no reason to assume an implacable Chinese aggressiveness toward its neighbours or hostility to the West, China is more likely to develop in a fashion benign for its neighbours and for itself if it is part of a balanced regional security system. As China inevitably develops its nuclear capabilities, and makes US home territory vulnerable, maintaining America’s extended deterrent against China will require an Asian equivalent of "flexible response". This means enough conventional forces for a rough conventional balance. This should prove very expensive for the US – as it did during the Cold War in Europe. It is a policy that will require allies. In Asia the logical American ally is Russia, with its huge and vulnerable territory. As the situation develops, two things are likely to happen. The US will grow conciliatory to Russia in Europe, and the US will grow more urgently interested in a European confederacy that can look after security in its own part of the world. I do not mean to suggest that the US will, in some ultimate sense, rank Asian security over European. But it will mean that the US will grow increasingly conscious that its leadership is far more essential in Asia than in Europe.

My last trend was the momentum of European integration. European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is a major step forward. It is full of implications for the future. First of all, making EMU work calls for a further streamlining of the EU’s institutions and decision-making, a development that should make it easier for it to elaborate effective arrangements for security cooperation as well. Secondly, EMU will make the EU an economic and financial superpower. It is an anomaly that such an EU should remain militarily dependent on America – its principal ally in the world, no doubt, but also its principal economic competitor. Furthermore, the existence of the euro as a major reserve currency has consequences for America’s tolerance for military burdens. It will undoubtedly make it more difficult for the Americans to go on borrowing cheaply but on a very large scale from abroad, an essential condition for financing America’s military burdens during the Cold War. As such financing grows more expensive, there will be more and pressure on the US to reduce its external deficits. As the new Asian burden grows heavier, the Americans will complain still more about free riding and demand more burden sharing. Europe, assuming burdens, will also take back power. To put this more bluntly, a Europe whose money is successfully challenging the dollar around the world is unlikely to remain indefinitely a US military protectorate.

What do these trends add up to? The rapid growth of China and the intensified integration of Europe both suggest that, insofar as anyone can see into the next century, it will be a more plural world system. The US will remain strong, but its margin of strength over others will diminish. Asia’s great powers, suppressed since the 18^th century, will rejuvenate and take a major place in any global system. We can hope Russia will do the same: that it will recover from its terrible historical misfortune of Communism and find its place in Europe and Asia – a place worthy of its culture and of the talent of its people. And, above all, we can hope to see the European states, after their terrible self-laceration in the 20^th century, consolidate their Union and begin to play a creative world role worthy of their own rich experience, human values and political genius. And we can also hope that we in America can find something better to do with our own political heritage than try to turn our admirable republic into a reborn Roman Empire.

What does all this have to do with NATO reform? In this more plural world, there should be every reason for the United States and Europe to preserve their alliance and at the same time to embrace Russia in a larger pan-European system – not to make a common front against an alien non-Western world, but to keep our own balance and our own affairs in order across Europe and the Atlantic. Such a pan-European system should be a model for reasonable behaviour in other regions of the world – a noyau dur of enlightened rationality. This is the broader "tripolar" structure needed to maintain order in pan-Europe – in the Balkans and in general. To function properly, a tripolar security system will require all three of its key elements to be strong enough to play the role that is required and satisfied enough not to demand more. Meeting the conditions of this vision presents a distinct challenge for each of the three.

For the US, it means suppressing geopolitical daydreams of a "unipolar world", with ourselves the "unique superpower" managing directly an integrated global system. We will need to emphasise another strategy: to foster, over time, balanced and cooperative regional systems that can take primary responsibility for managing their own affairs. The US should look forward to having genuine allies around the globe, rather than expensive dependencies. This is a strategy that requires, above all, a strong and cohesive Europe, strong enough, militarily as well as economically and politically, to balance Russia and America in a larger cooperative order. For Europeans to achieve this strength requires a profound act of faith in each other. It means deciding whether they still prefer a distracted American hegemon over having to rely on each other. The transition to an Atlantic alliance where Europe is much more in charge of itself is what NATO reform should really be about. For Russians, in addition to all their domestic challenges playing their proper pan-European role requires taking seriously their own vision of a Common European House. It means deciding themselves to become a European power, as opposed to a global superpower in exile or a superpower on vacation. Russians sometimes give the impression that entering into a "special relationship" with Europe is somehow a geopolitical demotion to be avoided. Obviously, that is not a general outlook productive for creating the tripolar pan-European system that I have been talking about.

Even in this capsule form, creating such a system means demanding adjustments all round. But this is the most promising structure for security – not only in the Balkans but in Europe generally. It would, of course, be a major contribution to security for the world in general. The formulas for organising NATO and the EU should keep this larger pan-European vision firmly in mind. That is, I suspect, the right policy for the plural world that is likely to be – and for ourselves as we ought to be. We have, I suspect, only a few years left to rise to this occasion. Not to do so will put us into a world where the adjustments required will be less agreeable and promising than those sketched here.

The longer NATO’s war against Slobodan Milosevic goes on, the more urgent it is that the European Union adds substance to its promise to draw up a Balkan Stability Pact. Let us be realistic about what could achieve the true political objective: to include Albania, Macedonia, Croatia, Bosnia and Yugoslavia in the European order – before they wreck it. The Balkans need something as effective as a Marshall Plan. For this the EU needs a new policy. Traditionally, new members have had to align their economic and political systems almost perfectly with the EU’s before being admitted to the club. These structures worked well in the past. But unless the rules are relaxed, the Balkan states will not qualify for membership in a reasonable time.

A new approach is needed that offers support for weak government structures from the beginning, otherwise there will be no beginning. The Centre for European Policy Studies proposes the following 10-point plan for post-war, South-east Europe:

1. New associate membership of the EU to be offered to Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and former Republic of Yugoslavia with negotiations to begin in January 2000 for those that meet basic political conditions. In addition, full accession negotiations to begin for Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Malta, in January 2000.
2. Emergency assistance. Compensation made to households and local authorities to accommodate refugees away from tent cities; three pontoon bridges across the Danube between Bulgaria and Romania to be laid by NATO immediately. Special programmes for Kosovo when the war ends.
3. Tariffs to be scrapped in favour of an enlarged EU customs union, with compensation for loss of customs revenues.
4. A wider euro area to be created along with a menu of monetary cooperation regimes, from euro-based currency boards now to full inclusion in the euro zone from 2003. Central banks to receive compensation for the loss of seignorage.
5. The establishment of a South-east European reconstruction agency as a subsidiary of the European Investment Bank, empowered to take equity stakes in infrastructure projects.
6. The creation of a South-east European foundation for democracy, together with a similar foundation for education.
7. Civilian security to be strengthened, for example through EU control of customs services where necessary.
8. In due course, military security to be provided by EU-led peacekeeping operations where necessary.
9. Progressive institutional integration to be achieved with the European Union.
10. Management innovations in the EU Commission and Council to expedite executive functions.

Of course, the EU cannot offer full membership to countries that are not yet stable democracies. It must not dilute its fundamental values. However, neither can it afford to prolong the current impasse, where the EU knows it should embrace the Balkans, but cannot do so under present rules. There are innovative ways in which the EU could progressively insert the Balkan states in EU institutions, first in consultative bodies, or as observers, and later into the legislative process. "Virtual" EU membership is possible and desirable, and it would open prospects for full EU membership, perhaps within a generation.

To get off to a hopeful start, Albania’s poor households – many of which have become hotels for refugees – should be compensated with EU grants for their contribution to the public good. These should be made available to Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Montenegro, which are accommodating refugees or could help in the provision of alternatives to the present tent cities. The grave disruption caused by the bombing of bridges across the Danube could be eased if NATO engineers built three pontoon bridges on the Bulgarian-Romanian border. Business leaders in the region are urging Nato to do this immediately.

Inclusion in the EU customs union and euro zone is vital for structural economic reforms. As any business man working in the region can attest, the main obstacles to investment and growth in the Balkans are corruption – in both public finances and border trade – and poor monetary and capital market conditions. The adoption of currency board regimes, like those already in place in Bosnia and Bulgaria, would be a useful first step towards restoring the credibility of local currencies. Eventually, these regimes could be incorporated into the euro zone before full accession to the EU.

The Balkans are often considered underdeveloped, irrational and barbaric. At the end of World War I, the word "balkanisation" became part of the idiom, meaning the fragmentation of large political units into small and aggressive states, which were not economically viable. Nowadays, the stereotypical notion of the "other Europe" describes at best a bridge between a civilised West and a backward East.

The war in Kosovo has changed the debate on the Eastern enlargement by stimulating new visions of integration. Since the Dayton Agreements, the idea of bringing peace to the Balkans and of defining a broad regional integration and development strategy has been discussed in the various European capitals. Two consequences of this thinking have been the realisation that the challenges posed by this region require a long-term policy for stability and that conflict prevention is less costly than war reparations.

Since 1991, the EU has spent about 7 billion euros on the conflicts in Yugoslavia, without taking into account aid for refugees and the contributions of international organisations. The costs of the military intervention in Kosovo, of the reconstruction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the overall economic consequences for the whole region are estimated by the Higher Military School of the Federal Republic at around 50 billion euros. As President of the European Council, the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer proposed the "Stability Pact for South-eastern Europe", signed at Cologne on 10 June 1999. 38 countries and 15 international organisations took part in the Conference of Ministers, of which the aim was to make the Balkans, in the long-term, a region of more democratic, prosperous and peaceful states. Albania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovenia and, at certain conditions, the FRY are asked to progressively get closer to the European structures and are given the prospect of eventual accession to the Union. In the meantime, these states are invited to agree to a stability pact to promote democracy, security and a market economy, using bi- and multilateral agreements and to be carried out during three round tables which follow the Helsinki model of the resolution for the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.

Many are reluctant towards the idea that these small Balkan states, traumatised by crises, could have their say in the future of the EU. The issue of conditionality and of the timing of their eventual integration is controversial. As French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine declared, "We have not worked for decades for the development of Europe to see it dissolve in a vast and unmanageable grouping without cohesion". The southern members of the EU, Spain and Portugal, appear equally reticent towards a Stability Pact that could channel Brussels funds towards the East. Romania and Bulgaria, which have already reached agreements with the EU, also fear that their position will be at a disadvantage with regard to their imminent negotiations for their accession.

The Stability Pact proposes a basic formula: a promise to the Balkan states to give them "the prospect of getting closer to the European Union". It is not a question of speeding up or of simplifying the regular process of integration. Brussels wants to offer new forms of contractual relations to the states of the region: a new generation of especially conceived "Stability and Association Agreements". These should provide the support necessary for the candidate countries (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia and Malta) to join the EU and to overcome the gap that separates them from the Union. In the meantime, before becoming full members, the countries of Yugoslavia and former Yugoslavia will have to meet the Copenhagen criteria with regard to democracy and the establishment and functioning of a market economy, and the conditions imposed on the Central and Eastern European candidates since 1993. So far, discussions on the stabilisation and association agreements are expected with Albania and Macedonia. Brussels seems to be preparing a three-level structure: at the centre are the fifteen member states forming the core of Europe; around this core group are the associated members of Central and Eastern Europe; the Balkans would constitute the third circle.

But numerous questions remain open. What will become of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the FRY if they do not manage to fulfil the conditions for a stability agreement in the long-term? At what conditions can Belgrade hope to abandon the isolation forced upon it since 1991-92? The strategy announced in the Stability Pact privileges in the first instance Montenegro. This could lead to favouring separatist aspirations in this part of the FRY, paving the way for another conflict which would lead to the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the last federal state of Eastern Europe. Russia also seems reticent with regard to the offer of integration into NATO tied to the Stability Pact. It would like Yugoslavia to resist the expansionist aspirations of the Atlantic Alliance, which has already integrated all of Russia’s neighbours in a system of partnership and cooperation agreements. Last, but not least, if the Union will eventually welcome 27 member states, how can it continue refusing membership to Turkey?

In the Cold War context, West European integration developed up to the 1980s without spending much thought on its expansion toward the East and South-East. Divided into spheres of influence in 1944 by Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin (90% of Soviet influence in Romania, 75% in Bulgaria, in exchange for 90% of Western influence in Greece and a 50% division over Yugoslavia), the Balkans stayed outside this process of unification. They still represent the "other Europe", a Europe that now needs to be "Europeanised", according to the Western political leaders.

"Europeanisation" is understood as a process of modernisation which, at best, will develop at different paces. The expectation is that the Balkan states will adapt, one after the other, their structures to resemble the Western model as defined in the acquis communautaire. But it is an unrealistic hypothesis to believe that South-eastern Europe can resemble Western Europe given its historical, political and economic conditions. The integration of Western Europe is certainly due to the tragic experience of the two world wars and to the loss of power during the US-USSR confrontation. As a new phenomenon in world history, the integration project worked because it rested on relatively advanced national states. One characteristic of South-eastern Europe is that its national states, and to an extent the nations themselves, are only now starting to establish themselves. But it is wrong to expect the war in Kosovo to lead to a "final catharsis". Some believe that the war, by destroying existing structures, can become the engine of economic renewal and democratic development.

As the bombing caused tragic destruction on a daily basis, the Americans and Europeans announced a large-scale "Marshall Plan" to rebuild the region after the devastation of war. This much-publicised will also had the political objective of suffocating the critical voices against the destruction of Yugoslav public infrastructures. One of the objectives of the Plan is to minimise the consequences of war in the neighbouring states. Belgrade is included in the countries entitled to aid, provided it meets the conditions of the "international community".1 South-eastern Europe is not postwar Germany and a "Marshall Plan" would meet totally different conditions. Despite protracted bombing, only 30% of Germany’s industrial capacity was destroyed. Reconstruction aid mainly served to accelerate a well-underway economic development. This will not be the case in the Balkans. Bosnia and Herzegovina provides a good example, where the international community has directed 5.1 billion dollars during the five years following the war. According to the World Bank, private investment reached 160 million dollars, just 4.7% of the funds given through international aid. This is not only due to the lack of legislation, high taxes and corruption, but also to the absence of a global vision. So far, the issues of the kind of economic structures that need to be developed and of the role Bosnia and Herzegovina will play in the European and global economy have not been addressed. The answer to this question will be no doubt even more difficult to find in the case of Kosovo, a truly underdeveloped country.

It is highly doubtful that the Western European model can be directly adapted to South-eastern Europe. A credible policy towards the region requires an understanding without prejudice of the countries concerned. Apart from economic problems, cultural traditions and social structures, well-established intellectual traditions would also be found. Ideas of integration and even of federalism are far from unknown in South-eastern Europe. Already during World War II Tito proposed to unite Yugoslavia, Albania, Bulgaria and perhaps Greece in a socialist federation of South-East Europe. On 1 August 1947 he agreed with the Bulgarian head of state Georgi Dimitrov on a project for an assistance pact and a customs union. Dimitrov’s federalist project went even further in proposing to integrate Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, Romania, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and perhaps Greece. Soviet and British resistance put an end to these integration projects. An autonomous organisation of states in the Balkans would have undermined the hegemonic influence of the great powers in the region.

It is often believed that, despite the West’s support, the states of South-eastern Europe do not want to cooperate among themselves. This is not true. On no other issue is political consensus in the Balkans so broad than on the objective of integrating rapidly into the European Union, and this also applies to Serbia and Montenegro.

When in the spring of 1992 I was living in the Serb-controlled area of Croatia, in Knin, serving with the UN Protection Force, the Serbs would swear God never to give up their ancient land of Krajina, where their fathers had been living for centuries. They would rather die than go back under Croatian ruling as long as it was, according to them, "a fascist regime". Never under foreign occupation again was the leitmotiv. In the faces of these peasants-warriors you could read centuries-old rooted pride and also a misery and roughness that so much reflect the rocky and rusty environment of Dalmatian hills. We spent endless evenings around Slivovitz and home made prosjut arguing on their version of Serb history of persecution and oppression. Each of this simple people, living in this isolated town for two centuries belonging to Venice, then the last outpost of Serb resistance against the Ustashia regime, had personal stories of tragic losses. The word genocide was recurrent. When I later visited the Jasenovac concentration camp at the border between Croatia and Bosnia – vast killing fields – their accounts of World War II suddenly re-emerged. It did not look as the most objective account of history, e.g. Serb harassment of Croat minorities in Krajina did not really figure, but I knew we were dealing with perceptions. Some in the West would disregard it as the usual pathetic mantra: Milosevic had brainwashed them with his criminal nationalism. True, but only to a certain extent. My experience is that the fear of being oppressed by "the other" ethnic group was genuine, a fear deeply rooted in centuries of Ottoman and other foreign domination. For me it looked like a page turned of unfortunate history, "a never again"; for them it was yesterday and bound to happen again.

The emotional ground was fertile for pan-Slav propaganda to prosper. I learned that fear was the engine of these Yugoslav conflicts; longing for protection along ethnic lines became the driving force of nationalism. As a communist leader determined to remain in power after 1989, Milosevic provided the fuel. Stirring fears by creating conflicts and instigating the need for protection became his way to retain power when communism was collapsing. He started with Kosovo. For the Serbs in Kosovo closer links to Belgrade by renouncing autonomy meant protection, for those in Croatia and Bosnia Herzegovina reuniting with Motherland Serbia meant protection. For the Serbs in Krajina, self-proclaiming a republic in Croatia meant protection. For them a border was a defence line, their police insignia a safety guarantee from being slaughtered by neighbouring ethnic groups.

In 1992 in order to fulfil our mission to build trust, it was crucial to try to understand their mindset and recognise that in the West we have a different Welt anschaung. This continues to be true. Acknowledging their perceptions does not mean agreeing with them, nor supporting the Serb nationalist authorities. However, discounting the reality of a people driven by fear has not so far advanced the cause of peace. Yes, the Serbs always look at the past. It is irritating to hear over and over rhetoric of the past prevailing over future oriented plans for recovery. Their dilatory negotiating tactics are exasperating. But for them it is a real historic unfinished business. Then the identity crisis that seems to have invested the entire nation since the break up of Yugoslavia in the early nineties adds to the legacies of history. Getting to terms with their identity and the many open wounds in majority-minority relations is going to be an important process to be able to move forward towards integration in Europe. The value of human life seems so different from universal standards in a region where blood was regularly shed for centuries in a vicious circle of ethnic massacres and revenge. This part of Europe is going through a different phase of history than the West. We do not accept such brutality. But let’s not forget what atrocities were committed in Europe during our national phases and in the two world wars. Wars have never been clean, always brutal. Partisan wars, typical of the Balkans, even more.

History and culture can explain but never justify crimes. The atrocities and deportation being perpetrated against the Kosovo Albanian nation are against all what we stand for in Europe. Our indignation and outrage are legitimate, as much as they were for crimes committed in Bosnia Herzegovina and Croatia. The competent tribunals should do justice according to the rule of law. The question is what are the most appropriate means to prevent and then stop ethnic barbarism. We should not all sink back to archaism in Europe by giving in to violence as a substitute to law and diplomacy. The picture I picked up in my years living with Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia – by the way as many as I lived with Croats and Bosniaks throughout the region – is of a complex mixture of defiance, pride, intransigence, fatalism and victimism. Slav blood and mythology combined with the legacy of communism and non-alignment. Namely dogmatism, authoritarianism and centralism, pride for ideological independence and suspicion against foreigners. A dangerous cult of personality is cherished, identifying the institution with the leader. Milosevic has been seen as the state, the Protector. My sense was that despite war fatigue, people were resigned to the idea that conflict was a natural status of life, uniforms and kalashnikov part of their mother’s milk. They seemed to live according to a non-written warrior code of conduct based on honour and prestige. They were saying that the West had entrusted them with the historical task to keep the Turks away from Vienna. They had succeeded. After the Austrian Empire had placed them in the Krajina – which means frontier regions – to fight the Ottomans, suddenly now the West wanted to create a Muslim state in the middle of Europe. They really could not understand Western support for Bosnia Herzegovina. They called the Bosniaks "the Turks" and talked about restoring the green line between Istanbul and Sarajevo. Paranoiac conspiracies for us, threatening plans for them. This was in Knin in 1993. Then one should distinguish. Belgrade, Sarajevo and other Yugoslav cities used to be cosmopolitan and have a cultivated Serb intelligentsia.

Already in 1992 Serb suspicion against Western peace policies was building up. They constantly shared with us in the field their resentment for feeling unfairly treated, blamed whatever happened. They felt more and more misunderstood and abandoned by the West accused of siding with Croatia. Then with Bosnia it went from bad to worse. You would hear all the time: "Why should we make gestures of good will. ... Whatever we do you blame us. We are always the bad guys". Krajina was indeed the forgotten war. The various Croatian army attacks from June 1992 throughout 1993 against Serbs in Krajina were overshadowed by the focus on Serbs disgraceful harassment of Croatian minorities. These Serbs claimed no one cared about them and their rights. When in late 1995 I was involved in setting up the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slovenia (UNTAES) to return this region on the Danube controlled by the Serbs back under Croatian authority, the Serbs inhabitants had the so-called Knin syndrome. "How can we trust Croatia after what they did in Krajina to our brothers?" Croatian military operation "Flash" in May 1995 and "Storm" in August 1995 against Western Slavonia and then Krajina in Croatia, what many called the liberation from Serb rebels, caused the uprooting of Serb life from Krajina and Western Slavonia. As all eyes were turned to the war in Bosnia where the Serbs were treated by some as "the enemy" of the West, the fate of the Serbs in Kraijna passed by almost unnoticed. We have yet to hear about indictments by ICTY for crimes in Krajina. All the Serbs were put in the same pot, authorities and people, Serbs from Pale and Serbs from Croatia.

The transition of authority in Sarajevo in March 1996 looked to me as a dramatic blow to hopes for a multi-ethnic Bosnia Herzegovina. The signal the Serbs perceived was "there is no life for us under Muslim Croat Federation ruling". They felt the international community did not lift a finger to prevent the sudden exodus of about 100.000 Serbs from Sarajevo suburbs, except for the High Representative of the International Conimunity, whose appeals remained unheard. Later, the progressive emptying over time of about 100.000 Serbs from Eastern Slavonia passed unnoticed, as since 1997, it was proclaimed publicly that UNTAES was a success story. Many of these thousands of refugees are now at risk in various parts of Serbia including Kosovo and Montenegro, where they have been living already as third class people. Many of the up to almost 200.000 Serbs living in Kosovo were refugees resettled from Krajina.

History does count. One deals with perceptions. No one can impose on a people our version of the truth. We have to claim respect of human rights, universal values and the rule of law. But in order to negotiate and achieve sustainable political solutions we also have to be even handed. It is also crucial to distinguish between people and their bad leaders. We cannot demonise a whole nation because they have bad leaders. We cannot punish a nation because of their communist leader and his wife stirring genuine fears to retain power. We tried over and over to convey the message to our leaders that the historical and psychological factors had to be taken into consideration if we wanted to facilitate dialogue between the parties, that blaming the Serbs would not help in building the climate of trust needed to engage talks. We preached that isolating and marginalizing them could be counterproductive. At that time we felt like green Martians. Now the pot is exploding. They were already saying in 1993 that they were being pushed against the wall and had nothing to loose.

Yes, their perspective is a strange perspective. Frankly they are good at shooting at their own feet. But it is a nation of about 10 million people, not only Milosevic and his wife. Let’s stop to divide the Balkans between bad guys and good guys. In the West we have a tendency to assume that the people of this region would or should think and behave the way we do. They do not. We do not accept it. What has now become the public perception that Serbs understand only force could also be misleading. Force can be indispensable to back diplomacy, counterproductive to replace diplomacy. Imposing peace by force does not result in long lasting solutions. So far there is no peace agreement for Kosovo. The Yugoslav Army would rather be defeated on a battlefield to defend their land than to capitulate in front of an ultimatum by foreign powers. But once they settle on a besieged mentality, it backlashes, confronting us with more intransigence and violence. Serb mythology cherishes martyrs as heroes. Only the respect of the basic legitimate rights of all people and the fair approach to all sides in the conflict can lead to sustainable peace.

As international diplomacy seeks strategies to end the war, I hope that the expected NATO "victory" will be defined in ways that will preserve credibility for all, and leave room for a nation to retain its dignity and hope for the future. Humiliating and deligitimizing a nation would worsen the long-term confrontation with the Serb people emerging from the current conflict. After the war, recovering from the total breakdown in confidence will be a long process. Opening up and reintegration in the world’s community will be the way to democracy. Further isolation and exclusion would lead to socio-economic implosion and fuel nationalism and totalitarism. We have to send the correct message right away if we are to contain an exodus of Serbs form Serbia, brain drain and economic refugees and further destabilisation of the region.

When I dare making these points in a world that has decided to demonise Serbs, it is not very popular. I lived through all I have shared here with you. I am not justifying the Serbs’ attitude. But MacCarthyism and crusades have not yet saved lives and promoted peace and reconciliation in the Balkan region. A Serb friend who remained in Sarajevo tbroughout the war used to tell me about the Serbs: "they are all crazy, there is something wrong about us". But they are our fellow Europeans and we should foresee in the long term to prepare the ground for opening our arms to include all the people of the region, including the Serb people in Europe.

We have agreed at this Colloquium that a long-term commitment in South-eastern Europe is necessary. Although I have doubts regarding our capabilities in carrying out a long-term plan, I believe that Italy and Germany are ready for such a step, and I hope that Europe as a whole is, too. My main doubts concern the US. The present US administration is committed to staying in Kosovo as long as an international presence is needed there. But during the last few weeks, I have heard many comments by American members of Congress, arguing that Europe should do more, especially in the field of defence, and at the same time complaining that Europe did not have the capabilities necessary for this. These criticisms are justified. But on the other hand, my former colleagues in the German Parliament told me that they tried to introduce a resolution in the North Atlantic Assembly in support of NATO’s action, but that the majority of the US Congress delegation rejected the adoption of any resolution to back NATO – and implicitly the American President – in this crisis.

Most Americans believe they have a tradition of bi-partisanship in foreign policy matters. They also claim that, in contrast to Europeans, they are not ideological. The fact is that the US Congress of today is guided more by ideology in moments of crisis, and that, often, Congressmen act in a more partisan way than most members of European Parliaments. Congress did not vote in favour of military participation in the Kosovo operation while a number of European Parliaments did so.

We cannot take it for granted that the American Congress will allow an indefinite continuation of its commitment in the Balkans. Two weeks ago I spoke to a number of conservative Republicans. I sensed that they were willing to take advantage of any weakness shown by the Administration on this issue. They accused the American Administration, on the one hand, of showing too much commitment and, on the other hand, of not completing the mission by achieving victory over Milosevic. If this is a correct observation, then Europe should try to engage the US as long and as much as possible in the Balkans, but it cannot be certain whether this commitment will last in the long-term.

My second point relates to the post 1980s debate over an American withdrawal from Europe. The current situation is totally different. The US is still present in Germany, in Italy, in Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo, Hungary and Macedonia. American attention has shifted towards South-eastern Europe; it is not primarily concerned with collective defence in the traditional sense, but about collective security, implying substantial deployments and a relatively large drain on resources. The American presence in Europe is greater than we had ever envisaged before 1989.

I doubt whether there is a consensus in the US on this kind of commitment. I suspect that if the American people had been asked in 1989 whether they would agree to such a presence in Europe ten years after the fall of the Wall, their answer would definitely have been: "no". Therefore, Europe and the US need to establish a consensus about the future US presence in Europe, to avoid the withdrawal of American forces at a later, critical, stage, e.g. during another crisis in the Middle East or in the Far East.

My third point concerns NATO. When I was younger, I was convinced that international institutions like NATO always intended to do what they finally achieved. I am now old enough to see that very often a "law of unintended consequences", as I would like to call it, applies: international institutions do something without having previously considered all its consequences.

An illustration of this was provided during the last NATO Summit in April of this year. At drafting stage a conflict emerged over whether or not to mention possible candidates for NATO membership (at the Madrid Summit, Romania and Slovenia had been mentioned). The compromise reached was that all the states that had sent in a letter asking for NATO membership would be named in the summit declaration. Thus, a policy line was defined without intention: all potential member states would be mentioned as enlargement candidates, but without any firm commitment: Romania, Bulgaria, Slovenia, the Baltic states were referred to and – due to the crisis – Albania and Macedonia. So, suddenly, a concrete area was defined for a possible NATO enlargement – without any concrete commitment. By coincidence, this area is identical (with the exception of Malta and Cyprus) to the area of the states that will soon start negotiations on EU membership.

This means we now have identical visions of the future geographical expansion of the European Union and of NATO. I do not know whether this was intentional or not.

It could give these countries a political vision for several years, without promising NATO membership, while engaging them more (by means of the Membership Action Programme) than we have been doing up to now with PfP programmes, as in Central Asia. This is possible because we have already gone beyond PfP: we are already responsible for the defence of Albania (which, in reality, surrendered its sovereignty regarding defence to NATO during the Kosovo crisis), we have overflight rights in Bulgaria and Romania, and we have made a conditional defence commitment in the case of Serbia attacking neighbouring countries.

During the Colloquium we discussed the Stability Pact. I would like to briefly comment on the usefulness of the Stability Pact, the Kosovo arrangement, ESDI and a new relationship between the EU and NATO. These institutional frameworks require new relationships, not only at the top level but also at working level. We should use this arrangement between WEU, EU and NATO for this purpose, as well as elements of the Stability Pact. A new relationship with the UN and the other institutions is developing in the Balkans.

As a consequence of Western and wider international action in South-eastern Europe after 1991, we have defined a new network of rather specific norms, institutions and procedures for the region. This is certainly true for actions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, for the creation of the Stability Pact, for the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, and for other instances of coordinated UN, NATO, OSCE or EU action in the region. The norms and procedures defined thereby are of a very specific nature. In many instances, they surpass the worldwide standards of international law in terms of preciseness, density of regulations and the degree to which they are obligatory in nature. Some would even call Bosnia and Kosovo quasi-protectorates of NATO.

There are a number of states in the Balkan region belonging to NATO; there is a somewhat different set of states belonging to the EU; and there are many more applicants for future membership of these two organisations. At the moment, the majority of the region’s states are members of neither of these two organisations. However, NATO and EU – each organisation in its own way – have legal rights in the region and are intervening decisively in its political and economic development. It is probably safe to say that NATO and EU actions are of greater relevance to the everyday life of a Balkan citizen than the actions of many of the states of the region. This is certainly true for the inhabitants of Bosnia and Kosovo. The same could be said, although to a lesser degree, about the actions of the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe in the region.

Interestingly, the actions taken recently by NATO and the EU in the Balkans have not been based on the usual terms of reference of these organisations, and were at least partly decided outside their integrated decision-making structures. As far as the EU is concerned, matters were decided through intergovernmental (i.e. CFSP) structures and not through the integrated, i.e. supranational EU decision-making system. In addition, applicant members usually associate themselves with these EU decisions by autonomous decision. In the case of NATO, matters are often not moved forward by discussions within the organisation itself, but by a "coalition of the willing" that encompasses the majority of NATO members, but often also includes candidates for membership, occasionally even Russia.

Such decision-making structures are, by definition, sub-optimal and transitory. They are not suited to addressing the problems of the region, which requires a more coherent, cooperative and integrated approach. In the long-term, this could lead to a change in the focus and decision-making structures of the organisations (i.e. EU and NATO) themselves.

Up to now, discussions on the future structures of the two organisations either focused on the enlargement issue or on the question of deepening their respective structures. While the first discussion was limited to the question of the organisations’ future external borders, the second discussion was of an inward-looking character.

These two categories do not correspond to present Balkan realities, where the enlargement issue and the discussion on inter-institutional decision-making structures are of secondary importance. What is at stake is the ability of these organisations to act outside their traditional terms of reference, which are implicitly based on traditional European political structures as they developed after 1945. What is needed today is, firstly, some form of rapid stability transfer to the region. Compared to this, the question of possible enlargement of EU and/or NATO to include parts or eventually the entire Balkans is secondary.

It is unclear yet whether these requirements will change the relationship of European nation-states to each other, the relationship between the EU and the US, between NATO and Russia and our visions of Europe and NATO. What is clear, however, is that they will add a new dimension to both the EU and NATO. These organisations will change. Also, their relationship with each other will become more cooperative and assume stronger elements of a division of labour.

Similar arguments apply to the OSCE. The OSCE functions well as long as there is consensus. Without consensus the Organisation neither disposes of the incentives nor of the deterrence capacities necessary to ensure implementation of its decisions. To a very great degree, the OSCE is based on the series of incentives provided by the EU or on the deterrent capability provided by NATO. The OSCE does function and does play a very important role, but its underlying framework relies on either NATO or the EU. In other words, NATO and the EU provide either the deterrent (threat of intervention) or the incentive (EU membership and economic assistance) that induce states to comply with OSCE demands and requirements.

Now to the question of the importance of EU-Russian and US-Russian relations. Someone said during the Colloquium that the Russians were always present in the Balkans. This is not quite true: today they are present in Bosnia and in Kosovo. Russia is an important component, but it is also part of an overall framework. In some situations it disposes of veto rights, but it does not constitute a threat and cannot shape conditions on the Balkans against our will. This is a completely different situation compared to last century and to the beginning of this century; Russia cannot be regarded as a dominant power in the Balkans – even less so today than before 1989. Therefore, I always remind people that, unlike before 1989, if our policies were only guided by short-sighted relative power considerations, we did not need to include Russia. It was our deliberate policy to do so, given the long-term importance of a constructive relationship with Russia. This implies a high degree of leeway in our relationship with Russia.

It is also very important to remember that we would find ourselves in a more difficult situation if the US withdrew from the Balkans and Russia stayed on. A Russian deployment in the Balkans without a corresponding US presence could indirectly change the European-American relationship by changing the European-Russian relationship. If the Americans were to leave Kosovo and Bosnia – and I hope they do not – they should not leave before Russia.

Now to Milosevic, Serbia and, last but not least, to Germany. I am very much in favour of entering into dialogue with the Serbs. Naturally, we have to try to separate the Serbs from Milosevic and his regime, even if they elected him. I would not define Serbia as a rogue state, but as a state with a bad government – a rogue state always implies an enemy state.

In Germany there are over 700.000 people who identify themselves as Yugoslavs. Many of them are now part of our society. Most of them are against Milosevic but remain very nationalistic. It would be a mistake to assume that all nationalist Serbs are pro-Milosevic and that everybody who is against Milosevic is a good guy. It is more complicated than that. In many European countries, and certainly in Germany, a trend towards engaging in dialogue with the Serbs is emerging. How can we distinguish between the regime and support for the people? However difficult, we have to make this distinction.

Underlying this discussion is a psychological change that Germany has experienced. Why were the Germans strongly opposed to Milosevic but not opposed to the Serbian people as a whole? Perhaps there is an element of collective memory. The Germans wrongly believe that the situation resembles Germany’s situation under Hitler, where Hitler was the "bad guy" while the innocent people suffered from Allied bombing. This is somehow being applied to the Serbian situation. But, in any case, it is good that there is no hate in Germany towards the Serb people.

There is currently a learning process underway in Germany regarding its future international role. A new generation of Germans is perhaps surprisingly aware of history, as the generation before them, but this awareness does not impede their confidence. This means that they cannot take history as a reliable guide on the appropriate political conduct in any given situation in present times. Rather, we now have to learn – and are about to learn – that Germany has to be more multilateral than other nations, especially more so than the US. If Germany takes on a greater role, it must also cooperate more with other European partners.

In conclusion, let me come back to US-German and US-European relations. The Americans, and especially Congress, will always be tempted to define their role as leaders as meaning that they make the decisions and we follow. If we want to change this in the long-term, it is very important for the European countries to be respected in the US. And in order to be respected we need a strong Europe. This means that the real problem is not the US’s strength but Europe’s weakness. We should not blame the Americans for something we have not achieved ourselves.

Secondly, the major European nations i.e. Germany, France and Britain, are always tempted to primarily engage in a bilateral dialogue with the US. I always say that our first priority is Europe and the nation-states only come second. I am very much in favour of a close relationship with the United States (Europe and the US are not drifting apart), but no individual European country should try to sacrifice Europe because of its relationship with the US. And furthermore, no European country should ever expect to lead Europe if it is willing to sacrifice Europe. And in that sense I look forward to a very constructive future relationship with the US.

Dana Allin (International Affairs, London)

Rosa Balfour (CeSPI, Rome)

Robert Barry (Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina)

Rose Bernstein (Liaison Officer USA, NATO Office of Information and Press)

Carlo Bellinzona (Director CeMiss, Rome)

Margaret Bliss (US Embassy, Rome)

Gianni Bonvicini (Director IAI, Rome)

Frédéric Bozo (IFRI, Paris)

Marie Janine Calic (SWP, Ebenhausen)

David Calleo (SAIS, Washington, DC)

Corrado Campobasso (ISDEE, Trieste)

Lucio Caracciolo (Limes, Rome)

Michael Clarke (King’s College, London)

Carmen Claudín (CIDOB, Barcelona)

Sophia Clement (WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris)

Anna Maria Corazza-Bildt (CEMiiS, Stockholm)

Christopher Cviic (RIIA, London)

Marta Dassù (Director CeSPI, Foreign Affairs Adviser to Italy’s Prime Minister)

Marco De Andreis (Cabinet of European Commissioner Emma Bonino, Brussels)

Staffan De Mistura (Director of the UN Information Centre for Italy)

Nicola de Santis (Liaison Officer Italy and Officer for Southern Eastern Mediterranean Countires, NATO Office of Information and Press, Brussels)

Michael Emerson (CEPS, Brussels)

Tito Favaretto (Director ISDEE, Trieste)

Ettore Greco (IAI, Rome)

Carlo Jean (Representative of the OSCE Chairman, Vienna)

Stephen Heintz (EastWest Institute, New York)

François Heisbourg (Chairman, Centre for Security Policy, Geneva)

Catherine Kelleher (Director Aspen Institute, Berlin)

Stephen Larrabee (RAND, Washington)

Guido Lenzi (Director WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris)

Klaus Lindenberg (Director Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Rome)

Peter Ludlow (Director CEPS, Brussels)

Roberto Menotti (CeSPI, Rome)

Cesare Merlini (President, IAI)

Antonio Missiroli (WEU Institute for Security Studies, Paris)

John Roper (University of Birmingham)

Alexander Ruck Keene (SAIS, Washington DC)

Andrea Segré (University of Bologna)

Stefano Silvestri (IAI, Rome)

Richard Sklar (Special Representative of the US President and the Secretary of State for the Southeast Europe Initiative)

Radoslava Stefanova (IAI, Rome)

Eric Terzuolo (US Embassy, Rome)

Karsten Voigt (Co-ordinator for German-American Cooperation, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Germany)

Monika Wolfeld (Conflict Prevention Centre, OSCE, Vienna)

Susan Woodward (Brookings Institution, Washington)

Mario Zucconi (University of Urbino)